本篇文章目的是研究在1996 年至2004 年間，臺灣地區人壽保險業之競爭程度狀況，並希望藉以探討導致臺灣整體壽險市場經營困難的主要原因，到底是因為處於過度競爭的局面，還是受到市場經濟不景氣或政策利空等因素所影響？這些問題的探究可讓臺灣在往後金融發展政策上提供重要的參考基礎。本研究以Rosse-Panzar 非結構模型作為研究臺灣地區壽險業的競爭程度證據，發現1996年至2000 年壽險市場是處於完全競爭(PC)，但2001 年至2004 年均拒絶市場存在獨占力(M)或完全競爭(PC)之虛無假設，顯示該年度為壟斷性競爭市場(MC)。 / The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree of the competition on the life insurance industry in Taiwan from 1996 to 2004 and to investigate thereason why the whole Taiwan life insurance market operates so difficultly.Perhaps it was because of the excessive competition, the economic downturn, bad policy, and some other factors? Exploration of these issues can provide an important reference on the financial development policy to Taiwan Insurance Supervisory Authority in the future. This paper use the Rosse-Panzar non-structural model as an evidence to support the result, It proved that the Taiwan life insurance market was in the perfect competition (PC) during the period of 1996 to 2000. In addition, from the year 2001 to 2004, it rejected the null hypothesis of monopoly power (M) and perfect competition (PC), indicating that the monopolistic competition market (MC) existed.

This dissertation examines the determinants of competition and consumer access in the health care market, and supply- and demand-side determinants of health care use under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The first essay studies insurer entry into the federally-facilitated health insurance market under the ACA. Motivated by the fact that insurers’ service areas can be subsets of rating areas, and the substantial variation in plan composition within a rating area, I explore variations in the type of plans offered and insurers’ decisions to enter a rating area. I find that availability of medical providers, population size, and metropolitan status are important in insurers’ decisions to enter a rating area. Medical cost affects the entry of restricted network plans. The second essay examines how supply-side incentives affect treatment choice for depression. Using claims data from Florida’s Medicaid program, I find large variations in initiating antidepressant treatment among newly diagnosed patients with three plan types: Fee-for-Service (FFS), Primary Care Case Management (PCCMs) and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). Compared to FFS, PCCMs and ACOs are more likely to provide antidepressant but no office-based care. I use the control function approach to mitigate the self-selection bias and find that ACOs tend to use lower cost medication options. Despite the use of low-cost alternatives for ACOs, no differences are found in subsequent psychiatric hospitalization or emergency room visits among plans. Different provider contractual relationships may partially explain treatment choice differences. The third essay investigates whether the ACA policy of free preventive services affects utilization of preventive care. I use variation in commercially-insured enrollees to examine the demand and supply prices of four preventive services. Despite an average 53 percentage point decrease in demand prices for these services, the actual service use only increased by 17 percent from 2007 to 2011, possibly due to little or no change in prices paid to providers. Using risk adjustment tools to predict and control for patient underlying health status, I find similar changes in demand prices and rates of service use across six health plan types, consistent with preventive visits being provider rather than consumer choices.