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Coffee-producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been trading coffee for centuries, but exports outside the continent expanded in the postcolonial period. Internationalization of coffee-producing countries expanded further in the 1980s and 1990s, when governments adopted market reforms and trade liberalization. Liberalization of an economy is, ipso facto, the implementation of policies to create an open, free trade, market economy. As the IMF noted in 1992, a marked shift in the orientation of the trade and industrial policies of most developing countries away from a heavy reliance on direct intervention and inward-looking industrial policies toward less controlled and more export-oriented trade regimes occurred from the mid-1980s onward. Similarly, liberal economic theory suggests that pressures caused by the internationalization of an economy widely affect preferences, institutions, and policies. Liberal economic theory is the only one of these theories that does not put the onus on leadership or institutional choice.

No description available.

Coffee-producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been trading coffee for centuries, but exports outside the continent expanded in the postcolonial period. Internationalization of coffee-producing countries expanded further in the 1980s and 1990s, when governments adopted market reforms and trade liberalization. Liberalization of an economy is, ipso facto, the implementation of policies to create an open, free trade, market economy. As the IMF noted in 1992, a marked shift in the orientation of the trade and industrial policies of most developing countries away from a heavy reliance on direct intervention and inward-looking industrial policies toward less controlled and more export-oriented trade regimes occurred from the mid-1980s onward. Similarly, liberal economic theory suggests that pressures caused by the internationalization of an economy widely affect preferences, institutions, and policies. Liberal economic theory is the only one of these theories that does not put the onus on leadership or institutional choice.

Existing research finds that increases in administrative burden reduce client access, political efficacy, and equity. However, extant literature has yet to investigate how administrative burden policies are interpreted by street-level bureaucrats (SLB), whose values and beliefs structure uses of discretion and client experiences of programs. In this article, we utilize quantitative and qualitative data to examine SLB policy preferences regarding administrative burden in Oklahoma's Promise—a means-tested college access program. Our findings demonstrate that SLB in our sample interpret administrative burden policies through the lens of political ideology. Conservative SLB express significantly more support for administrative burden policies, arguing that these policies prevent fraud and demonstrate client deservingness. In contrast, predominantly liberal SLB justify opposition to administrative burden by arguing that the requirements undermine social equity. Together, our findings reveal that SLB political ideology shapes interpretations of administrative burden and perceptions of client deservingness in Oklahoma's Promise.

Using survey data collected from residents of counties along the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States, we use innovative compositional data analysis techniques to examine individuals' assignment of responsibility for hurricane preparedness across federal, state, and local officials as well as among household residents and their community. We find that the public assigns limited responsibility for hurricane preparedness to governments. Rather, respondents, especially conservatives and those with low trust in government, view individuals themselves as responsible for preparedness. Our results emphasize the role of ideology and the individualistic culture of American politics. These results also have implications for scholars who study individual attribution responsibility in multi-level systems and who may assume that individuals will assign responsibility to one of the various levels of government; however, focusing on disaster preparation in particular, our study shows that a significant number of individuals may not assign responsibility to government at any level.

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Public goods are both unique and fascinating because it is virtually impossible to allocate a pure public good through market mechanisms. This chapter explores public goods and presents the criteria that can be used to identify public goods and to differentiate them from other types of goods. It looks at the purest public goods, which are conveniently called pure public goods. The chapter discusses why the characteristics of these purest of public goods make it extremely difficult to provide them through markets. The concept of public goods appears under several different terms in academic literature, including pure public goods, collective consumption goods, and social goods. There are at least two definitions for public goods. The first is loose, casual, and imprecise but immediately easy to understand. The second is precise and abstract, and it requires subsequent additional definitions to clarify. Impure goods occupy the vast area between pure public goods and pure private goods.