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In this dissertation I investigate the relationship between arms races and the probability of militarized conflict onset. The research question is critically important on at least two fronts: first, many policy makers and scholars alike believe ramping up military forces is the best way to deter military conflict (the peace through strength argument) while others suggest arms races do nothing but lead states towards militarized conflict. Second, this dissertation fills a research gap present since the end of the Cold War since research on arms races by the scientific community of conflict scholars has slowed dramatically since the end of the Cold War and findings remain inconclusive. The Steps to War research program (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008), however, suggests arms races are one of the central provocateurs of militarized conflict and warfare between states. Using this theoretical approach I frame arms races as dangerous events in the global arena and provide a clear theoretical account of the international system, the incentives for arming, and the linkage between arms racing and international conflict. The central theoretical argument suggests arms races lead states into conflict with one another. I test my expectations through a regional analysis of minor powers from three geographic areas: Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East over the period 1970-2000. In an important departure from the majority of previous quantitative arms race and conflict studies I utilize the actual weapons stockpiles of states (as opposed to defense expenditure data) as the primary measure of an arms race. The empirical results not only shed insight into the likelihood observing international conflict when preceded by arms racing but also indicate whether certain types of arms racing --- air as opposed to sea or ground racing, for example---may be more likely to develop into conflict than other forms.

Thesis (M.A.)--Lehigh University, 2009. / Adviser: John M. Gillroy.

Thèse - Université de Paris. / At head of title: Université de Paris. Faculté de droit. "Bibliographie": p. [275]-276.

Inaug.-Diss.--Frankfurt am Main. / Lebenslauf. "Schrifttum": p. vii-viii.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Calcutta. / Bibliography: p. [145]-148.

A complete theory of interpretation for human rights law must answer two kinds of questions. First: Who should interpret international human rights law? Second: What principles should guide the interpretation of human rights law? Individual governments frequently claim the right to interpret international law as it applies to them, but this claim is contested by many United Nations subgroups and by nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International. I argue that international institutions are more likely to give a fair hearing to people's human rights than are their own governments. Accordingly, we can conclude as a general rule that international institutions should be assigned authority to interpret international human rights law. The general rule has an exception, however. Democratic states that protect basic freedoms of speech and assembly will promote and protect their own citizens' human rights better than undemocratic states. Moreover, free democratic states, by giving a voice to all citizens, can take advantage of local knowledge about particular human rights problems and solutions, and so are more likely than international institutions to interpret human rights law with a sensitivity to the human rights of all citizens and to the locally important human rights issues. Therefore, unlike other states, liberal democratic states should have the authority to interpret international human rights law as it applies within their borders. What principles should guide the interpretation of human rights law? The answer depends on whether we take a short- or long-term perspective. Currently, the institutions of international law are relatively ineffective when compared to most domestic legal systems. While this remains the case, a principle allowing interpreters to use their judgment about moral human rights in interpreting human rights law can be justified on the basis of the contribution this would make to global deliberation about the proper understanding of moral human rights. As human rights law develops more effective, less voluntaristic institutions, this principle of interpretation should be phased out.