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Thesis (doctoral)--Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-82).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-84).

Research into whether insider trading exists in the shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“JSE”). The purpose of the research is to examine the share price in target companies and to determine whether or not it increases significantly during the days immediately preceding a takeover, delisting or share buy-back announcement. Out of a total of 5,039 merger and acquisition transactions, during the six- year period from 2000 to 2005, only 30 transactions met the criteria of information availability and non-occurrence of confounding events. The Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAAR) of target companies during a 21-day event window period were examined. The examination of the CAAR was based on the historical bootstrapping technique and the CAAR was plotted on the frequency distribution to test for significance. The CAAR of the sample tested to be statistically significant in the days prior to the first public announcement. Evidence of a share price build-up in the days prior to the first public announcement was found. Controlling for confounding events, this price build-up could be indicative of insider trading. This research study seems to be the first study focused on insider trading and pre-announcement price run-ups on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Much work has been conducted on the signalling effect that a directors’ trade has on outsiders. This is based on the premise that insiders, or directors, shareholders and managers of companies have access to information about their companies that outsiders do not (Bhana, 2007; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2006; Hodgson and van Praag, 2006), raising questions about the efficiency of markets (Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Other research concludes that the greater the shareholding percentage or percentage control held by an insider, the greater would be their access to company information, and that this would lead directly to an increase in the strength of the signal to the market. Hillier and Marshall (2002) find that the abnormal returns occur most strongly where directors have increased their shareholding. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog in various studies found that the opposite is true, particularly for purchases, citing a perceived danger of increased entrenchment as the reason for this anomaly. This study will use the AltX of the JSE and attempt to show that there is a positive return on shareholder investment following an insider purchase and a negative return on investment following an insider sale as outsiders react to these signals and the information contained in these trades. This study will also attempt to prove that the percentage control of a director who purchases their own shares has an inverse relationship to the abnormal returns. This study uses the event study methodology and analyses the abnormal returns in the event windows extending back to twenty days prior to the events and for the following twenty days after the event. Abnormal returns are modelled using the control portfolio model of Mordant and Muller (2003) which is based on the Fama and French Three-Factor model. These abnormal returns are then tested for significance using T-tests and the bootstrapping technique. Relationships between shareholding interest and returns is established using linear correlation. No statistical significance could be found on the returns compared to the market following either a purchase or sale insider trade. However, it was found that the reaction to purchases was significantly higher than the reaction to sales, and results indicate that the reaction to sales on the AltX of the JSE leads to abnormal losses in the short term. This study finds that there is no indistinguishable relationship between shareholding and returns that are different to zero. While it is clear that other bourses internationally demonstrate clear evidence of the existence of signals contained in insider trades, and other South African studies find corroborative evidence on the JSE main board, there is no evidence that insider trades on the AltX contain any signalling value in them for outsiders, particularly pertaining to purchases. Although not economically significant, sales do suggest that there is information contained in the trade, but is this reaction in the market due to the information contained in the trade, or simply due to a culture of trading on market sentiment? / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Insider trading is one of the most unscrupulous financial crimes, as it results in people placed in positions of trust effectively stealing from those that they were supposed to protect. This research examined the volumes traded in shares listed on the JSE All Share index, to determine if it could be used as an indicator of insider trading, and whether it increases significantly in the days immediately preceding SENS announcements. The top five abnormal returns per share were generated using control portfolios. These were analysed manually to identify the most appropriate SENS announcement. From the 735 abnormal returns, 142 announcements qualified for the volume analysis, after the removal of confounding events. These announcements were classified into seven categories: BEE and governance; financial structure; investment/disinvestment; key personnel; mergers and acquisitions; trading update; and other. The average daily cumulative abnormal volume turnover (ACAVT) was examined using a 21-day event window period preannouncement. The preceding 63 days were used to calculate the benchmark. Three techniques were used to calculate ACAVTs – equations, t-tests and bootstrapping - which proved successful in determining ACAVT. The tests showed that overall the ACAVT was statistically insignificant. Two categories exhibited significant ACAVT – BEE and governance, and key personnel. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Anti-insider trading provisions were initially enacted to inter alia; enhance confidence in South African financial markets by contributing to the maintenance of a stable financial market environment by promoting the international competitiveness of investors in securities services in the country. In attempts to determine whether the Insider trading regulations are indeed effective at deterring insider trading contraventions as well as enforcing contraventions thereof, the research will subsequently examine the relevant legislation which pertains to insider trading in South Africa as well as analyse any definitional ambiguities and difficulties caused therein. Wherefore other than where the definitions in the legislation is lacking, the research will further discuss what additional problems are drawn from the current legislative insider trading framework. An analysis will be done regarding the difficulties experienced by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (hereafter the FSCA or the Regulator) as the entity responsible for the supervision of compliance with market abuse provisions in discharging of its duties as a result of the current legislation and/or the lack of clarity therefore. A comparative study will consequently be conducted in the research to establish how Australia has arguably become acknowledged to have the most progressive and developed market abuse legislation in the world compared to that of South Africa. Ultimately, recommendations will be presented using the above comparisons on what mechanisms can be adopted to improve on South Africa’s regulation of insider trading. / Mini Dissertation (LLM (Corporate Law))--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Mercantile Law / LLM / Unrestricted

The first essay explores relations between political affiliations and illegal insider trading. Assessing illegal insider trading is challenging due to the nature of the activity. Researchers observe and evaluate only the detected portion of illegal trading, not all illegal transactions. This presents a problem when using traditional empirical techniques to investigate such activity. In our analysis we employ a bivariate probit model that takes into account the partial observability nature of insider trading and provides estimates for the determinants of both the commission and the detection of illegal insider trading. Among our findings, most notable is the influence of the SEC’s political structure on insider trading detection. We show that the political party affiliation within the SEC, past indictments by the SEC, and SEC budget play a crucial role in determining current prosecution. Past SEC indictments significantly decrease the likelihood to engage in illegal insider trading as well. Essay two investigates insider trading returns by corporate insiders in light of their firms’ lobbying activities. Lobbying is a channel firms often use to influence regulatory change. Firms also use lobbying to obtain information on upcoming legislative and regulatory changes that are significant to the firms’ future. Establishing and maintaining these political connections provides informational advantage not only to the firms engaged in lobbying but also to the insiders of these firms who receive an opportunity to base their trading decision on this potentially valuable information. Using data on firm lobbying activities, we provide evidence of an informational advantage acquired by corporate insiders of firms that develop these connections with policymakers. We find that insiders of lobbying firms gain additional return of 138 (156) basis points on their buys (sells) trades relative to transactions placed by insiders of firms that are not engaged in lobbying activities. We also document that the role of establishing and fostering lobbying contacts and the amounts spent on lobbying differ with type of insider transactions and length of investment horizons. The focus of the third essay is the impact of actual trading on material non-public information on firms’ securities. Finance and law scholars present theoretical arguments both in favor of and against trading on material non-public information. However, investigating empirically the actual impact of insider trading on the insider’s firm poses significant challenges due to the lack of precision in identifying from publically available data trades that are based on private information. In this study, we utilize Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) indictments of illegal insider trading to examine the impact of illegal insider trading on the firm. We provide evidence suggesting that illegal insider trading increases stock market liquidity for the involved firms. Our results imply that bid-ask spread following transactions based on private information is narrower for long-run windows. However, we also find results implying that informed trading is associated with reduced liquidity, when estimated with Amihud Illiquidity proxy, reflecting price impact of trades based on private information.

by Leung Wai Yuen and Wong Che Keung. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-81). / ABSTRACT --- p.iv / ACKNOWLEDGMENT --- p.v / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.vi / LIST OF TABLES --- p.x / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.xi / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Objective of This Study --- p.5 / Chapter II --- THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STOCK MARKET IN HONG KONG --- p.6 / Development of the Stock Exchange --- p.6 / Performance of the Stock Market --- p.10 / Chapter III --- CURRENT SITUATION OF THE SEHK --- p.14 / Performance in 1994 --- p.14 / Future Development of the SEHK --- p.19 / Chapter IV --- REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN HONG KONG --- p.20 / History of Securities Legislation in Hong Kong --- p.20 / Regulatory Hierarchy of the Securities Market in Hong Kong --- p.24 / The Securities and Futures Commission --- p.25 / Mission and Functions of the SFC --- p.25 / Chapter V --- SECURITIES (INSIDER DEALING) ORDINANCE --- p.29 / Definition of Insider Dealing --- p.29 / The Insider Dealing Tribunal --- p.30 / Chapter VI --- SECURITIES (DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST) ORDINANCE --- p.32 / Gist of the Ordinance --- p.32 / Duties of Substantial Shareholders --- p.33 / Disclosure of Directors and Chief Executives --- p.34 / Interests That Can be Disregarded --- p.35 / Penalties for Breaches --- p.36 / Chapter VII --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.37 / Research on Overseas Stock Markets --- p.37 / Watchdog Report by Credit Lyonnais --- p.42 / Chapter VIII --- METHODOLOGY --- p.43 / Data Sampling --- p.43 / Definition of Insider Activities Index --- p.45 / Design of the Study --- p.46 / Chapter IX --- RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS --- p.50 / Industry Type --- p.50 / Company Size --- p.51 / Seasonal Effect --- p.52 / Ownership Concentration --- p.53 / Chapter X --- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.55 / Conclusion --- p.55 / Recommendations for Further Studies --- p.56 / APPENDICE --- p.58 / Appendix 1 --- p.59 / Appendix 2 --- p.63 / Appendix 3 --- p.67 / Appendix 4 --- p.71 / Appendix 5 --- p.73 / Appendix 6 --- p.75 / Appendix 7 --- p.77 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.79