The access control mechanisms used in traditional security infrastructures, such as ACL and password applications, have been proven inadequate, inflexible, and difficult to apply in the Internet due to the incredible magnitude of today's Internet. Recently, research for expressing trust information in the digital world has been explored to be complementary to security mechanisms. This thesis deals with the access control for the resources provided over the Internet. On line digital content service is exemplary of such an application. In this work, we have concentrated on the idea of a trust management system, which was first proposed by Blaze et a1 in 1996, and we have proposed a general-purpose, application-independent Dynamic Distributed Trust Model (DDTM). In our DDTM, access rights are directly associated with a trust value. The trust values in this thesis are further classified into direct trust values, indirect trust values and trust authorization levels. We have calculated and expressed each type of the trust values as explicit numerical values. The core of this model is the recommendation-based trust model, organized as a Trust Delegation Tree (TDT), and the authorization delegation realized by delegation certificate chains. Moreover, the DDTM provides a distributed key-oriented certificate-issuing mechanism with no centralized global authority. A Dynamic Distributed Trust Protocol (DDTP) was developed as a general protocol for establishing and managing the trust relationship in a TDT structure. The protocol was verified by means of the verification tool, SPIN, and was prototyped to simulate communication and behaviors among the certificate issuer nodes on a TDT.

Wang, Jingjing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-62). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

This paper examines national Internet control from a policy regime perspective. The mechanisms through which governments attempt to control the Internet may be developed and implemented by different institutions and agencies, or fall outside of a formal regulatory structure entirely. As such, the totality of the institutions and practices of national Internet control is better conceptualized not as a regulatory regime, but as a control regime. After a survey of the critical policy and control dimensions, a six-part typology of control regimes is proposed. The purpose of this study and typology is exploratory. With comparative research about Internet control regimes at a relatively early stage, this paper aims to enable the formation of concepts and hypotheses about the interrelationship, or co-presence, of key distinguishing variables in different Internet control regimes.

The challenge of having to create and remember a secure password for each user account has become a problem for many computer users and can lead to bad password management practices. Simpler and less secure passwords are often selected and are regularly reused across multiple user accounts. Computer users within corporations and institutions are subject to password policies, policies which require users to create passwords of a specified length and composition and change passwords regularly. These policies often prevent users from reusing previous selected passwords. Security vendors and professionals have sought to improve or even replace password authentication. Technologies such as multi-factor authentication and single sign-on have been developed to complement or even replace password authentication. The objective of the study was to investigate the password habits of South African computer and internet users. The aim was to assess their attitudes toward password security, to determine whether password policies affect the manner in which they manage their passwords and to investigate their exposure to alternate authentication technologies. The results from the online survey demonstrated that password practices of the participants across their professional and personal contexts were generally insecure. Participants often used shorter, simpler and ultimately less secure passwords. Participants would try to memorise all of their passwords or reuse the same password on most of their accounts. Many participants had not received any security awareness training, and additional security technologies (such as multi-factor authentication or password managers) were seldom used or provided to them. The password policies encountered by the participants in their organisations did little towards encouraging the users to apply more secure password practices. Users lack the knowledge and understanding about password security as they had received little or no training pertaining to it.