The presence of insider trading in a financial market is detrimental to its functioning. Traders with public information are always at a disadvantage when negotiating with agents in possession of inside information. Thus insider trading should increase risk and should lower participation in financial markets. In this study we investigate a channel through which inside information may be transferred to market participants: social connections based on common education. We hand-collect a novel data set of the educational background of members of the board of directors of Brazilian firms and portfolio managers of stock funds. Board members hold inside information on their firms that is valuable to fund managers. We propose that these agents may engage in active social interactions if they 1) attended the same educational institution, 2) within an overlapping time window, and 3) obtained the same degree. We study if such connections influence fund managers\' portfolio decisions. We find that fund managers tend to place larger bets in companies with which they possess this sort of educational connection. We also find that these connections are economically valuable: managers tend to conduct large purchases of connected stocks prior to large increases in their return, and also tend to sell them prior to downfalls. Finally, we study if market participants view increases in a company\'s connectivity as an increase in its risk. We find that increases in connectivity are followed by increases in expected returns. We also determine that the return of holding a portfolio long in highly connected stocks and short on stocks with few connections cannot be explained by the traditional risk factors. These two results indicate that the market does indeed see connectivity as a form of risk. This is, to our knowledge, the first study of its kind for Brazil. / A presença de insider trading em um mercado financeiro é prejudicial ao seu funcionamento. Investidores com informação pública sempre estão em desvantagem quando negociam com agentes que detêm informação privilegiada. Portanto, insider trading aumenta o risco e diminui a participação em mercados financeiros. Neste estudo nós investigamos um possível canal através do qual a informação interna à firma é potencialmente transferida para participantes do mercado: conexões sociais baseadas em uma educação comum. Nós coletamos manualmente uma base de dados inédita sobre a experiência educacional de dois grupos de agentes: membros do conselho de diretores de empresas brasileiras e gestores de carteiras de fundos de ações. Os membros do conselho possuem informação privilegiada sobre suas firmas que seria valiosa para os gestores de fundos. Nós propomos que esses agentes podem engajar em contato social ativo se eles 1) frequentaram a mesma instituição de ensino, 2) em janelas de tempo sobrepostas e 3) obtiveram o mesmo diploma. A partir daí, estudamos se tais conexões influenciam as decisões de investimento dos gestores de carteiras. Nós descobrimos que gerentes de fundos tendem a alocar posições maiores em companhias com as quais eles possuem esta conexão educacional. Nós também descobrimos que tais conexões são valiosas: gerentes tendem a realizar grandes compras de ações conectadas em antecipação a aumentos em seu retorno e tendem a vender essas ações antes de quedas. Finalmente, nós estudamos se participantes do mercado veem aumentos na conectividade de uma empresa como aumentos no risco da empresa. Nós descobrimos que aumentos na conectividade são seguidos de aumentos no retorno esperado. Nós também encontramos que o retorno de um portfólio comprado em ações de alta conectividade e vendido em ações de baixa conectividade não pode ser explicado pelos fatores de risco tradicionais. Esses dois resultados indicam que o mercado vê a conectividade como uma forma de risco. Este é, ao nosso conhecimento, o primeiro trabalho de seu tipo para o Brasil.

The presence of insider trading in a financial market is detrimental to its functioning. Traders with public information are always at a disadvantage when negotiating with agents in possession of inside information. Thus insider trading should increase risk and should lower participation in financial markets. In this study we investigate a channel through which inside information may be transferred to market participants: social connections based on common education. We hand-collect a novel data set of the educational background of members of the board of directors of Brazilian firms and portfolio managers of stock funds. Board members hold inside information on their firms that is valuable to fund managers. We propose that these agents may engage in active social interactions if they 1) attended the same educational institution, 2) within an overlapping time window, and 3) obtained the same degree. We study if such connections influence fund managers\' portfolio decisions. We find that fund managers tend to place larger bets in companies with which they possess this sort of educational connection. We also find that these connections are economically valuable: managers tend to conduct large purchases of connected stocks prior to large increases in their return, and also tend to sell them prior to downfalls. Finally, we study if market participants view increases in a company\'s connectivity as an increase in its risk. We find that increases in connectivity are followed by increases in expected returns. We also determine that the return of holding a portfolio long in highly connected stocks and short on stocks with few connections cannot be explained by the traditional risk factors. These two results indicate that the market does indeed see connectivity as a form of risk. This is, to our knowledge, the first study of its kind for Brazil. / A presença de insider trading em um mercado financeiro é prejudicial ao seu funcionamento. Investidores com informação pública sempre estão em desvantagem quando negociam com agentes que detêm informação privilegiada. Portanto, insider trading aumenta o risco e diminui a participação em mercados financeiros. Neste estudo nós investigamos um possível canal através do qual a informação interna à firma é potencialmente transferida para participantes do mercado: conexões sociais baseadas em uma educação comum. Nós coletamos manualmente uma base de dados inédita sobre a experiência educacional de dois grupos de agentes: membros do conselho de diretores de empresas brasileiras e gestores de carteiras de fundos de ações. Os membros do conselho possuem informação privilegiada sobre suas firmas que seria valiosa para os gestores de fundos. Nós propomos que esses agentes podem engajar em contato social ativo se eles 1) frequentaram a mesma instituição de ensino, 2) em janelas de tempo sobrepostas e 3) obtiveram o mesmo diploma. A partir daí, estudamos se tais conexões influenciam as decisões de investimento dos gestores de carteiras. Nós descobrimos que gerentes de fundos tendem a alocar posições maiores em companhias com as quais eles possuem esta conexão educacional. Nós também descobrimos que tais conexões são valiosas: gerentes tendem a realizar grandes compras de ações conectadas em antecipação a aumentos em seu retorno e tendem a vender essas ações antes de quedas. Finalmente, nós estudamos se participantes do mercado veem aumentos na conectividade de uma empresa como aumentos no risco da empresa. Nós descobrimos que aumentos na conectividade são seguidos de aumentos no retorno esperado. Nós também encontramos que o retorno de um portfólio comprado em ações de alta conectividade e vendido em ações de baixa conectividade não pode ser explicado pelos fatores de risco tradicionais. Esses dois resultados indicam que o mercado vê a conectividade como uma forma de risco. Este é, ao nosso conhecimento, o primeiro trabalho de seu tipo para o Brasil.

acase@tulane.edu / The relationship between microstructure, efficiency and data frequency give us a new opportunity to test information (e.g. events and news) efficiency assimilation for Mexican ADRs and their underlying Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV) stocks It also allows to corroborate whether in emerging markets, specifically in the Mexican market, insider trading could be present but it may not be necessarily detected by market efficiency tools only. Using a proprietary dataset of Mexican Stock Exchange (Mexican Bolsa) intraday prices for underlying stocks and their respective Type II and III ADRs quoted in NASDAQ, AMEX and New York Stock Exchange, time series analysis related to price dynamics and event studies methodologies were applied. Non-linearity of the prices was tested, finding no statistical evidence of such behavior, which led to conclude linearity in them. Volatility transmission was also analyzed, finding that external shock can impact both markets having a recursive behavior; shocks in Mexican market has an impact also in American Market and vice versa. Using a standard Event Studies methodology we tested for nine different corporate events (dividends, changes in capital structure, acquisitions, mergers, takeovers, spin offs, sell offs, joint ventures and privatizations) and seven different classes of stocks in both markets, looking for parallelism in cumulative abnormal returns, volatility, trade volume and Granger causality. The results are a statistically significant behavior similar in both markets (for both CARs and volatility). The evidence of Granger-causality in ADR / underlying stock was detected in both ways: underlying stocks Granger cause the ADRs and vice versa. The results corroborate a non-arbitrage behavior in both markets and no evidence of insider trading in ADRs / underlying stocks in both markets / 1 / Polux E. Diaz Ruiz

The decisions of the federal government such as new legislation, bills and reforms can have serious implications for the financial markets, especially in terms of corporate profitability and shareholder value. As the overseers of federal agencies, U.S. Senators are arguably the most important participants in these decision making processes, in addition to being the most informed investors in the market. As such, Senators may be able to capitalize on their superior networks and information through stock trading. The portfolios traded on such insider information should generate abnormal returns against the market index. This study conducts an analysis of the abnormal returns on common stock purchases reported by U.S. Senators between 1995 and 2012. This paper recreates congressional buy portfolio using a consistent methodology throughout the entire sample period considered by earlier studies. While the sample size is reduced, the methodology used in this analysis relies on actual transactions dates to maximize accuracy. An analysis of the abnormal returns of the common stock investments of U.S. Senators during the period 1995 – 2012 shows that Senators are generally poor investors: purchases made by senators underperform the market index by approximately 3% a year.

Abstract The study attempts to filter the public trading data, based on TESC and TEJ to get the proxy variable of insiders¡¦ trading. We estimate the proxy variable of insider trading according to the Security and Exchange Act. The correlation between the daily return and time-series proxy variables are significant and the proxy variable is a factor for the return. The paces of information releasing are different by capital levels. When the capital is under 40 billion, the information will be released within 4 days. The portfolio of the proxy variable in 4 factors Fama and French model is only effective in small capital levels. In the aspect of the price levels, the time series proxy variables are significant but the effects are different among the levels of price. The portfolio of the proxy variable in 4 factors Fama and French model is only effective in the lower price levels

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Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-283).

Due to recent events in corporate America, including the recent Enron scandal and numerous cases of insider trading, the public's faith in the fairness of the stock markets has been shaken. The current study suggests that public relations efforts that are designed to increase the public's perception of the integrity of United States stock markets and lower public cynicism toward insider trading may be fruitful. The contributions of this study are to identify what leads to insider trading and thereby identify methods to reduce it. Graduate student subjects are used to test the relationship between the intent to trade based on insider information and the deterrents and motivations for insider trading. The results of the study indicate that gain, certainty, cynicism, guilt, social stigma, and agreement with the law have a significant effect on an individual's intent to take part in insider trading. The results do not provide conclusive support that increasing severity of punishment decreases the likelihood of trading based on insider information. The results also show that there are differences in the perceptions of male and female respondents with regard to the deterrence variables. Identifying what situations are more likely to lead to insider trading allows policymakers to design more efficient detection efforts. This study finds that subjects' are more inclined to trade based on insider information to avoid a loss on stock they currently own than to achieve an abnormal gain by purchasing a stock that they do not currently own. This study finds that the intent to take part in insider trading increases as the perception of likelihood of getting caught decreases. The results indicate that subjects are more willing to use insider information when it is from a friend because their likelihood of getting caught is lower. This is important for two reasons. If the incidence of insider trading is higher in situations that involve second hand knowledge, then detection efforts become more complicated. Also, the presence of insider trading may be significantly higher than current detection efforts indicate because these cases are hard to detect. / Ph. D.

Note: / This thesis is a critical analysis of the law relating to insider trading in three common law countries. Chapter One, addresses the merits and demerits of the regulation of insider trading and presents a review of the academic literature relating to this field. In Chapters Two, Three and Four, the law ofinsider trading in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom is analysed and discussed on a comparative basis. Each of these chapters is in two sections. The tirst section describes the regulatory system and institutions, and the second section discusses the regulation of insider trading, highlighting the critical elements ofthis type ofregulation, such as the definition of an 'insider' and the scope of 'inside infonnation'. It concludes with a broad discussion of the differing approaches ofthese countries to insider trading. Cette thèse est un analyse critique du délit d'initiés dans trois pays 'common law'. / Dans le premier chapitre, on discute les avantages et les inconvénients de la réglementation du délit d'initiés et la littérature academique rélatif à ce sujet. Dans les Deuxième, Troisième et Quatrième Chapitres on analyse et compare le droit concernant le délit d'initiés dans les Etats-Unis, le Canada et le Royaume-Uni. Chacun de ces chapitres comprend deux parties. La première partie décrit le système réglementaire et les institutions. La deuxième partie discute le droit du délit d'initiés et les éléments critiques de ce droit (par exemple, le définition d'initié et d'information privilegiée). La Conclusion discute les approches différents de ces trois pays quant au délit d'initiés.