Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, June 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-139).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Kansas State University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-78).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1988. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: P. Dean Corbae. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.M. (Finance & Investment)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Wits Business School, 2016 / The banking industry plays an essential role in any economy in terms of resource mobilisation and allocation. Banks also accept deposits, create credit, offer agency, utility and money transmission services.A well-developed banking industry plays an important role in efficient financial intermediation and this helps to boost economic growth. The financial intermediary role performed by banks allows the banking sector to influence the direction of available resources, thereby affecting the rate of economic growth (Obadeyi, 2014).Due to these benefits derived from the banking sector, a large number of industrialised, developing and transition countries have undertaken extensive reforms in their banking sector over the past two decades (Swary and Topf 1992). Banking sector reforms are defined as government intervention in the banking industry to provide a panacea for existing anomalies in the banking sector (Azeez and Ojoh, 2012). The reforms that were implemented by various countries included interest rates liberalisation, the removal of quantitative controls on lending, lifting barriers to competition, deregulation of the banking sector, the privatisation of public financial institutions and the introduction of market based securities. They were implemented to enhance the intermediation role of banks, ensure that banks are well positioned to greatly mobilise savings and optimally allocate these mobilised savings in the form of credit extension to profitable investments (Ajayi, 2005). The treatise investigates the effectiveness of banking sector reforms on financial intermediation in African Countries using data of eleven countries. Annual time series and panel data which covered a period of 20 years from 1980 to 2000 was used.Secondary data which was used for this treatise was gathered fromjournals, books, peer-reviewed articles, International Monetary Fund statistics (IMF), Global Banking (Center for financial markets Milken Institute) and World Bank Financial Development database was used in this research. The regression results showed that the banking sector reforms had a negative impact on financial intermediation on the eleven countries under study. Thus, the reforms failed to achieve their objectives of mobilising savings and increasing intermediation activities (lending). In addition, the results showed that the control variables which were inflation and gross savings had an inversely relationship with financial intermediation except for income per capita which had a positive relationship. The main causes of the failure of the banking sector iii reforms in Africa were the macroeconomic imbalances, financial system instability and wrong sequencing of the reforms. / GR2018

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-138).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Economics, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

The issue of economic growth and income inequality is always the hottest topic among economists. Over the past decades to the onset of the global economic crisis, a large majority of OECD countries have experienced widen income inequality. More recently, the break out of the Occupy Wall Street Movement has rapid spread and recaptured much attention. One of the most driving themes is a country’s economic growth and embarrassing income inequality; it also reflects a broad-based frustration about how the sophisticated financial development affects the overall economy. To understand the impact of financial development on economic growth and income distribution has more important implications than ever. This dissertation is an effort to study these issues with three studies. / In Study 1, a simplified version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of liquid provision is embedded into a framework of overlapping-generations model. In the model, the agents are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, and have to make their own mind whether to hold the savings on hand or invest in a long-term illiquid technology and how to allocate. By comparing the autarky economy and the economy with financial intermediaries, our results suggest the existence of both benefits and costs of financial intermediaries and the net effects tend to differ with the development stage of the underlying economy. / In Study 2, the links between economic growth and income inequality are reexamined using a newly compiled panel dataset. This study mainly address three empirical questions: 1) Does inequality increase in the early stages of development and then decline when per capita income reaches a certain level? 2) Do countries with unequal income distribution experience slower economic growth than more egalitarian countries? 3) What might be the determinants of economic growth and income inequality, and whether they are simultaneously determined? Our results show that the links between economic growth and income inequality are quite complex and their determinants are not mutually exclusive. / In Study 3, the impacts of financial development on economic growth and income inequality are explored empirically. By collecting proxy variables measuring different aspects of financial development, this study tests 1) Is financial development pro-growth? In other words, does financial development always exert a positive impact on economic growth? 2) Is financial development pro-poor? By pro-poor, we mean whether financial development significantly improve income distribution by disproportionately boosting the incomes of the poor. Our results indicate that financial development is not always pro-growth, taking into account of country-specific effects, endogeneity and potential heteroskedasticity. In addition, after controlling for the overall growth, financial development is not pro-poor. It is more likely for the rich to get more benefits from both bank-based and market-based developments. / 經濟增長和收入不平等的問題始終是經濟學家中最熱門的話題。在過去的幾十年到近年全球經濟危機爆發，大多數經濟合作與發展組織（OECD）國家都經歷了收入不平等的擴大。近年來爆發的"佔領華爾街"運動在全球迅速蔓延，並成為關注的焦點。其中一個最為重要的導火索是國家的經濟增長和愈加惡化的收入不平等，同時也反映出廣大民眾對於金融業發展會如何影響整體經濟的困惑。因此，理解金融發展對經濟增長和收入分配的影響變得比以往任何時刻都更具有重要的意義。本論文通過三篇研究從不同的角度分析這一問題。 / 在研究一中，我們把一個簡化的Diamond 和Dybvig（1983）模型嵌入代際交疊模型的框架中。在這個模型中，每個人都會受到流動性的衝擊，因此必須決定是將儲蓄持有在手邊還是投資於長期的不能流動的技術中，以及如何分配。通過比較自給自足的經濟和有金融機構存在下的經濟，我們的研究結果表明，金融機構是把雙刃劍，其淨效應取決於相關經濟體的發展階段。 / 在研究二中，我們用新編譯的面板資料重新檢驗了經濟增長和收入不平等之間的聯繫。這篇研究主要回答了三個問題：1）收入不平等是否在經濟發展的早期增加，在人均收入達到一定水準後下降？2）收入不平等的國家是否比收入平等的國家經濟增長緩慢？3）經濟增長和收入不平等的決定因素是什麼，二者是否是同時決定的？我們的研究結果表明，經濟增長和收入不平等之間的聯繫相當複雜，並且其決定因素也不是相互排斥的。 / 在研究三中，我們通過實證的方法探索金融發展對經濟增長和收入不平等的影響。通過用不同變數來衡量金融發展的各個方面，這篇研究主要回答了兩個問題：1）金融發展是否促增長？換句話說，金融發展對經濟增長是否都產生了積極的影響？2）金融發展是否有利於窮人？所謂有利於窮人，我們是指金融發展能大幅提高窮人的收入，從而顯著改善收入分配。我們的研究結果顯示，在考慮了國家影響、內生性和潛在異方差等因素後，金融發展並不總是有利於經濟增長。另外，剔除整體經濟增長的影響，金融發展也並不利於窮人。相反，富人更有可能從銀行和市場為主的金融發展中得到更多的實惠。 / Yu, Yao. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 192-207). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on 20, December, 2016). / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only.

I study financial intermediation and optimal regulation through the lens of banking theory and applied corporate finance. In my understanding, the theory on banking is primarily the theory on bank runs. And the key questions I have been pursuing to answer are the causes of runs in both the traditional and shadow banking sectors and the roles of the market and the regulator in maintaining financial stability. I start with the shadow banking system outside the traditional regulatory framework, which accumulated tremendous risks and led to a major financial crisis. Why don’t we simply shut down the shadow banking sector? Chapter 1 examines the role of shadow banking and optimal shadow bank regulation by developing a bank run model featuring the tradeoff between financial innovation and systemic risk. In my model, the traditional banking sector is regulated such that it can credibly provide safe assets, while a shadow banking sector creates space for beneficial investment opportunities created by financial innovation but also provides regulatory arbitrage opportunities for non-innovative banks. Systemic risk arises from the negative externalities of asset liquidation in the shadow banking sector, which may lead to a self-fulfilling recession and costly government bailouts. Heavy regulatory punishment on systemically important shadow banks controls existing systemic risk and has a deterrent effect on its accumulation ex ante. My paper is the first to formalize the designation authority of a macro-prudential regulator in systemic risk regulation. I then switch from the assets side to the liabilities side on the bank’s balance sheet. Chapter 2 introduces informed agents to the banking model and proposes a novel role of deposit insurance in fostering market discipline. While the moral hazard problem brought by deposit insurance weakens market discipline, I show that the opposite can be true when the insurance stabilizes uninformed funding and increases the benefits of monitoring through information acquisition. Knowing the bank asset type, informed depositors utilize the demand deposits as a monitoring device and discipline the bank into holding good assets. However, self-fulfilling bank runs initiated by uninformed depositors erodes the future returns, inducing more depositors to forgo information acquisition and act like uninformed depositors. A novel role of deposit insurance emerges from the strategic complementarity between monitoring efforts and stability of uninformed funding. A capped deposit insurance, by stabilizing the retail funding of the bank, restores wholesale depositors’ monitoring incentives and benefits market discipline. I examine the role of information in generating bank runs in Chapter 3, where I explore the relationship between redemption price and run risks in a model of money market fund industry. Money market funds compete with commercial banks by issuing demandable shares with stable redemption price, transforming risky assets into money-like claims outside the traditional banking sector. Floating net asset value (NAV) is widely believed a solution to money market fund runs by removing the first-mover advantages. In a coordination game model a la Angeletos and Werning (2006), I show that the floating net asset value, which allows investors to redeem shares at market-based price rather than book value, may lead to more self-fulfilling runs. Compared to stable net asset value, which becomes informative only when the regime is abandoned, the floating net asset value acts as a public noisy signal, coordinating investors’ behaviors and resulting in multiplicity. The destabilizing effect increases when investors’ capacity of acquiring private information is constrained. The model implications are consistent with a surge in the conversion from prime to government institutional funds in 2016, when the floating net asset value requirement on the former is the centerpiece of the money market fund reform.