Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2008. / Includes appendixes. Title from PDF title page (viewed May 27, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 49-52)

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bonn.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1934. / Without thesis note. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1934. / Without thesis note. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 277-317).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1917. / "A list of the principal works and articles referred to": p. 5-7.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--Acadia University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-52). Also available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2008. / Title from title screen (site viewed Nov. 25, 2008). PDF text: 269 p. ; 1 Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3315208. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

Thèse--Montpellier. / "Bibliographie": p. 121-126.

Michel Foucault's archaeology of the silence of madness in the age of reason circumvents the discipline of psychiatry by refusing to contest the latter on its own terms. The success of Foucault's project of giving voice to the mad is achieved, however, at the expense of neglecting a long history of resistance to the silencing of madness, to which autobiographical writings by people said to be mad have contributed. The first phase of my dissertation focuses on mind-problem memoirs published since the late 1960s, a period in which an international psychiatric survivor movement has emerged. My readings of these memoirs examine how they elaborate ways of negotiating encounters with psychiatry in everyday life, and how they reveal the contingency of naturalized psychiatric practices. The second phase begins with the identification of certain questions that are not prominent among the concerns of political activists struggling to displace the psychiatric system. In the course of articulating a critique of narrative, I introduce the phrase "order of making sense" to describe a moral injunction—to respond and contribute to narrative reason—that acts as a regulative ideal. The third phase consists of fragmentary writing about personal experiences that, in spite of being framed by competing theoretical perspectives, destabilize boundaries. My increasing emphasis on the body, understood as a multiplicity of forces that are not amenable to the formation of coherent subjectivity, opens up the possibility of a revaluation of non-knowledge and the absence of work. The fourth phase concludes a dissertation whose unanticipated discontinuities are both caused by, and a mode of expression of, persistent mind problems. With the delineation of a post-Nietzschean aesthetic of the materialist sublime, the political strategies of psychiatric survivors, including my critique of narrative, are surpassed by the intensities of unproductive expenditure. Until mind problems are no longer pathologized as troubled being that stands in need of direction, the project of overcoming the condition of internal exile remains imperative. Yet it is the anti-project of exceeding sense—through an affirmation of being troubled by eternal recurrence—that most exposes the limits of the age of reason. / Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies / Graduate