As soon as India attained freedom in 1947, the fundamental problem facing her was internal and not external. Naturally, the Indian leaders were concerned more about her domestic problems than foreign. The communal disturbances which immediately followed the partition of the country, made it difficult for the Government to maintain law and order in certain parts. Moreover, the economic situation went from bad to worse after independence. Free India had to tackle the tremendous problem of providing her vast population with the necessities of life, like food, clothing and housing. The Government of India was fully aware of these difficulties and the economic weakness of the country. It was under these circumstances that the leaders of free India had to determine the objectives of India's foreign policy. The difficult situation at home and the desirability of obtaining economic and technical assistance from abroad, made the pursuit of peace one of the great objectives of India's foreign policy. Other objectives were to work for the ending of colonialism and Imperialism throughout the world and the elimination of racial discrimination. In order to carry out these objectives successfully, the statesmen of India felt that they must give full support to the United Nations and follow an independent foreign policy. But India decided to continue her historical connections with the Commonwealth of Nations because she owed common allegiance to a particular way of life and ideal of State and Government. With regard to her policies in the Far East, India developed friendly relations with Communist China. She was one of the first countries who recognised the People's Republic of China. Although these friendly relations were disturbed in 1950 over Tibet, India continued to press for the representation of Communist China in the U.N. Nevertheless, she seems to be aware of the principal potential threat of this large neighbour to her security. For this reason, and others, India wishes to see Japan a strong sovereign state in Asia. In the case of Korean problem, India supported the U.N. action branding the North Koreans as aggressors, but she could not send any economic and military support. However an ambulance and surgical unit was sent to join the U.N. forces. As soon as the United Nations forces pushed the aggressor back across the 38th Parallel, the issue, according to Indian leaders, was no more an issue of resistance to aggression. From this time on India was reluctant to support any such action of U.N. which might prolong and extend the conflict. At the same time she began to work for some kind of peaceful solution of the Korean situation. Although she could not succeed in obtaining her objective completely, negotiations between the parties in dispute did begin which brightened the prospects for peace. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

A thesis submitted in fulfilment to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, 2018 / One of the key challenges facing the international community in the 21st Century is the shift of the global balance of power from West to East. The rise of the “Emerging Powers” of China and India, as well as the increasing importance of energy security globally, have converged to make the security of the sea lane of communication across the Indian Ocean crucial to the maintenance of international peace and security. South Africa as a littoral state to the Indian Ocean, sitting on a key trade route, namely the Cape of Good Hope sea lane, and with a viable navy, will be affected by these shifts as they take place, as will the rest of the Indian Ocean region’s states. As a new balance of power emerges, states will need to decide whether it is in their national interests to align against the global superpower, the United States of America, or to bandwagon with them. However, this is not simply a choice between the established status quo power of the United States and the new emerging global powers of India and China. The choice is complicated by the emerging geopolitical competition between China and India as each struggle to assert their vision for the regional integration of the Indo-Pacific on the region. While neutrality is currently an option, should the regional tensions result in a conflict between India and China, that may be a luxury that states littoral to the Indian Ocean, such as South Africa, can ill afford / MT 2019

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of Government and Public Administration

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India’s foreign policy behaviour often challenges conventional theories of international relations (IR). Why for instance, did India wait 24 years after its first nuclear test to conduct another test? In the wake of its nuclear tests, why did the political leadership highlight the scientific achievements more than the military implications and why did it characterise India’s nuclear program as being unique in terms of its restraint and its commitment to total disarmament? Why did India engage in a discourse of friendship with China rather than adopt the anti-communist stance of other democratic states? These are just some of the questions that cannot be adequately explained by the positivist and ahistorical traditions of IR that down-play the connection between state identity and foreign policy or analyse foreign policy as the product of pre-existing realities, subjectivities and interpretive dispositions. An approach that takes into account the historical and cultural context of the construction of state identity however, offers a fuller understanding of India’s foreign policy behaviour. Using genealogy and the idea of identity performativity, this thesis analyses India’s foreign policy discourse as a representational practice which, through various codings of sex, gender and race, enacts India’s postcolonial identity. The thesis uses the findings of five case studies – India’s relationship with China, its nuclear politics, its relations with its South Asian neighbours and its interventions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka – to suggest that a deep ambivalence toward Western modernity lies at the heart of India’s postcolonial identity and, therefore, the foreign policy discourse that enacts it. This ambivalence arises because, on the one hand, Indian nationalists accepted colonial narratives in which the backwardness of ‘Indian civilisation’ led to its degeneration, but on the other hand, they recognised the need to advance a critique of Western modernity and its deep imbrication with colonialism. The result is a striving for a postcolonial modernity that is not only imitative but strives to be distinctly different and superior to Western modernity by being culturally and morally grounded. Thus, India is fashioned as a postcolonial civilisational-state that brings to international affairs a tradition of morality and ethical conduct which it derives from its civilisational heritage. This thesis argues that in order to comprehend the apparently inexplicable aspects of Indian foreign policy it is crucial to understand this self-fashioning. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008

India’s foreign policy behaviour often challenges conventional theories of international relations (IR). Why for instance, did India wait 24 years after its first nuclear test to conduct another test? In the wake of its nuclear tests, why did the political leadership highlight the scientific achievements more than the military implications and why did it characterise India’s nuclear program as being unique in terms of its restraint and its commitment to total disarmament? Why did India engage in a discourse of friendship with China rather than adopt the anti-communist stance of other democratic states? These are just some of the questions that cannot be adequately explained by the positivist and ahistorical traditions of IR that down-play the connection between state identity and foreign policy or analyse foreign policy as the product of pre-existing realities, subjectivities and interpretive dispositions. An approach that takes into account the historical and cultural context of the construction of state identity however, offers a fuller understanding of India’s foreign policy behaviour. Using genealogy and the idea of identity performativity, this thesis analyses India’s foreign policy discourse as a representational practice which, through various codings of sex, gender and race, enacts India’s postcolonial identity. The thesis uses the findings of five case studies – India’s relationship with China, its nuclear politics, its relations with its South Asian neighbours and its interventions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka – to suggest that a deep ambivalence toward Western modernity lies at the heart of India’s postcolonial identity and, therefore, the foreign policy discourse that enacts it. This ambivalence arises because, on the one hand, Indian nationalists accepted colonial narratives in which the backwardness of ‘Indian civilisation’ led to its degeneration, but on the other hand, they recognised the need to advance a critique of Western modernity and its deep imbrication with colonialism. The result is a striving for a postcolonial modernity that is not only imitative but strives to be distinctly different and superior to Western modernity by being culturally and morally grounded. Thus, India is fashioned as a postcolonial civilisational-state that brings to international affairs a tradition of morality and ethical conduct which it derives from its civilisational heritage. This thesis argues that in order to comprehend the apparently inexplicable aspects of Indian foreign policy it is crucial to understand this self-fashioning. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008

This study presents an overview of Indo-Soviet relations in light of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition for a favorable position in relations with India. Both superpowers consider better relations with India to be crucial to the furtherance of their interests in the Indian Ocean region. The study provides background information on Indo-Soviet diplomacy, with emphasis on the period 1968-1976m during which the Soviets gained their greatest influence in the region. This period also represents the nadir of Indo-American relations, although India formally maintained a policy of non-alignment with either of the two superpowers. Conclusions are drawn about India's role as a non-aligned nation, its relations with the superpowers, and its quest for regional influence.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences. / Department of Government and Public Administration

No description available.