Note:

The Irish crash that began in 2008 has been described as one of the most dramatic economic reversals ever experienced by an industrialised country. There is a strong consensus about the economic roots of the crisis: the country experienced a classic asset bubble. Much more difficult to explain however, is how a mature democracy sleep-walked into a crisis that had so much precedent and in retrospect seems to have been so apparent. The policy decisions made in the boom period must shoulder much of the blame, but they were not created in a vacuum. This thesis systematically examines the discourse on the Irish economy from a broad range of commentators in the years prior to the crash, including international and domestic organisations, academics, the newspapers, and politicians. It demonstrates that key mainstream analysts anticipated how the property boom would end on the basis of estimated fundamental house prices and demand levels. This implicitly assumed that these fundamentals would remain strong as the boom abated, and ignored the potential for a market panic. By contrast, the most prescient analysts relied heavily on international precedent, and recognised that property price falls would be closely correlated with the increase observed during the boom. A key dimension of the discourse was therefore how the lessons of financial history were applied or disregarded. The Irish crash that began in 2008 has been described as one of the most dramatic economic reversals ever experienced by an industrialised country. There is a strong consensus about the economic roots of the crisis: the country experienced a classic asset bubble. Much more difficult to explain however, is how a mature democracy sleep-walked into a crisis that had so much precedent and in retrospect seems to have been so apparent. The policy decisions made in the boom period must shoulder much of the blame, but they were not created in a vacuum. This thesis systematically examines the discourse on the Irish economy from a broad range of commentators in the years prior to the crash, including international and domestic organisations, academics, the newspapers, and politicians. It demonstrates that key mainstream analysts anticipated how the property boom would end on the basis of estimated fundamental house prices and demand levels. This implicitly assumed that these fundamentals would remain strong as the boom abated, and ignored the potential for a market panic. By contrast, the most prescient analysts relied heavily on international precedent, and recognised that property price falls would be closely correlated with the increase observed during the boom. A key dimension of the discourse was therefore how the lessons of financial history were applied or disregarded.