Thesis (Ph. D.)--Princeton University, 1983. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 498-515).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Johns Hopkins University, 1987. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 315-326).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Iowa, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 278-283).

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Conditionality refers to the program policies required by international institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order for countries to be eligible to receive access to resources provided by such institutions. In the case of the IMF these resources are available in the form of loans. The proper role of conditionality as a component of the Fund's financial arrangements with developing nations has been a topic of debate in both the political science and economic fields of study. On the political science side the argument has centered on whether or not austere and structural conditionality can in effect cause political dissent in the developing nations, and whether or not the process of conditionality violates the sovereign rights of nations. In this research study three Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, and Costa Rica) were utilized as case studies to try and determine whether or not their was a casual link between the implementation of IMF conditionality and instances of political dissent manifested as protests, riots, and strikes. Evidence of political dissent directly related to the implementation of IMF conditionality was found in all three case studies at varying levels. The instances of political dissent were then analyzed individually and as a group to try and determine specific cause, group dynamics, and the economic context in which they took place. The study concluded that as practiced in the 1990s and early 2000s conditionality can interfere with the democratic process in developing nations. / Master of Arts

Throughout the International Monetary Fund's history it has been criticized for failing to address the negative impact its adjustment programs have on the poor in borrowing countries. This study examines the Fund's declared intention and actions regarding the construction of a social safety net in Indonesia from October 1997 until May 1998. A historical narrative using Constructivism as a theoretical framework is used to explain the relationship between the IMF, Suharto and the effect their interaction had on social safety net construction. This historical perspective reveals that rather than working towards building a social safety net, the Fund's main priority was the decentralization of Indonesian political and economic structures. / Master of Arts

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 202-219).

Introduction The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international financial institution that acts as a lender of the last resort for countries experiencing balance of payments problems. Its loans to national authorities come with conditions, which typically include tighter control of public spending, though the nature and extent of conditions as well as the emphasis on social protection may vary according to the type of lending agreement. A subject of intense debate has been the effects of these loans on the capacity of health systems to meet health need. This study investigates the effects of IMF agreements on one crucial determinant of that capacity: government health expenditure (GHE). To do so, it evaluates: (i) the effects of IMF agreements on GHE across low- and middle-income countries; (ii) how these effects vary across different country income groups; and (iii) how these effects vary according to the type of agreement. Methods The study employs a dataset that includes GHE for 127 countries for the years 1995-2012, estimates the effects of IMF agreements using the Fixed Effects estimator, controls for determinants of GHE and accounts for endogeneity using a Heckman-style selection model. Results When controlling for endogeneity and important determinants of government health expenditure, the results suggest that, across all countries, agreements do not have a statistically significant effect on GHE. However, the effect differs according to country income group, with low-income countries experiencing increases in spending during agreement, lower-middle income countries seeing decreases in expenditure, for upper-middle income countries no effect on spending are observed. In addition, the effect differs according to agreement type: agreements with a social protection component are associated with increases in spending in low-income countries but have no statistically significant effects among middle-income countries. Agreement types with no social protection component are associated with decreases in spending among lower-middle income countries; and there is no statistically significant effect among low-income and upper-middle income countries. Conclusions The results indicate that, contrary to claims in the existing literature, IMF agreements do not have a statistically significant effect on GHE (positive or negative). However, this aggregate finding obscures the effect of particular agreement types in particular contexts. In low-income countries, agreements with an emphasis on social protection are associated with increases in GHE. When agreements have no social protection component they are associated with decreases in GHE for lower-middle-income countries, but not in other countries. In such contexts, IMF agreements either fail to enhance, or actually reduce, the capacity of health systems to meet health need.

This dissertation aims to problematize the concept (and proposed policy) of "debt sustainability", particularly in relation to those countries classified as "low-income", by attempting to map the logic behind what is presented as neutral, technical fact (i.e., "best practice") and seeing what work this logic does, i.e., what its effects are. Debt sustainability is not a free-floating concept, but one that is operationalized in policy. This means that the outcomes of employing a debt sustainability framework for low-income countries may have tangible consequences; in this way, and most importantly, debt sustainability may also have consequences regarding prospects for debt reliefand for the way countries and organizations make lending and borrowing decisions. The way the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conceptualizes and presents indebtedness, poverty, governance, and (sustainable) "development" dialectically reproduces a discourse around debt that both limits (depoliticizes) and opens possibilities for debt cancellation and fundamental change fundamental change in the IMF's role and function, in the Fund's relations with countries of the global south, and in the budgetary and other constraints those countries face in processes of "indebtedness" and "development". / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2005.

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