There are four primary objectives of this study. First, it examines the association between the disclosure of the Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs), as a proxy for the internal control quality, and information asymmetry (IA) in the secondary loan market. Second, it identifies which types of ICDs exacerbate conditions of information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Third, it investigates whether firms that remediate or take corrective actions to address ICDs lead to a reduction in information asymmetry in the market. Finally, it examines the effect of the loan specific characteristics such as debt covenants, credit rating and number of lenders (syndication) in the secondary loan market on the association between ICDs and IA. Results suggest that firms that disclose ICDs have significant positive association with IA and that ICDs reported under section 302 have significant positive association with IA. Although results on the association between the severity rank of ICDs by using Internal Control Material Weaknesses (ICMWs) as a proxy and IA are not supported, the use of Company Level (CL) internal control as a proxy for the severity rank of ICDs shows a significant positive association with IA. Overall, firms that remediate their ICDs have significant negative association with IA. Overall, there is a statistical negative association between the interaction term of ICDs and number of lenders (syndication) and IA. Same negative significant association is documented between the interaction term of ICDs and credit rating, and IA and the interaction term of ICDs and debt covenants and IA. The latter result suggests that the secondary loan market unique characteristics mitigate the negative consequences of the disclosure of ICDs and reduce the information asymmetry between lender and multiple arrangers. My results are consistent with prior studies’ (Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007 a,b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008), which suggest that firms with reported ICDs are generally small, poor performing, financially weaker, and characterized by higher market risk than firms with effective internal control system.

This study uses an institutional theory perspective to examine whether significant changes to the audit work and engagement practices required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) lead to improved audit quality in nonprofit hospitals. Unlike their for-profit counterparts, nonprofit organizations have been subject to audits of internal controls over financial reporting and program compliance for decades under Circular A-133 of the Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended. Circular A-133 audits represent the primary accountability tool over the billions of grant dollars awarded annually by the federal government. Despite the enormity of these awards and the substantial informational effect of the audit reports, prior empirical research suggests that the quality of these audits is problematic. Using the archival data of nonprofit hospital Circular A-133 audits and related hand-collected financial data from IRS Form 990s, bivariate and multivariate analyses are conducted on a cross-sectional sample of 875 audits for 141 nonprofit hospitals with audits during both pre-SOX (2001-2004) and post-SOX (2008-2011) periods. Audit quality is inferred from discretionary accruals (Modified Jones model) and auditor-reported internal control deficiencies (reportable conditions and material weaknesses). The results indicate support for improved audit quality from the pre- to the post-SOX period for all measures of audit quality. The results are different for the measures of audit quality used to examine the association between audit firm size and audit quality. Non-Big 4 audit firms experienced a significant improvement in audit quality when discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for audit quality. Conversely, Big 4 audit firms experienced a significant improvement in audit quality when internal control deficiencies are proxies for audit quality. In the post-SOX period audit firms provide approximately the same level of audit quality regardless of firm size when discretionary accruals or material weaknesses are the proxy for audit quality. When reportable conditions are the proxy, non-Big 4 firms have higher audit quality than Big 4 firms post-SOX. Client characteristics, specifically hospital size and the interaction of leverage and risk, are attributable to differences in post-SOX audit quality. Finally, the study fails to support the hypothesis that large audit firms self-select low risk clients.

金融秩序之維持基於金融機構的穩健運作，金融機構穩健運作之關鍵來自內部控制制度的落實，而此一制度係建構在公司治理—強化經營者責任上。2013年底，我國公司治理機制一項重大變革為審計委員會之設置要求。因此本研究即探討審計委員會與內部控制缺失之關聯性。以2013年至2015年上市櫃金融控股公司（包含其銀行和保險子公司）以及上市櫃和興櫃的銀行及保險公司為研究對象。 本研究發現：審計委員會與內部控制缺失具統計上的顯著關聯性。審計委員會的設立與內部控制缺失呈顯著負相關；監督者（獨立董監事及審計委員會成員）會計或財務專業的比例，並未與內部控制缺失成顯著負相關，拆出分獨立董監事和審計委員會兩項不同監督機制，其成員會計或財務專業的比例與內部控制缺失也並未呈現顯著的負相關；金融控股母公司的獨立董事同時兼任子公司獨立董事，則與較多的裁罰件數成顯著正相關。另外研究也發現，部分會計師事務所與金融業者內部控制缺失呈顯著的負相關。 綜上結果隱含以下推論：審計委員會監督功能發揮，將幫助金融業者減少內部控制缺失的發生，不過獨立董事在同一金控體系兼任多家公司獨立董事的情形，並未有較佳的監督效果出現。由於我國金融業者發生的內部控制缺失類型多樣，因此在審計委員的安排上，除了會計或財務專業的審計委員，也可廣納其他專業的專家學者擔任，另外會計師事務所也可扮演完善內部控制制度的一個輔助角色。 / To find out the effect of the audit committee on internal control, this study examines the association between audit committees and internal control deficiencies.The samples are listed financial holding companies including their bank and insurance subsidiaries, bank, and insurance companies in TWSE and OTC in Taiwan over the period from 2013 to 2015. I find that the audit committees are negatively associated with the internal control deficiencies. However, there is no association between the audit committees of accounting or financial expertise and internal control deficiencies. Besides, I find that the circumstances that the independent directors of the financial holding parent companies also serve as an independent directors of the subsidiaries are positively associated with more incidences of penalty cases. Taken together, the empirical result indicates the association between the audit committees and internal control deficiencies in Taiwan financial industry.