Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Law Wing Fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [151]-156). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / 摘要 --- p.II / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.III / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.IV / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Purpose --- p.3 / Organization --- p.4 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- REVIEW OF THEORIES AND LITERATURE --- p.5 / The Literature on Foreign Direct Investment --- p.5 / The Literature on Legal Issues --- p.10 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- METHODOLOGY --- p.17 / Data Collection --- p.17 / Control Variables in Detail --- p.20 / Design of Regression Models --- p.26 / Methodology --- p.28 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON INVESTMENT MODE SELECTION --- p.29 / Rationale for the Study --- p.29 / Fundamental Differences between Partial Acquisition and JV --- p.30 / Importance of Legal Institutions in the Choice of M&A and JV --- p.33 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.36 / Hypothesis on the Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.39 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.43 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.45 / Legal Origin --- p.45 / Shareholder Protection --- p.48 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.50 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.52 / Other Legal Issues --- p.54 / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON OWNERSHIP PROPORTION DECISION --- p.57 / Rationale for the Study --- p.57 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.57 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.61 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.63 / Legal Origin --- p.63 / Shareholder Protection --- p.65 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.66 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.67 / Other Legal Issues --- p.68 / Chapter CHAPTER SIX --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.70 / TABLE --- p.73 / Table 1: The Variables --- p.73 / Table 2: Shareholder protection around the world --- p.82 / Table 3: Government enforcement efficiency around the world --- p.85 / "Table 4: Accounting standard, corporate transparency, securities regulation, mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation around the world" --- p.88 / Table 5A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection --- p.91 / Table 5B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection --- p.93 / Table 5C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection --- p.95 / "Table 5D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection" --- p.97 / Table 5E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection --- p.99 / Table 6A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.101 / Table 6B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.103 / Table 6C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.105 / "Table 6D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion)" --- p.107 / Table 6E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.109 / Table 7A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.111 / Table 7b: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.113 / Table 7C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample) --- p.115 / "Table 7D: Effect of shareholder protection, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample)" --- p.117 / Table 7E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.119 / Table 8 A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.121 / Table 8B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.123 / Table 8C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (minority ownership sample) --- p.125 / Table 8D: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.127 / Table 8E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.129 / Table 9A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.131 / Table 9b: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.133 / Table 9C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.135 / "Table 9D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (m&a sample)" --- p.137 / Table 9E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.139 / Table 10A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.141 / Table 10B: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.143 / Table 10C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.145 / "Table 10D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample)" --- p.147 / Table 10E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.149 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.151 / APPENDIX --- p.157 / Appendix 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of investment mode selection --- p.157 / Appendix 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (m&a sample) --- p.159 / Appendix 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.161 / "Appendix 4: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.163 / "Appendix 5: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.164 / "Appendix 6: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency and other legal issues" --- p.165 / Appendix 7: Correlations of firm-level and country-level control variables --- p.166

The recent developments in the European Community evoked by the Single European Act and commonly referred to as the creation of "Fortress Europe" by the end of 1992 have been attracted considerable attention with respect to economic and political integration in the international arena. Similarly, the conclusion of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement aiming at a loose form of economic integration received significant recognition. These two agreements cover not only liberalization of trade in goods and services but moreover, include foreign direct investment. This is of particular significance since little progress has been made in its regulation on an international level in comparison to the regulation of trade in goods. Due to the fact that direct investment is primarily exercised by large multinational enterprises it has a larger political impact on the host countries than trade in goods and services. Foreign ownership of local industry creates the concern of economic dependence and of a loss of sovereign powers among host governments. Consequently, governments introduce laws and regulations aiming at the restriction of direct investment of foreign investors. However, as foreign investment augments economic growth, it is of common benefit to both investors and host countries to provide an investment climate which balances the conflict of interest between the need of legal certainty and flexibility for foreign investors arid the safeguard of economic independence and political freedom of host country governments to introduce and maintain measures deemed necessary for the benefit of their national economies. This thesis will demonstrate the most effective regime to solve this conflict through comparison of the Free Trade Agreement with the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Single European Act. These agreements have been chosen since they involve two of the triad world economic powers and thus, represent industrialized nations with the highest degree of foreign direct investment aiming at the liberalization of direct investment in their "enlarged" markets. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first and second parts will discuss the degree of liberalization of foreign investment within the Common Market including the progress made under the Single European Act of 1986 and within the free trade area established by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1989. The analysis will centre around the issues of free establishment of companies, the National Treatment Principle, capital movement, and mergers and acquisitions. The third part consists of the comparative analysis and will provide the final conclusions. The conclusions will show that the two agreements share few similarities but they are characterized by their divergent approach to direct investment liberalization. It is submitted that the more comprehensive form of liberalization is reached in the Common Market due to its broad restraint on sovereign powers of its Member States and coherently implemented elimination of restrictions on foreign investment. In contrast, the Free Trade Agreement only imposes selected obligations on the parties to liberalize direct investment. It will become clear that the Free Trade Agreement stands for a settlement of the most vexing investment issues between the parties rather than a commitment to virtually liberalize investment between the U.S. and Canada. In view of this result, recommendations are made to further liberalize investment under the Free Trade Agreement. These have to be seen, however, in the light of numerous economic and political divergencies between the Common Market and the U.S.- Canadian free trade area. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This study examined the determinants of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports of processed food. This study also examined the impact of U.S. FDI on U.S. exports on processed food. FDI and export models used for estimation in this study were based on the cost-minimizing production function. The analysis focused on ten countries for the period of 1989-2004. Four of them were Asian countries: India, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. Six of them were European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The model was estimated using the two-way error component three-stage least squares (EC3SLS) method. Results from this study show that U.S. FDI and U.S. exports of processed food are complements. Major factors affecting U.S. FDI in the processing industry are GDP, GDP per capita, exchange rate, tariff rate, labor compensation cost, interest rate, and distance. Major factors affecting U.S. exports in the processed food industry are GDP, distance, and GDP from the agri-sector.

This paper will show that, despite the need for extension of foreign direct investment in the form of multinational corporations to capital-scarce, less developed countries, political risk creates a gap between the demand and supply of foreign investments. In Chapter II, the patterns of foreign direct investment are analyzed. Chapter III reviews the various sources of political risk and concludes that the existence of political risk is an obstacle to the formation of optimum level investment. Chapter IV discusses the relative positions of the less developed countries and the multinational corporations. Chapter V shows the problems caused by the absence of a universal, regulatory institution. Chapter VI presents case studies of corporations based in Chile, Peru, and Angola. Chapter VII suggests ways that political risk can be minimized.

This study analyzes corporate governance practices of foreign (non-U.S.) issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq. Specifically, I examine the extent to which these foreign issuers voluntarily comply with U.S. stock exchange corporate governance requirements applicable to domestic issuers. My sample consists of 201 foreign companies primarily domiciled in Brazil, China, Israel, and the United Kingdom. I find that 151 (75 per cent) of the sample firms do not elect to comply with any of the U.S. corporate governance requirements. Logistic regression analysis generally supports the hypotheses that conformance with U.S. GAAP and percentage of managerial ownership are positively associated, and that percentage ownership by major shareholders is negatively associated with foreign firms electing to comply with U.S. corporate governance rules. This evidence is relevant for regulators and investors.