Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz 2003. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-143).

Thesis (L.LM) -- University of the Western Cape, 2007. / Includes bibliographic references (leaves 60-63).

Thesis--Purdue University. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 343-346).

Thesis (doctoral)--Helsinki, 1978. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 407-428).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, June 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

This thesis examines the interaction between real and financial decisions in a two-country world economy. To understand this interaction, we develop two-country general equilibrium multi-period models of pure exchange and production economies. We model the real decisions of consumption and investment choice and the financial decisions of portfolio choice explicitly under various degrees of financial market integration. In addition, we allow the governments to act strategically in making their policy choice regarding the degree of integration in the international goods and financial markets. Therefore, our models allow us to examine the effect of the interaction between real and financial decisions on policy choice in the goods and financial markets. The main results in the thesis are presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. We first analyse how the optimal tariff decision may vary under different financial market structures. In order to do so, we determine the government's choice of tariff level using a two-good general equilibrium framework where the financial structure in the economy is explicitly modelled. We find that the extent to which of financial markets are integrated affects trade policy decisions in the commodity markets. Specifically, we find an inverse relationship between the Nash equilibrium tariff level and the degree of international financial market integration. The intuition underlying this result is as follows. In our model, the government uses tariffs to cause a favourable change in the terms of trade. However, in the presence of financial markets, households can hedge endowment risks and the change in the terms of trade by using financial contracts. Thus, the favourable terms of trade effect (which is the motivation for a tariff in our model) associated with a tariff levy is reduced with increasing degrees of financial integration. Given the influence of financial market structure on endogenous trade policy, we then characterise and numerically compute the welfare gains from financial market integration. We identify the welfare gains from two sources. The direct source is the gain from risk-sharing in the financial markets. The second source is the gain from free trade in the commodity market that results from a government's tariff game in the presence of complete financial integration. We find that the magnitude of the welfare gain due to free trade is substantially greater than that due to increased risk-sharing capabilities under a reasonable calibration of our world economy. Thus far, we have assumed the financial market segmentation in the economy to be exogenous and our results suggest that the existing financial market structure has important repercussions in the-commodity markets. In the third part of our analysis, we analyse the government's choice of financial market structure. To do this, we examine the equilibrium policy choice of financial market segmentation in the absence of trade policy. That is, under what conditions will a country find it optimal to limit access to its own or foreign capital markets? Our results suggest that in the special case in which the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale in capital, each country may choose to deny foreign access to its domestic stock market. In general however, we find that complete financial market integration will be the optimal choice for both countries. Our main finding is that there are strong interactions between financial markets and goods markets. Consequently, the optimal tariff level can be very different under different financial market structures. Also, the welfare impact of opening financial markets can be large, given the influence of financial market structure on endogenous tariffs in the goods markets. Finally in a production economy, the optimal financial market structure can be related to the nature of the production technology. Some policy recommendations follow from our work. First, the existing financial market structure in the economy should be considered in making the policy choice of a tariff level: the more integrated the financial markets, the lower the optimal tariffs. Second, the share of capital in a country's production technology is an important factor in the decision of the optimal financial market structure. When the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital, the optimal financial structure is complete integration. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The three chapters of my dissertation study the macroeconomics and firm dynamics under financial frictions and institutional frictions. They contain both theoretical and empirical analysis with a special emphasis on the scope of the open economy and the implications on policy. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical framework to study the debt portfolio choice and optimal capital control policy in an open economy with financial frictions. I extend the model of international borrowing with collateral constraint to allow for multiple debt maturities. As in the single-maturity version of the model, the equilibrium exhibits overborrowing because, due to a pecuniary externality, private agents undervalue the cost of financial liabilities that demand repayment in future constrained states. I show that in the multiple-maturity model overborrowing in short-term debt is especially severe because the repayment of short-term liabilities is larger than that of long-term liabilities in future constrained states, resulting in greater cost undervaluation of short-term financial obligations. To counteract these inefficiencies, the model justifies a set of maturity-dependent capital controls. The model predicts a tightening of capital controls tilted toward short maturities during financial crises. When calibrated to Argentine data, the model reproduces the observed dynamics of debt portfolios, and the short-term targeting of capital controls during crises. The optimal capital-control policy reduces the frequency of crises by half and generates sizable welfare improvements. Motivated by the policy implications of Chapter 1, the second chapter of my dissertation presents an empirical study of how capital control policies are implemented in financial crises. I construct a novel measure of capital control stringency and establish three stylized facts about the capital control changes around banking crisis. First, capital control policies do not show significant changes until the onset of financial crisis (procyclicality). Second, not only outflow controls but also inflow controls are strengthened upon the arrival of financial crisis (dual tightening). Third, inflow controls show strong emphasis towards curbing short-term flows, while outflow controls are generally enhanced with respect to a wide range of flows regardless of their maturities (short-term maturity targeting). These patterns are robust to countries with different economy stances, external indebtedness, exchange-rate regimes and capital control levels. Besides the financial frictions, the institutional frictions also play important roles in the external finance. Therefore, the third chapter of my dissertation examines the role of public governance quality in determining the composition of a country's external liabilities and the capital structure of firms. In this joint work with Shang-Jin Wei, we first build a model with firm heterogeneity to show that better institutional quality tends to promote a higher share of foreign direct investment and equity investment in total foreign liabilities, and a higher share of long-term debt within the debt/loan category. Similar prediction holds for the capital structure of firms. We then conduct extensive empirical investigation by exploring both firm-level data and country-level data and find supportive evidence for these predictions.

Abstract not available

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Political Science Department, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on January 12, 2010). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta." "Spring 2010." Includes bibliographical references.