The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in 1998. The Statute provides that the ICC has jurisdiction over „the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole‟. These crimes are: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute defines the first three of these, but not the last. At the time this Statute was being drafted, the international community could not agree on a definition of the crime of aggression, so it could not be inscribed fully into the Statute. Instead, it was agreed to include aggression within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, but, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute, the ICC cannot not exercise jurisdiction over this crime until a proper definition has been established by states parties and an agreement is reached on the conditions under which the ICC may prosecute the crime. The present researcher believes that the omission of the crime of aggression from the Court‟s jurisdiction is one of the main defects of the Rome Statute. This thesis explores whether it is possible to establish a satisfactory definition of the crime of aggression and, if so, what this might be. It argues that aggression as an international crime can and should be defined. This thesis will examine the history of the crime of aggression in order to determine whether its definition should build upon previous efforts, or whether it would be better to start afresh. It has been found in this thesis that today‟s dilemma over the crime of aggression cannot be separated from its past; its current status is indeed the result of an accumulative process that began long ago. In addressing the question of the definition of aggression, this thesis also examines critically the contemporary law on the use of force by states in order to identify the lawful and unlawful uses of force that might be relevant to the crime of aggression. In particular, the focus will be on some of the most controversial uses of force, such as pre-emptive self-defence, humanitarian intervention and the use of force to secure the right of self-determination. A precise determination of the scope of the lawful use of force should facilitate the establishment of a definition of the crime of aggression. This thesis concludes that the rules of international law concerning aggression are dispersed across various instruments. This has led, in turn, to the existence of a vague legal stance on the matter when applied to specific cases, especially when dealing with concepts of a v controversial nature, such as pre-emptive self-defence and humanitarian intervention. Moreover, these instruments seem to circumvent the question of individual criminal responsibility for committing the crime of aggression. Hence, it is necessary to close this gap in the international system by producing a single document containing a definition of aggression that takes into account all of these aspects. Overall consideration will be given to the various proposed definitions of the crime of aggression that were submitted before, during and after the Rome Conference of 1998. Particular attention, however, will be paid to the latest proposal made by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. This thesis argues that this proposal, as the result of profound and detailed consideration of various aspects of the crime, should form the basis of any definition to be adopted at the forthcoming ICC Review Conference. However, the study also suggests that certain components of the proposed definition should be amended and, therefore, a new proposal for the definition of the crime will be proffered at the end of this paper. This thesis will also examine the conditions under which the ICC should exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Based on the assumption that determining the existence of state‟s act of aggression is a pre-condition for prosecuting an individual for the crime of aggression, the question that needs to be addressed centres on which organ should determine whether or not a state has committed an act of aggression. In short, this thesis maintains that as the Security Council is entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it should be consulted in situations relating to the determination of the existence of an act of state aggression. It is also argued, however, that the Council‟s determination on whether a state has committed aggression should not be binding on the Court, which should be able to review the Council‟s determination. It is further argued that if the Security Council fails to make such a determination, then the ICC should go forth to commence its own investigation with respect to the crime.

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The context for this work is set by the proliferation of intrastate conflicts and the international legal debate of humanitarian intervention. The thesis specifically addresses the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) as formulated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The objective is to assess the present quality of R2P as a concept of international law. Five components of the R2P framework are discussed: the primary responsibility of every state to protect its population from large-scale killings and large-scale ethnic cleansing; the right of other states to collective humanitarian intervention through the United Nations; a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention without prior Security Council authorization; the responsibility of the international community to take military action; and the criteria for external military involvement. Methodologically, the analysis is grounded in the dominant theory of legal positivism and its doctrine of sources, which requires notably an analysis of treaties and customary international law. An ethical theory is devised and applied, however, to remedy inadequacies of a strictly positivist method that sets out to determine international law solely on the basis of hard facts. These ethical considerations serve as a background theory to provide guidance in difficult cases of treaty or customary law analysis, and they fill gaps in positive international law as legally binding “principles of ethical law”. In conclusion, the individual components of R2P differ in terms of their legal status and the degree to which it can be explained by the traditional posivist approach to international law. The primary responsibility of every state has become accepted as a hard norm of international customary law; the right of collective humanitarian intervention is provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter; a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention has become part of the international legal system as a “principle of ethical law”; the residual responsibility of the international community is a principle of “legal soft law”; finally, positive international law defines no criteria delineating the permissible and required use of force for the protection of foreign populations.

The province of the present study is a legal and geo-political inquiry into the status of the navigable air-space. The fundamental law of the status of the air-space was restated or reaffirmed in 1944 at Chicago by the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Article 1 of this convention provided that 'every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-space above its territory.' [...]

Traditionally, public international law and private international law were perceived as two different categories of law; the former governing the international relations between states and the latter those between private individuals. Their relation is based upon an evolutionary development from private to public, and from municipal to international, law. In the modern world, this evolution has culminated in a dynamism reflected in numerous interactions between a wide range of different actors. As a result, the former boundaries between the public and private law, as well as the international and municipal law dichotomy, have become blurred. In an emerging global society, these four major categories have entered a dynamic dialogue that equally challenges both legal theory and practice. This dialogue is centred around a functioning global legal framework, in which public international law and private international law can---due to their distinct scopes of application---answer many unanswered questions, providing that they speak with one voice.

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