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No description available.

This thesis examines Protestant unionist commemorations of the Battle of the Somme in Northern Ireland during a phase in which they exhibited marked popularity and politicization. Filling a gap in the scholarship and building upon it, this thesis pays closer attention to the historical context and development of these commemorations and takes into account a broader swath of forms and locations of commemoration. It argues that, in the face of the perceived threat of Irish unification posed by the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, unionists employed the memory of the Somme as a political tool on two different but overlapping fronts. On one front, they used it against their collective opponents, who supported or supposedly supported Irish unification. On a second front, conflicting groups within the unionist community, namely unionist politicians, Orangemen, Protestant youths, and loyalist paramilitaries, interpreted the Somme differently to satisfy their partisan agendas. Analyzing Somme commemoration at the Belfast cenotaph, in parades, and in murals, this thesis provides explanations for why the Somme was remembered differently in various mediums and locales of commemoration, with particular attention to the differing degrees and manners in which Protestant commemorators recognized the Catholic contribution in the Somme campaign. / Department of History

This thesis outlines the evolution and roles of the political fronts in Northern Ireland and their potential for attaining political change. It will assess the impact of a number of selected 'variables', both 'internal' and 'external', on the utility (or lack of utility) of these fronts. The variables that have been selected for consideration are: 1) Ideology, structure and leadership, 2) The notion of violence as a habit, 3) Popular support, 4) State response and 5) Other factors and events in the External Environment. Alexander George's 'structured, focused, comparison' methodology will be employed and the selected cases are the Irish Republican Army, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Although all of the 'variables' have had a significant impact the thesis argues that the greatest motivation behind the use of Simi Fein has been the desire to mobilise or tap perceived existing support. In the case of the loyalist political fronts the domestic external environment, specifically the perception that the loyalist working classes had been manipulated by 'respectable' unionist politicians, was the most important factor behind their greater use. Paradoxically, it is unionist culture (such as its 'law abiding' nature and division of labour ethos) that has presented the most significant obstacle to their utility. The thesis will then assess whether or not political fronts represent moderation towards the use of violence on the part of the groups. It will suggest that they have in the loyalist cases. Although the following argues that political fronts are very much part of the 'terrorist machinery' as the political voices and propaganda outlets for terrorist groups, and that it is a misconception to view them as the 'moderate half of a movement, the thesis will contend that Sinn Fein has also ultimately come to represent moderation towards the use of violence. The conclusion will then suggest that the selected variables be tested in other examples and, assuming that Sinn Fein has come to represent moderation towards the use of violence, will then attempt to draw some lessons from the case of the IRA and its political front that might be considered when studying other cases.

This thesis examines the 1981 hunger strike by republican prisoners in Northern Ireland against the removal of special category status from newly convicted paramilitary prisoners on 1 March 1976, the fast was part of a protest that began in 1976. The thesis opens with an examination of the origins of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1969 and the emergence of a younger leadership in the late 1970's, and evaluates the significance of the prisons in Irish history. The development of the prisoners protests ranging from the refusal to put on a uniform and perform prison work to the rejection of sanitary or washing facilities, is analysed. The prisoners demands are examined in the context of British and international law. The campaign in support of the republican prisoners conducted outside the Maze Prison, including the formation of the Relatives Action Committee and the National H-Block/Armagh Committee is surveyed, and the female "dirty" protest at Armagh Prison is examined. The medical, ethical, and moral dilemmas presented by hunger striking are identified and the thesis examines the debate whether the men who died were suicides or martyrs. The 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes are examined with particular attention to the efforts to bring about a compromise with the British government and the factors leading to a new hunger strike in 1981 and to the intervention of the Catholic Church with the prisoners relatives which ended the fast. The hunger strike is analysed regarding its effect internationally in building up republican support, and in the Province where it acted as the base for the future success of Provisional Sinn Fein later in the decade.

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No description available.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985 represented a watershed in Anglo-Irish relations. Its specific aim has been the removal of the unionist veto which has frustrated attempts to settle the Irish Question since the partition of Northern Ireland from the rest of the island in 1921. Heralded initially by many as the "solution" to the "troubles", the Agreement had much to live up to. To an extent initial accolades were functions of wishful thinking and condemnation that of knee-jerk reaction based upon instinctive fear. One can only hope that a path to resolution had been created despite such misgivings and high expectations. One thing has been evident, there has been a general confusion among nationalists and unionists as to what the Agreement allows for. This paper attempts to analyze where the Anglo-Irish Agreement fits into the scheme of things in the political context of Northern Ireland. In the third year since its passing there seems to be little external sign of resolution to the conflict, certainly nothing that might justify the grand expectations of those who would have seen it realize the ultimate withdrawal of Britain from Ireland. The Agreement remains as contentious now after three years as it was in the days after its passing. This raises the necessity of a re-appraisal of the situation and forces the question, can there ever be a peaceful solution if there continues to be such a fundamental disagreement as to what is at stake? One of the few certainties about Northern Ireland is that if the parties involved continue to approach the problem from opposite and intransigent perspectives, no agreement reached between Britain and Ireland on the future of Northern Ireland which "threatens" to succeed will be allowed to do so peacefully. / Master of Arts

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Anglo-Free State relations between the wars still awaits a comprehensive study ... This is in par a reflection of the larger failure of British historians to work on Anglo-Irish history '" the Right has been ill at ease dealing with Britan's greatest failure, whilst the Left has found tropical climes more suited for the cultivation of its moral superiority. When R.F.Holland made this apposite comment, just over a decade ago, he may have been adding to the very problems he identified. Writing within the context of the 'Commonweath Alliance', he was joining a distinguished list of British and Irish historians who have sought to fiter inter-war Anglo-Free State relations through the mesh of Empire-Commonweath development. Beginning with A. Berredale Keith in the 1920s, this usage continued in either direct or indirect form (by way of particular institutions of Commonweath) from the 1930s to the 1970s through the works of W.K. Hancock, Nicholas Mansergh and D.W. Harkness, and was still finding favour with Brendan Sexton's study of the Irish Governor-Generalship system in the late 1980s.2 But herein a contradiction has developed: cumulative study of the unnatural origins and performance of the Free State as a Dominion has moved beyond questions of function to ask whether the Free State was in fact ever a Dominion at alL. 3 As such, there seems ever more need to step back from inter-Commonwealth study and refocus on the precise nature of the Free State's central relationship with Britan in this period. It is of course acknowledged that outwith the established zones of internal Irish and Empire-Imperial study there is no home or forum for one of the most enduring quandares of modern Europea history. Even if it is accepted that 'pure' Anglo-Irish history did not end in 1922, the weight of research based on the ten yeas prior, as against the ten yeas subsequent, suggests an easy acceptance, on both sides of the Irish Sea, and Atlantic, of the absolute value changes in that relationship. Studies covering the transition to independence, such as those of Joseph M. CUITan and Sheila Lawlot, have taen only tentative steps beyond 1922, and may indeed have epitomised an approach that subsequent Irish studies have done little to dispel; in the 1980s, major overviews by RF. Foster and J.J. Le have been notably reluctant to evaluate the quality of that new found freedom with continuing reference to Ireland's giant neighbour. Though Foster, and others, have noted that the main aim of the Free State in the 1920s was 'self-definition against Britan', the point is the extent to which Britan was wiling to allow the same. There has then been little impetus for direct Anglo-Free State inter-war study, and although the tide has begun to turn since the mid-1980's, notably through the achievements of Paul Canning, Deidre McMahon and, shortly before his death, Nicholas Mansergh6, it is probable that we are stil a long way short of being able to produce a comprehensive and coherent review of the period. Apar from the crucial Anglo/Irish-Anglo/Commonwealth dichotomy,there remains the political chasm dividing the Cosgrave years of the 1920s from those of de Valera's 1930s; indeed the overwhelming preoccupation with post-1931 confrontations has often, as in the case of McMahon's fine study, taen as its contrasting staing point the supposedly compliant 'pro-Treaty' years of 1922-31. It is hard to bridge this gulf when the little direct work on these earlier years, mostly concentrating on the two fundamenta issues of Boundar and financial settlement, has tended not to question this divide. Although Irish historians have turned an increasingly sympathetic eye on the internal politics and problems of these early yeas, the apathetic external image, in contrast to the later period, has been persistent. Nowhere has this negativity been more apparent than on the, also vita, topic of defence relations. For a subject that has been given more than adequate attention in terms of the 1921 Treaty negotiations and the Treaty Ports issue of the 1930s, the period in between has had little intensive coverage. In this regard the negative response of W.K.Hancock in 1937, stating that Cosgrave did not bother to question British defence imperatives, was stil being held some fifty yeas later by Paul Canning.7 Thus an enduring and importt image has emerged of defence relations re-enforcing the above divide, an image that has had to stand for the lack of new reseach. This does not mea that the image is necessarly an entirely false one, but it does mean that many of the supposed novelties of the de Valera yeas have been built on largely unknown foundations. The Treaty Ports issue is also vita to this thesis, but then so are other defence related matters which had an impact specific to the 1920s. In other words, the human and political context of how both countries, but the Irish government in paricular, coped with the immediate legacy of centuries of armed occupation, with the recent 1916-21 conflct, and with the smaller scale continuity of British occupation, was bound to cast old shadows over a new relationship. But how big were these shadows? It was on the basis of placing some detaled flesh on the skeleton of known (and unknown) policies and events that this thesis took shape. Frustrations and resentments could tae necessarily quieter forms than those which characterised the 1930s, and in the end be no less significant. If the first objective is then to make solid the continuity of defence affairs, it is appropriate to begin with a brief evaluation of the Treaty defence negotiations before tang a close look at British operations in the South in 1922 - the year when a reluctant Cosgrave was to inherit a situation where British forces were close to the development of civil war. Despite our growing knowledge of Britan's part in the progress of that war, there is stil a general perception that its forces became peripheral to events after the Truce of July 1921, and that its Army was, and had been, the only British Service involved in the struggle against armed republicanism.This is simply not the case, and it is to be wondered whether the proper absorption of Irish historians with the internal dynamics of the period, together with the authoritative quality of Charles Townshend's history of the 1919-21 British campaign, have not produced inhibitions to wider inquiry. 8 In any event, as the Admiralty was to play a central par in later defence relations it seems right to introduce, for the first time, the Royal Navy's importt role in the events of 1922. The point here is to establish that the actions and perceptions of both Services were to have repercussions for later attitudes. After these chapters, the following two aim to look at the cumulative legacy of British involvement and how both countries adjusted to the many unresolved questions thrown up by the Treaty and the unplanned contingencies of 1922. Retaining the theme that neither country could escape the past, nor trust to the future, chapter six returns to the physical and political impact made by the continuing presence of British forces in and around the three Treaty Ports, and along and across the Border. The final two chapters explore how all these factors helped determine the conditions for, and consequences of, one of the most damaging episodes of the later 1920s - the complete failure of the joint coasta defence review scheduled for December 1926.In all, the cumulative emphasis on the politics of defence may ilustrate what it was to be a small aspiring country that had little choice but to accept Britan's version of what was an inevitably close relationship, and to endure what Britan claimed as the benign strategic necessity of continued occupation.