This thesis examines and explains the development of the KEF between its formation in 1970 and 2003. Using a historical and case study approach, the thesis analyses the strategic behaviours of the KEF. The guiding questions shaping this thesis are drawn from the intersection of resource dependence theory and the literature on employer associations. In response to these questions, chronological narrative explains the development of Korea's political economy and industrial relations between 1970 and 2003 as it affected the KEF. It pays particular attention to the growth of the chaebols -- family-owned and controlled business conglomerates -- as political as well as economic forces, their changing relations with government and their labour management strategies. This thesis argues that when Korea's chaebol owners formed their association, the KEF, they did so in the absence of immediate clear or concrete challenges to their business interests. Instead, they evaluated the likelihood of some future external challenges and chose to act on these perceptions. In particular, they strategically chose to prepare for the possible re-emergence of an independent labour movement many years into the future rather than trust forever in governments? repressive systems of labour control. Resource dependence theory proved useful for examining the KEF's internal dynamics. The KEF and its chaebol members were linked through asymmetric inter-dependence. The chaebols dominated KEF membership, took financial responsibility for KEF operations and formally ruled through its governance structure. The KEF's high dependence on the chaebols inhibited any shift away from its chaebol-dominated profile. This also meant that the KEF leadership found it extremely difficult to exert control over member firms' behaviour. However, as the relationship between the chaebols and their external environment changed, internal power resources (industrial relations expertise) and external ones (a militant union movement, tripartite arrangements) helped the KEF Secretariat increase its authority. This allowed it to achieve greater discretionary power in its internal and external domains.

This thesis examines and explains the development of the KEF between its formation in 1970 and 2003. Using a historical and case study approach, the thesis analyses the strategic behaviours of the KEF. The guiding questions shaping this thesis are drawn from the intersection of resource dependence theory and the literature on employer associations. In response to these questions, chronological narrative explains the development of Korea's political economy and industrial relations between 1970 and 2003 as it affected the KEF. It pays particular attention to the growth of the chaebols -- family-owned and controlled business conglomerates -- as political as well as economic forces, their changing relations with government and their labour management strategies. This thesis argues that when Korea's chaebol owners formed their association, the KEF, they did so in the absence of immediate clear or concrete challenges to their business interests. Instead, they evaluated the likelihood of some future external challenges and chose to act on these perceptions. In particular, they strategically chose to prepare for the possible re-emergence of an independent labour movement many years into the future rather than trust forever in governments? repressive systems of labour control. Resource dependence theory proved useful for examining the KEF's internal dynamics. The KEF and its chaebol members were linked through asymmetric inter-dependence. The chaebols dominated KEF membership, took financial responsibility for KEF operations and formally ruled through its governance structure. The KEF's high dependence on the chaebols inhibited any shift away from its chaebol-dominated profile. This also meant that the KEF leadership found it extremely difficult to exert control over member firms' behaviour. However, as the relationship between the chaebols and their external environment changed, internal power resources (industrial relations expertise) and external ones (a militant union movement, tripartite arrangements) helped the KEF Secretariat increase its authority. This allowed it to achieve greater discretionary power in its internal and external domains.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 251-262).