This thesis applies the analytical concept of political culture to politics in the Indonesian context. The term "Javanization" is used to describe the process whereby ethnic Javanese and Javanized individuals gradually became the overwhelming and disproportionate majority of the governing elite in the post-independence era. It is further argued that the dominance in terms of numbers has led to the Javanization of Indonesian conceptions of state and limits of political behavior. The first chapter surveys other theories of Indonesian politics and makes a proposal for a cultural theory. The cultural cleavages in Indonesian society in the horizontal plane are described and a description of the government of Mataram operating in a totally Javanese environment is given. The changing roles of the primary bearers of Javanese political culture and the nature of the state are discussed. Chapter Two interprets post-independence political history from the perspective of increasing Javanization and the gradual loss of national political influence by non-Javanese Islamic political elements. Data on the ethnic composition of the contemporary military, governmental and political elite are presented. Chapter Three is a discussion of contemporary (1959 to I972) Indonesian government and politics using the same conceptual framework (structure, functions and style) as is used to discuss Mataram. Some similarities and dis-similarities are pointed out. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the future of Javanization. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Note: / In the history of Islam in Indonesia, the Islamic movement of Nahdlatul Ulama may be regarded as a unique one. A bit more than a quarter of a century ago it rose to face “the endangering elements” from reformist-modernist group who introduced and carried on the ideas of Abduh and Al Afghani in Indonesia. The N. U. suspected that this group intended not only to lead Indonesian Islam away from the idea and principles of mazhabite teachings, but also to weaken the traditional position of ulama in the ymmat society. From one angle, the N.U. movement, therefore, was similar to the one of the Azharite ulama which fiercely opposed the new ideas carried out by the two leading figures mentioned above. The pages of the history of Islam in Indonesia since then may be said to have been 'decorated' by conflicts and reconciliations between these two blocs. Actions and reactions from both sides will continue so long a s the two ideological and Weltanschauung generators rotate on different axes.

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The 'New Order' government, under President Suharto's leadership, has undertaken different initiatives in the face of both 'political' Islam and 'religious' Islam in Indonesia. Since coming into power in 1966, it has exercised strict control over 'political' Islam; on the other hand, its attitude towards 'religious' Islam has generally been tolerant and even supportive. The result has been a considerable weakening of Islamic political forces but a rapidly developing 'religious' Islam. This reality has forced the present-day generation of Indonesian Muslim thinkers to take an approach which is different from that of the previous generation in responding to the government's policies towards Islam. Unlike their predecessors, some of whom had too ideological and formalistic a conception of an Islamic state, the present Muslim thinkers take an approach which is for the most part politically non-partisan. There has been a growing tendency among them to denounce the efficacy of Islamic political parties. They see that the realization of an Islamic community and the well-being of the ummah will come about not through exclusive and uncompromising political actions but through socioeconomic and cultural means and the ability to be less exclusive and willing to work with those who share different ideas. As a result of efforts along these lines, the relationship between the Muslim community and the government has improved substantially. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether or not this developing 'religious' Islam will, at some future date, be transformed into a powerful 'political' Islam.

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This study describes how the New Order regime created and used a particular version of the Indonesian past. This official past drew on the work of "the history industry" (archaeological and historical research) and is reflected in approved works of history writing. The New Order past can also be seen in textbooks and in what monuments the regime erected. The New Order chose to emphasize fourteenth century Majapahit empire; this hierarchical, Java-centred, Hindu empire was identified as the true ancestor of the present nation. Although Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim in population, subsequent Muslim advances were not stressed, except as part of the "palace culture" of Central Java, which was seen as an extension of Majapahit. Islam also provided its share of "national heroes" who fought against the Dutch colonialists. Dutch control, was looked upon with some ambiguity; the colonial regime was oppressive but it also provided stability. The Dutch were driven out during the 1945--1949 Revolution. The New Order gave credit for the Indonesian victory in this struggle to the military rather than to civilians such as Sukarno. The Revolution later took on a more radical character that culminated in an attempt on the part of the Indonesian Communist Party to seize power. The suppression of the September 30 Movement in 1965 was seen as a righting of the nation's proper path of development, a course that could in fact be traced back to Gajah Mada's Majapahit. Not all were impressed with this official history. A more Islamic "history in waiting," which differed significantly from that of the regime, was created by historians and archaeologists working within the New Order. This "ummat-oriented" past stressed long connections between Indonesia and the rest of the Muslim world. The New Order's past was used to foster national integration and the legitimacy of the regime itself. The fate of the Suharto Presidency might indicate that the past was utiliz

This thesis investigates the role played by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a traditionalist Islamic organization established by K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari in 1926, in the development of Indonesian nationalism, elaborating in particular on its activities under the New Order (1980s and 1990s) after it implemented the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties, social and mass organizations. As the largest Muslim traditionalist organization in Indonesia, the NU was originally founded to protect and promote the interests of Muslim traditionalists, who loyally followed the school of Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah. The doctrines of the latter school are shown here to have largely influenced the organization's dealings both culturally, religiously and politically. / In order to fully understand the NUs view of Indonesian nationalism, this thesis examines the three phases of Indonesian nationalism, beginning with the rise of this organization, its involvement in the formation of the Indonesian state and its ideology, and the period after the country stipulated the sole foundation of Pancasila. It is from these three phases of Indonesian nationalism that this thesis shows the significance role played by the NU during the 1980s and 1990s. The NUs example in accepting the Pancasila as its sole basis served as an inspiration to other social and mass organizations in the country and represented one of its major contributions to the nation's welfare.

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