I investigate the information content in the implied volatility spread, which is the spread in implied volatilities between a pair of call and put options with the same strike price and time-to-maturity. By constructing the implied volatility time series for each stock, I show that stocks with larger implied volatility spreads tend to have higher future returns during 2003-2013. I also find that even volatilities implied from untraded options contain such information about future stock performance. The trading strategy based on the information contained in the actively traded options does not necessarily outperform its counterpart derived from the untraded options. This is inconsistent with the previous research suggesting that the information contained in the implied volatility spread largely results from the price pressure induced by informed trading in option markets. Further analysis suggests that option illiquidity is associated with the implied volatility spread, and the magnitude of this spread contains information about the risk-neutral distribution of the underlying stock return. A larger spread is associated with smaller risk-neutral variance, more negative risk-neutral skewness, and seemingly larger risk-neutral kurtosis, and this association is primarily driven by the systematic components in risk-neutral higher moments. I design a calibration study which reveals that the non-normality of the underlying risk-neutral return distribution relative to the Brownian motion can give rise to the implied volatility spread through the channel of early exercise premium.

This thesis examines the informational efficiency of the European carbon market based on the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The issue is approached from three different perspectives. I explore whether the volatility embedded in carbon options is a rational forecast of subsequently realized volatility. Then, I investigate if, and to what extent, new information about the structural and institutional set-up of the market impacts the carbon price dynamics. Lastly, I examine whether the European carbon market is relevant for the firm valuations of covered companies. First, perhaps because the market is new and derivatives’ trading on emission allowances has only started recently, carbon options have not yet been extensively studied. By using data on options traded on the European Climate Exchange, this thesis examines an aspect of market efficiency which has been previously overlooked. Market efficiency suggests that, conditional upon the accuracy of the option pricing model, implied volatility should be an unbiased and efficient forecast of future realized volatility (Campbell et al., 1997). Black (1976) implied volatility and implied volatility estimates directly surveyed from market participants are used in this thesis to study the information content of carbon options. Implied volatility is found to be highly informative and directionally accurate in forecasting future volatility. There is no evidence, however, that volatility embedded in carbon options is an unbiased and efficient forecast of future realized volatility. Instead, historical volatility-based forecasts are shown to contain incremental information to implied volatility, particularly for short-term forecasts. In addition, this thesis finds no evidence that directly surveyed implied volatility estimates perform better as a forecast of future volatility relative to Black’s (1976) estimates. Second, the market sensitivity to announcements about the organizational and institutional set-up of the EU ETS is re-examined. Despite their importance for the carbon price formation, demand-side announcements and announcements about the post-2012 framework have not yet been researched. By examining a very comprehensive and updated dataset of announcements, this thesis adds to the earlier works of Miclaus et al. (2008), Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Lepone et al. (2011). Market participants are found to rationally incorporate new information about the institutional and regulatory framework of the emissions trading scheme into the carbon price dynamics. However, they seem to be unable to accurately assess the implications of inter-temporal banking and borrowing on pricing futures contracts with different maturities. The impact of macroeconomic conditions on the market responsiveness is investigated by splitting the dataset into subsamples according to two alternative methods: 1) a simple split into pre-crisis and full-crisis time periods, and 2) according to a Bai-Perron structural break test. Evidence is found that in the context of economic slowdown and known allowances oversupply, the relationship between the carbon price and its fundamentals (institutional announcements, energy prices and extreme weather) breaks down. These findings are consistent with the arguments in Hintermann (2010), Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) and Koop and Tole (2011) that carbon price drivers change in response to the differing context of the individual trading periods. Third, the role of carbon performance in firm valuation is understudied. Since companies were not obliged to disclose their carbon emissions prior to the launch of the EU ETS, there exists little empirical evidence of the effect of carbon performance on market value. Earlier studies of the European carbon market have only focused on the impact of ETS compliance on the profitability and competitiveness of covered companies (e.g. Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008). There is also little research on how the newly available emissions data has altered the carbon performance of companies. This thesis addresses these gaps in the literature by examining the stock price reactions of British and German firms on the day of verified emissions release under the EU ETS over the period 2006 – 2011. An event study is conducted using a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model to deal with the event clustering present in the dataset. Limited evidence is found that investors use information about the carbon performance of companies in their valuations. The information contained in the carbon emissions reports is shown to be somewhat more important for companies with high carbon-intensive operations. This thesis finds no conclusive evidence that the cap-and-trade programme has been able to provide regulated companies with enough incentives to de-carbonize their operations. The market does not punish companies which continue to emit carbon at increasing rates or reward companies which improve their carbon performance. In brief, the results of the thesis suggest that the market is not fully efficient yet. Inefficiently priced carbon options may allow for arbitrage trades in the market. The inability of investors to incorporate rules on inter-temporal banking and borrowing of allowances across the different trading periods leads to significant price reactions when there should be none. A recessionary economic environment and a known oversupply of emission allowances have led to a disconnect between the carbon price and its fundamental drivers. And, lastly, the signal embedded in the carbon price is not strong enough to invoke investor action and turn carbon performance into a standard component of investment analysis.

This paper uses survey data by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) from 1991-2013 to test the role that institutional ownership has on the relative informational efficiency of stock prices in the Hang Seng Index, using the R2 of stock prices as a measurement of efficiency. This paper finds that on the aggregate level, the presence of institutional ownership is positively associated with R2, reflecting a negative effect on the level of information incorporated into stock prices. However, in isolating foreign institutions, the relationship with R2 reverses, and I find a positive correlation with the informational efficiency of stock prices. Moreover, this paper finds that a period characterized by high growth in institutional shareholding does not necessarily correspond to a greater level of improvement in the informational environment of stock markets. The results however, lack significance, perhaps due to the shortcomings of the survey data which is limited to 21 annual observations when incorporating a t-1 year lag. With more observations we would expect a substantial increase in the significance of the coefficient on our explanatory variables.

Cette thèse a pour but de présenter le marché des paris sportifs plus précisément de montrer en quoi ce dernier constitue un cadre d'observations simplifié suffisamment proche des marchés boursiers pour tester la théorie de l'efficience informationnelle et aboutir à des conclusions unanimes concernant sa validité empirique. En premier lieu, nous concentrons notre attention sur la forme faible de l'efficience informationnelle et plus précisément sur une anomalie connue sous le nom du Favourite Longshot Bias, qui a été recensée aussi bien dans le cadre des paris sportifs que celui des marchés boursiers. A l'aide d’un vaste échantillon de données, nous démontrons que les coûts de transaction et les préférences des parieurs ont un impact significatif sur le niveau des cotes proposées par les bookmakers et donc sur la structure des prix. Par ailleurs, nous discutons de la rationalité des parieurs et nous montrons en quoi le comportement des parieurs n’est pas si différent de celui des investisseurs sur les marchés boursiers. En second lieu, nous analysons en détails la forme forte de l'efficience informationnelle et plus précisément la pertinence de la fourchette en tant qu'indicateur de délits d'initiés dans le cadre des paris sportifs. / The aim of this thesis is to introduce the sports betting market, and more precisely to show how this market forms a simplified framework for observations, close enough to stock markets to test the informational efficiency theory, and lead to unanimous conclusions about its empirical validity. Firstly, we focus on the weak form of informational efficiency and more particularly on an anomaly known as the Favourite Longshot Bias, which was listed in sports betting markets, as well as in stock markets. Thanks to a vast data sample, we prove that transaction costs and bettors’ preferences have a significant impact on odds fixed by bookmakers, and consequently on prices’ structure. Moreover, we also discuss bettors’ rationality and we show how bettors’ behaviour is not so different from that of investors in the stock markets. Secondly, we provide a detailed analysis of the strong form of informational efficiency and more precisely of the spread as an indicator of insider trading in the sports betting market.

Après avoir proposé un cadre général des opérations de fusion‐acquisition, notamment en tant que processus créateur de valeur, nous examinons empiriquement les effets de leur annonce au travers de trois essais. Premièrement, nous étudions les réactions intra‐journalières des investisseurs lors d’annonces diffusées aux États‐Unis. Nous trouvons des gains pour la cible, alors que l’impact s'avère neutre pour l’acquéreur. Ces résultats se déroulent dans une activité de marché soutenue, conjointement à une amélioration de la liquidité. Deuxièmement, nous étendons l’analyse aux concurrents des acquéreurs et des cibles. Considérant le marché canadien, la diffusion de l’information affecte négativement leurs rivaux. Troisièmement, nous soulignons les conditions sous lesquelles les dirigeants écoutent les marchés financiers. Analysant un échantillon d’acquisitions françaises, nous montrons que les dirigeants connectés sont plus enclins à réaliser une acquisition en dépit d’une réaction négative des marchés financiers lors de l’annonce. / After providing a general framework of merger‐acquisition, in particular as value‐creating process, we examine empirically the effects of their announcement through three essays. First, we study the intraday market reactions to announcements in the United‐States. We find gains for target firms, while acquiring firms do not earn significant abnormal returns. These results occur in a high trading activity and animprovement of liquidity. Second, we extend the analysis to the competitors of merging firms. Considering the Canadian evidence, the release of information affects negatively their rivals. Third, we study the conditions under which managers are more willing to listen to investors. Analyzing a sample of French acquisitions, we find that the well‐connected managers are more likely to complete a deal in spite of a negative market reaction on acquisition announcement.

This thesis consists of four independent essays, which consider different topics in information economics and political economy. The first two papers are variants of the same idea. An uninformed principal, e.g., a government, will make a decision. In order to gain more information it may consult two experts; however, these experts have a private interest in certain policies being implemented. The question is, to gain as much information as possible, should the principal consult experts who are biased in the same direction, or experts who prefer different decisions? The main result is that, as long as collusion between experts can be prevented, homogeneous panels are superior to heterogeneous ones, and this advantage increases with the experts’ informational precision. In the third paper, two firms consider entry in a new product market and must decide when to enter the market and how to design their product. Firms do not know for certain what the best design is, so both firms want to outwait the other’s decision in order to gain more information. The focus of the paper is on which firm will make the first decision. The main result is that if products are strong (strategic) substitutes, the worst informed firm makes the first decision in equilibrium. The analysis should apply to a range of other contexts, such as investors’ trading decisions or the policy choices of political candidates. The final paper asks the following question: Could it be that parties in a two-party system may benefit from using several candidates in the same election? To promote the use of multiple candidates, I assume that a party never runs the risk of having its votes split up among its candidates. Despite this, it turns out that parties have a strong incentive to restrict their number of nominees. Paradoxically, it seems that the more uncertain parties are about voter opinion, the fewer candidates they want to use. In particular, with a uniform voter distribution the optimal number of candidates is one. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2001 S. v-vii: sammanfattning, s. 1-72: 4 uppsatser