No description available.

No description available.

The object of this thesis is, from a study of the contemporary Persian sources, to determine the broad outlines of the development of the early Safawid state, and in particular to describe the evolution of the principal offices of state. As the reforms of 'Abbais I (1587-1629) had a profound effect on the structure and organization of the Safawid state, the accession of 'Abbas I forms a convenient point at which to terminate this thesis, which therefore relates in the main to the reigns of Isma'il I (1501/2-1524) and Tahmasp I (1524-76). An attempt has been made to show how the fundamental dichotomy between Turk and Persian, the lack of any precise definition of the functions of the chief dignitaries, and the absence of any clear differentiation between the classes, affected the development of the Safawid state during this period. It should be noted that this thesis deals only with the most important offices of state, and does not purport to be in any way a complete description of the early Safawid administrative system. An attempt has also been made to determine the factors which enabled the Safawids to impose Shi'ism as the orthodox religion of the Safawid state. In writing the historical background to this thesis, I have endeavoured, on the one hand, to give the shortest account of events consonant with a proper understanding of the period, and, on the other hand, to give a rather fuller picture of events in Khurasan, 'Iraq-i 'Ajam and Fars, during the hundred years between the death of Timur and the accession of Isma'il, than is to be found elsewhere.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: From 628 CE to 632 CE, in the late Sassanian period, there were possibly eleven royal successors to the Sassanian throne. This indicates instability and that the Sassanian dynasty was politically weakened. A succession crisis had developed. This study presents an attempt to understand one aspect of the political milieu of the succession crisis period, namely the legitimisation practices of the late Sassanian rulers. Therefore, the tools that were used for legitimisation by the Sassanian monarchs from the succession crisis period, and how they were used, are investigated. To better understand how the legitimisation tools available to Sassanian monarchs developed the political techniques used by the succession crisis monarchs will be compared with the early Sassanian monarchs of 224 CE to 302 CE (Ardashir 1, Shapur I, Hormizd I, Wahram I, Wahram II, Wahram III and Narseh). The comparison contributes to an improved understanding of the 7th century Sassanian succession struggles by tracking the changes in the techniques and practices Sassanian rulers utilised in the Empire to legitimise their rule. Such changes are rooted in the wider politico-historical contexts within which the Sassanian monarchs excercised their authority. The study will open with an investigation of the major political events of the 7th century CE that had an effect on the succession struggles and political events in the Sassanian Empire. One of the primary sources that are used is The History of Prophets and Kings by the 10th century CE Arabic historian Jarir al-Tabari. Physical evidence of the Sassanian monarchs like coinage, rock reliefs and silver bowls will also be used as primary sources and analysed to better understand the propaganda used by the Sassanian monarchs. The material propaganda techniques used by Sassanian monarchs from the early period and late period changed. The reasons behind the changes are highlighted and these reasons are furthermore explained. The study concludes that the Sassanian monarchs from the succession crisis period had a shrinking pool of legitimisation resources and that they had to legitimise their rule in a short period of time in view of internal opposition. As a result, the Sassanian monarchs from the period focused on legitimisation techniques that were not a drain on resources and could quickly influence the perception of people. The political legitimisation of the last Sassanian monarchs ultimately failed though as the Sassanian dynasty only continued to reign for another 23 years after 628 CE. The failure of the legitimisation of the Sassanian dynasty could be largely attributed to the internal opposition and the damaging war against the Byzantine Empire. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die tydperk tussen 628 tot 632 n.C was daar na bewering elf troonopvolgers in die Sassaniede Ryk. Dit illustreer die politieke onstabiliteit in die Sassaniede Ryk op daardie tydstip, n troonopvolgingskrisis het ontwikkel. In die studie word n poging van stapel gestuur om een aspek van die politieke milieu van die tydperk te verstaan, die legitimasiepraktyke van die laat Sassaniede heersers. Die hulpbronne tot die beskikking van die Sassaniede konings wat ingespan is om hulle regerings populariteit te gee word daarom ondersoek. Om die ontwikkeling van die legitimeringspraktyke beter te verstaan word die praktyke van die troonopvolgingskrisis konings vergelyk met die tegnieke van die vroeë Sassaniede konings van die tydperk 224 n.C. tot 302 n.C. (Ardashir I, Shapur I, Hormizd I, Wahram I, Wahram II, Wahram III and Narseh). Die vergelyking dien as n beginpunt om die Sassanied troonopvolgingskrisis beter te verstaan en om die veranderings van die legitimeringspraktyke te identifiseer. Sulke veranderings is gegrond in die wyer politieshistoriese konteks waarin die Sassanied konings hul mag uitgeoefen het. Die studie ondersoek eerstens die belangrike politieke gebeure van die 7de eeu n.C. wat n effek op die troonopvolgingskrisis en politieke aspekte van die Sassaniede Ryk gehad het. Een van die primêre bronne waarvan die studie gebruik maak, is The History of Prophets and Kings van die 10de eeuse n.C. Arabiese geskiedkundige Jarir al-Tabari. Ander primêre bronne wat gebruik word, sluit in muntstukke, rotsreliëfs en silwer bakke wat analiseer word om beter te verstaan hoe die produkte gebruik is as propaganda. Die legitimeringspraktyke en propaganda het n verandering ondergaan van die vroeë typerk tot die laat tydperk. Die redes vir die verandering word identifiseer en ‘n verduideliking vir die redes word aangebied. Die studie maak die gevolgtrekking dat die Sassaniede konings van die troonopvolgingskrisis tydperk minder hulpbronne tot hul beskikking gehad het en dat hulle hul blitsig moes regverdig vanweë interne teenkanting. As gevolg van hierdie faktore het die Sassaniede konings propaganda verkies wat nie te veel van hul hulpbronne gebruik het nie en ook mense baie vininig beïnvloed het. Die politieke programme van die laat Sassaniede het uiteindelik misluk. Die Sassanidiese dinastie het net vir nog 23 jaar na 628 n.C. geheers. Die uiteindelike mislukking van die politieke regverdigings programme van die laat Sassaniede kan grootliks verbind word aan die sterk interne teenstand en die effek wat die oorlog teen die Bisantynse Ryk gehad het.

No description available.

No description available.

In recent Muslim history, the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 has been a watershed event which has had--and continues to have--a significant impact on Muslim societies. Indeed, the Revolution is often perceived as the single most important example in contemporary times of the manner in which Islamism has been utilized as a revolutionary tool. The success of the Revolution in utilizing ideological Islam has had important implications for Pakistan, given the latter's reliance upon Islamism in its public life. This thesis examines editorial response in the Pakistani press to the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79 and analyzes the factors which influenced this reaction. / Pakistan's response to the Iranian Revolution provides a glimpse into the nature of a country coming to terms with itself and its own interpretation of its dominant socio-political ideology. The Revolution highlighted already-existing tensions within the Pakistani national psyche: questions were raised with regard to the ideological direction of the country, its pragmatic concerns for security as well as the role of Islam in the formation of a public identity. The Iranian Revolution, by presenting differing perspectives on some of these issues--though all were framed within the context of the language of Islamism--served to deepen the collective Pakistani soul-searching. The nature of Pakistani response was essentially one of an intricate balancing act amongst competing loyalties, perspectives and imperatives. This response highlighted Pakistan's somewhat tense relationship with itself and its reliance upon Islam as a dominant socio-political ideology. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

This thesis will analyze the role of Shi'i religious symbols employed in the Iranian revolution of 1979. During the revolution, the Shi'i symbolic structure of the Karbala' paradigm or the symbols of Karbala' and of Husayn's martyrdom were extensively employed to mobilize the masses. Regarded as the Imam and as the symbol of the revolution, Khumayni extensively utilized such religious symbols in order to generate mass revolutionary political consciousness against the Shah's tyrannical regime. In other words, throughout the revolution the traditional 'ashura' mourning ceremony--commemorating a tragic historical event the martyrdom of Husayn who was killed on the battlefield of Karbala' on Muharram 10, 60/680--was transformed into and politicized to be a vehicle of mass revolutionary political mobilization.

The problem with which this study is concerned is the development of a plan to reform the structure of the current system of Iranian higher education, both quantitatively and qualitatively. These goals have been set by the Charter of Educational Revolution and coincide with the Development Plans of the nation which have aimed to bring about a fundamental change in society. Educational history of Iran since ancient times is discussed, with special emphasis on higher education, and the religio-cultural influences in shaping the organization of educational institutions and curricula are overviewed. The nation developed one of the world's oldest scholastic centers of higher learning, Gondi-Shapur Academy, whose international faculty contributed significantly to the advancement of knowledge. Iranian culture was exposed to Islam following the Arab invasion; and Islamic doctrine, which has been opposed to secular education, has dominated the educational philosophy of the country. Western education came to Iran through military institutions and religious institutions. Modern schools increased during the last decades of the nineteenth century; however, their progressive development can be traced only from the reign of Reza Shah, beginning in 1925. The first modern university of Iran was established forty years ago. The provincial universities and other institutions of higher learning came into existence in following years. After adopting the Charter of Educational Revolution in 1968, Iran experienced a rapid expansion of its institutions of higher learning. The percentage of total student enrollment in these institutions has never exceeded 0.37 per cent of the population, however, because the institutions could not expand rapidly enough to accommodate the students who applied for admission. Graduate education is also in the primary stages of development, currently comprising 2.4 per cent of the college students of the nation. To cope with these shortcomings, the study has come to the following conclusions: 1. The system of higher education in Iran should develop qualified graduate schools to educate highly advanced professionals and scholars to fill the positions which the nation, until the present time, has had to award to personnel who have received their education abroad.

This thesis is a study of the development of the Babi movement and the political implications embodied in its religious teachings. The thesis basically assumes that in its early development (1844--1848), the movement may be seen merely as religiously dissenting from the mainstream of Shi'i tradition. In the course of history, however, and especially after the Bab, its founder, claimed in 1848 to be the return of the Hidden Imam and proclaimed the abrogation of Qur'anic shari'a, the Babi movement showed radical tendencies, thus threatening the established religious and political authorities. This later development (1848--1853) was characterized by armed revolts by the Babis against the government troops. This thesis also examines the nature of Babi religious dissent and demonstrate that the Babi revolts were to a large extent based on religious motives.