The Soviet-U.S. rapprochement in the late 1980s ended one of the bitterest rivalries of modern history. Before this landmark event, the study of accommodation as a security strategy hardly received its fair share of attention in international relations theories. This thesis attempts to add to the growing body of work on the dynamics of accommodation. Specifically, it analyzes accommodative moves of Pakistan vis-a-vis India, thereby studying the dynamics of accommodation in the context of developing states. Four cases are studied in depth: first, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960); second, the Tashkent Declaration (1966); third, Post-Brasstacks Accommodative Moves (1987); and finally, Post-1990 Accommodative Moves. This thesis argues that three factors are particularly important in the initiation of accommodation in the developing world, namely, (1) decision-makers' desire to minimize losses (in the external politico-military sphere, the internal economic sphere and the internal political sphere), (2) their commitment to serious domestic reforms and (3) the involvement of a powerful third party that exercises leverage over both adversaries.

The overall aim of this thesis is to explore what emigration state power means in relation to the rules that govern international migration. This thesis challenges the conventional view that within a bilateral migration relationship the migrant-sending state is a 'rule-taker' compelled to accept the consequences of the migrant-receiving state's immigration and integration policies. Using India-Canada migration relations as its empirical case, this thesis examines how diaspora populations can serve as a transnational resource for the sending state to mitigate power asymmetries with the receiving state in bilateral migration relations. Part I of this thesis examines the Indo- Canadian diaspora's use of Canadian tribunal, electoral and lobby channels to advance immigration and integration policy outcomes that further both the interests of the diaspora and the Indian state. Part II considers the diffuse and ideational mechanisms through which the Indian state influences the diaspora's political mobilisation abroad. The diaspora's political activities in the host state, combined with the sending state's transnational influence over facets of diaspora identity, interests and organisational capacity, register important effects on Canadian migration policy that bear on the distribution of power between sending and receiving states. These effects cannot be explained on a purely inter-state model of migration relations, but are accounted for by the framework developed and applied in this thesis. The Conclusion addresses the scope conditions under which this thesis' theoretical framework and conclusions derived within it from the single-case study may allow for a wider comparative approach across other cases in future research.

Orientador: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T06:35:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cardozo_SandraAparecida_D.pdf: 1886884 bytes, checksum: c3002679902720555baacb3bc3f9709a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Este trabalho analisa como a interação entre Brasil e Índia nos anos 2000 tem relação com as trajetórias autonomistas dos dois países. Apoiado no construtivismo para execução do desenvolvimento do estudo, as políticas internacionais de cada um dos países são apresentadas, inicialmente, no decorrer de um longo período, incluindo o da Guerra Fria, onde se percebem os princípios, ideias e identidades autonomistas e críticas à estruturação do poder mundial. Na mesma perspectiva, a análise caminha para a exposição de posturas e atuações de Brasil e Índia, no mundo pós-Guerra Fria, e demonstra perante as mudanças das políticas internacionais de cada um, a preservação de posturas autonomistas, a defesa do multilateralismo e a participação dos países em desenvolvimento nas instâncias decisórias internacionais. Por fim, são expostas as principais formas de interações entre Brasil e Índia e suas posturas concertadas sobre grandes temas da agenda internacional. Argumenta-se que a aproximação entre Índia e Brasil, nos últimos anos, advém do conhecimento que cada país tem um do outro, da defesa de valores dos países em desenvolvimento, ou seja, a convergência de identidades que alavancam novas idéias e interesses. Estes elementos, então, contribuem para a reconfiguração da identidade sul no mundo pós-Guerra Fria / Abstract: This paper analyzes how the interaction between Brazil and India in the 2000s is related to the autonomous trajectories of the two countries. Based on the constructivism as to execute the development of the study, the international policies of each country are presented, initially, over a long period, including the Cold War, in which we can meet the principles, ideas, autonomous identities and some critics to the structuring of world power. Under the same perspective, the analysis moves to the exposure of Brazil and India postures and performances in the post-Cold War context and it demonstrates before the changes of the international policy of each one the preservation of autonomy postures, the defense of multilateralism and the developing countries participation in international decision-makers. Finally, it exposes the main forms of interactions between India and Brazil and their postures, arranged within major topics of the international agenda. It is argued that the nearness of India and Brazil in recent years comes from the knowledge each country has from one another, from the defense of values in developing countries, i.e. the convergence of identities that leverage new ideas and interests. These elements then contribute to the reconfiguration of southern identity in the post-Cold War era / Doutorado / Ciencia Politica / Doutor em Ciência Política

The purpose of this thesis is to study and analyse the development of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the effect of their respective outlooks upon the various proposals for settlement brought forward by the United Nations or their own leaders, and the reasons for each subsequent failure to resolve the eighteen year deadlock. Twelve years ago, Michael Brecher concluded in The Struggle for Kashmir that both India and Pakistan had economic, strategic and political interests in the State; and of the three, those brought about by the two-nation theory and the conflicting religious and secular policies were deemed to be the most important. While one cannot disagree with Brecher's general conclusions, this writer feels that the specific importance of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan at any given time is not a constant factor but instead has been influenced by contemporary foreign and domestic events and has been in a perpetual state of change. What was considered of primary importance in 1947, therefore, does not necessarily hold the same position today. Indeed, to single out one factor as the reason for the continuation of the dispute would not only be inopportune, but incorrect. Because of the very nature of the dispute and its international and domestic.characteristics, one is faced by a plethora of material - including White Papers on correspondence; over one hundred Security Council debates; many pamphlets and some thousands of diplomatic newsletters. It has been necessary, therefore, to sift through all available evidence and to extract only that which is pertinent to the topic. It must be realized that because of the importance of Kashmir to both India and Pakistan;, all the information from governmental sources or written by their nationals contains the type of material calculated to present their case in the best possible light. Thus it becomes necessary in many cases - the Pathan incursions in October 1947, the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks and the Mohammed All-Nehru discussions, and the essence of the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah proposals for federation - to read between the lines in order to trace developments. In the early stages of the dispute, one can sympathize with Pakistan's claim to Kashmir and her efforts to obtain a "free and impartial plebiscite." Unlike India, she accepted every practical proposal brought forward to settle the dispute. Although neither India nor Pakistan produced a statesman capable of resolving the deadlock, the former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, must be singled out as the major contributor to the continuation of the dispute. It was not that his actions were incomparable with his Pakistani counterparts; but rather that as a statesman of such magnitude, willing to solve the world's problems - with or without invitation he could adopt a self-righteous "Babu" attitude when dealing with the State. Indeed, Nehru appears to have become emotionally incapable of treating Pakistan as an equal; hence the dispute continued in deadlock. India's intransigence has continued in open defiance of the United Nations and in complete contradiction to her earlier promises for self-determination in Kashmir. Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan, in her effort to gain international support for her Kashmir policy, has virtually talked - herself out of any claim to the State, one can now sympathize with the Indian position. It is not that India is more right today than eighteen years ago, but rather that her interest in the State - originally a prestige issue - has now degenerated to the point where a plebiscite could possibly mean her internal collapse through the onslaught of communalism. She accepted and held Kashmir as a showplace for secularism and for the prestige offered by its geographic location; today she controls a monster within which could lie the seeds of her own destruction. The point of view taken in this thesis, therefore, is that the existing stalemate appears to be the only practical solution to the Kashmir dilemma, and that history may prove Nehru's negative attitude towards Kashmir to have been correct. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that the voice of Kashmiri nationalism has yet to be taken into account. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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India's nonalignment policy attracted the attention of many newly independent countries for it provided an alternative to the existing American and Russian views of the world. This dissertation is an examination of both India's nonalignment policy and the official American reaction to it during the Truman-Eisenhower years. Indian nonalignment should be defined as a policy of noncommitment towards rival power blocs adopted with a view of retaining freedom of action in international affairs and thereby influencing the issue of war and peace to India's advantage. India maintained that the Cold War was essentially a European problem. Adherence to military allliances , it believed, would increase domestic tensions and add to chances of involvement in international war, thus destroying hopes of socio-economic reconstruction of India. The official American reaction was not consistent. It varied from president to president, from issue to issue, and from time to time. India's stand on various issues of international import and interest to the United States such as recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Korean War, the Japanese peace treaty of 1951, and the Hungarian revolt of 1956, increased American concern about and dislike of nonalignment. Many Americans in high places regraded India's nonalignment policy as pro-Communist and as one that sought to undermine Western collective security measures. Consequently, during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies the United States took a series of diplomatic, military, and economic measures to counter India's neutralism. America refused to treat India as a major power and attempted to contain its influence on the international plane by excluding it from international conferences and from assuming international responsibilities. The Russian efforts to woo India and other nonaligned countries with trade and aid softened America's open resistance to India's nonalignment. As a result, although tactical, a new trend in America's dealings with India was visible during the closing years of Eisenhower's presidency. Therefore, America sought to keep nonaligned India at least nonaligned by extending economic aid.

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