To Iraq, her relationship with Britain has been a factor of major importance for the greater part of this century. At times, the connection has been particularly close, especially between 1914 and the end of the Mandate in 1932, and during the Second World War, when British forces once again occupied the country. Until recently, Britain was Iraq's most important ally, and is still her major trading partner. This thesis examines Anglo-Iraqi relations during the Occupation and Mandate periods, and attempts to assess their effect on the political and socio-economic life of the country.

It is difficult to know exactly why leaders and their advisors make decisions. Despite this, scholars have long attempted to gain insight into this largely unintelligible process, especially when the decision is acknowledged by many to be a poor one. In 1972, Irving Janis published a book that intended to explain why groups of seemingly rational and intelligent men could make disastrous decisions, a theory he named groupthink. When groupthink was first introduced, the Vietnam War was provided as an example of the theory in action. Though at the time Vietnam seemed like a plausible case of groupthink, declassified documents now available tell a decidedly different story. It is now evident that Lyndon Johnson agonized over the decision to send combat troops to Vietnam and that he did in fact seek the advice of people with an array of opinions on the best course of action in Vietnam. The application of groupthink to Vietnam becomes even weaker when compared to the cogent role groupthink played in the Iraq War. The Iraq War not only displayed symptoms of groupthink at an executive level, but precipitated it down into the lowest levels of government and the American people. Consequently, the Iraq War has thus far manifested itself as the most potent case of groupthink documented in modern times. While many of the symptoms found in Vietnam could be construed as coincidental, much of the groupthink symptoms found in the case of Iraq appear to be the result of careful calculation by the Bush administration.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the Iraqi politics of oil in the period from 20 th century onwards. Within this regard, while &ldquo / rentier state&rdquo / conception is generally put under consideration to understand the state&rsquo / s centrality in political, economic and social spheres of oil &ndash / producing countries, contrary to this conventional approach,this thesis argues that the key to all achievements and all failures of Iraqi state is related to the status of oil in Iraq&rsquo / s engagement with the superpowers and the attractiveness of Iraqi oil for other external actors like international non-state actors and multinational companies. In the first instance, the engagement of Britain and later on, the inclusion of the U.S to the national, regional and international affairs of Iraq are discussed within the boundaries of the aforementioned argument. The role of oil in the creation of the state, in its relations with neighbour countries and in relations conducted with the super powers of the international system is analyzed. Within this context, in the aftermath of the September 11, the U.S&rsquo / s intense desires for regime change in Iraq is analyzed to reveal that the main motivation behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is related with the country&rsquo / s vast oil resources. In the similar vein, the developments in the post- invasion period are analyzed to indicate the prevailing prominent role of oil. Eventually, this thesis states that even though changes and continuities occur in the course of time and accordingly divergences and convergences exist in the implementations of the Iraqi state, the issue of guaranteeing the flow of oil at reasonable price has remained in the focal point of the external interventions to Iraq.