The discussion concerning the prospects for democratization in Muslim-majority countries has been revived in recent years. It has been widely argued that the repression and exclusion of Islamic movements from the political process in Muslim countries breeds radicalism, while political engagement and inclusion, however, encourages moderation and compromise. The fact that only few Muslim states have been affected by the recent global wave of democratization has raised many questions concerning the impact of Islam and Islamic activism on democratization. Does Islam or Islamic activism hinder democratization and strengthen authoritarianism in the Muslim-majority countries? Can democratization progress in Muslim countries without the full inclusion of the major Islamic forces in the formal political process?

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-125).

This thesis studies the formation of the basic ideology of the Muh&dotbelow;ammadiyah during the period 1912--1942, analyzing in particular the fundamental aspects of its religious and social beliefs. The words and deeds of its leaders were crucial during the period in forming the Muh&dotbelow;ammadiyah's ideology, for these alone provided the basis for the movement's program. Their religious outlook reflected the movement's philosophical view of this world and the role of reason in understanding religion. This view was marked by openness, tolerance, and pluralism in dealing with other ideas, and a belief in the salutary character of change. What set the Muh&dotbelow;ammadiyah apart from other reformist groups was its insistence that the way to revive belief in and observance of Islamic injunctions was not limited to merely purifying certain aspects of religious practice ('ibadah), especially khilafiyah (controversial) matters such as takhayyul (fancy), bid`ah (innovation), and khurafah (superstition), but in pursuing social reform in line with a theology of practical action. For the Muh&dotbelow;ammadiyah, basic Islamic teachings served to encourage social responsibility; religious principles thus underlay every action.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, August, 2003. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-118)

No description available.

The relationship between Muslims and Christian in Indonesia is and important subject. Apart from a few investigations on certain conflicts in different areas of Indonesia, little effort has been devoted to thoroughly examining the complexity of the relationship between the two religious groups. This study is an attempt to investigate the perspectives of the exclusivist and inclusivist Muslims on Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia, especially during the New Order period (1965-1998). / In dealing with this subject, the theological and legal precepts on the ‘religious’ other as developed in some classical texts are explored briefly. In order to provide the historical background of current Muslim-Christian relations, the study then investigates policies of the Dutch, Old Order, and New Order governments on Muslims and Christians. During the Dutch regime, Christians received better treatment as compared to Muslims. This was deeply resented by some Muslims, who identified the Dutch as Christians and Christians as colonists. By the time Indonesians were approaching independence, Muslim, Christian and other religious groups were preoccupied with deciding the philosophical basis of the state, and the Sukarno government paid scant attention to the hidden tense relations between Muslims and Christians. With the shift to the New Order period, Muslim-Christian relations changed dramatically because Soeharto intentionally and carefully controlled Indonesians based on the policy of SARA. The study found that some elements of SARA policy caused tensions between Muslims and Christians. / In separate chapters, the study then explores the backgrounds and concerns of the exclusivists and inclusivists in relations to Muslim Christian relations. It found that among both exclusivists and inclusivists the degree of ‘exclusiveness’ or ‘inclusiveness’ varied, as they were influenced by their different backgrounds. In addition, within each groups or among individuals, the concerns on issues related to Muslim-Christian relations differed. Four main exclusivist institutions are discussed in the study: the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI), the Forum Pembela Islam (FPI), and the Laskar Jihad. Key issues discussed by the exclusivists include the Christian ‘other’, relations between religion and the state, Christianisation, and the Ambon conflicts. The relations between the exclusivists and the Christians have been coloured largely by disharmony. Exclusivists believe that Christianity underwent alteration and that the God of Muslims is different from the Christian God, who is described as having offspring. In addition, all exclusivist groups in the study stated the view that it was the Christianisation activities that tore apart the relationship between Muslims and Christians. / In contrast, the relationships between inclusivists Muslims and Christians are coloured largely by harmony. The inclusivists chose to work within the New Order system for changes beneficial to Indonesian Muslims by avoiding direct conflict with the government and occupying themselves with intellectual endeavours. Against such a backdrop, the renewal of Islamic thought, characterised mainly by inclusivism, was introduced and developed. Moreover, the inclusivists hold the view that plurality is a law of nature (sunnatullah). Within this view, all religions are seen to adhere to the same principle of One Truth; and will therefore gradually find their ‘common platform’ or kalimatun sawa. As a reflection of their perspective on religious pluralism, most inclusivists admit the existence and rights of other religious believers, especially the ahl al-kitab. / The study found that it was the exclusivists who were more adamant in criticising the inclusivists through articles in their media or sermons in their mosques. Three of their important critiques are the belief that the inclusivists have established a link with Jews and Christians, that inclusivism weakens Muslim faith by giving new interpretations to the Islamic foundation texts that deviate from the accepted views, and that inclusivists lack concern about Christianisation. In contrast, the inclusivists tend not to criticise or respond to critiques directed at them by the exclusivists, as they consider these to be emotional or personal.

This thesis investigates the activities of the Majlisul Islamil A`la Indonesia (MIAI), an Islamic federative organization of pre-independent Indonesia, elaborating in particular on the federation's socio-religious and political stance. Operating for only six years (1937--1943), the MIAI represented Muslim groups, as a counterpart to the "secularists," within the nationalist movement during both the final years of Dutch rule and the early stages of the Japanese occupation. The MIAI was established for the specific purpose of unifying the Islamic organizations---political and non-political, traditionalist and modernist alike---while at the same time reviving Muslim political and socio-religious strength after the decline of the Sarekat Islam, which had for almost fifteen years dominated the nationalist scene. / The mission of the MIAI was seen by Muslims as a response to the threat posed by external forces. It reacted in particular against Dutch policies considered discriminatory by Muslims concerning matters involving Islamic belief and practice, such as marriage and education. The federation also took a strong stand regarding Christian polemic aimed at Islam and took part in Indonesian Muslim response. That the establishment of the MIAI was favored by most Islamic organizations attested to the strong sentiment among Indonesian Muslims for a common front, regardless of their differences on socio-religious and political issues. Together with the GAPI (Gabungan Partai Politik Indonesia or the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties) and the PVPN (Persatuan Vakbonden Pegawai Negeri, or the Association of Government Employees), the MIAI took part in demanding political reform on behalf of Muslim groups. Indeed, notwithstanding its short life span, the MIAI was a pioneer for national unity in general and Indonesian Muslim unity in particular.

The relationship between Muslims and Christian in Indonesia is and important subject. Apart from a few investigations on certain conflicts in different areas of Indonesia, little effort has been devoted to thoroughly examining the complexity of the relationship between the two religious groups. This study is an attempt to investigate the perspectives of the exclusivist and inclusivist Muslims on Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia, especially during the New Order period (1965-1998). / In dealing with this subject, the theological and legal precepts on the ‘religious’ other as developed in some classical texts are explored briefly. In order to provide the historical background of current Muslim-Christian relations, the study then investigates policies of the Dutch, Old Order, and New Order governments on Muslims and Christians. During the Dutch regime, Christians received better treatment as compared to Muslims. This was deeply resented by some Muslims, who identified the Dutch as Christians and Christians as colonists. By the time Indonesians were approaching independence, Muslim, Christian and other religious groups were preoccupied with deciding the philosophical basis of the state, and the Sukarno government paid scant attention to the hidden tense relations between Muslims and Christians. With the shift to the New Order period, Muslim-Christian relations changed dramatically because Soeharto intentionally and carefully controlled Indonesians based on the policy of SARA. The study found that some elements of SARA policy caused tensions between Muslims and Christians. / In separate chapters, the study then explores the backgrounds and concerns of the exclusivists and inclusivists in relations to Muslim Christian relations. It found that among both exclusivists and inclusivists the degree of ‘exclusiveness’ or ‘inclusiveness’ varied, as they were influenced by their different backgrounds. In addition, within each groups or among individuals, the concerns on issues related to Muslim-Christian relations differed. Four main exclusivist institutions are discussed in the study: the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI), the Forum Pembela Islam (FPI), and the Laskar Jihad. Key issues discussed by the exclusivists include the Christian ‘other’, relations between religion and the state, Christianisation, and the Ambon conflicts. The relations between the exclusivists and the Christians have been coloured largely by disharmony. Exclusivists believe that Christianity underwent alteration and that the God of Muslims is different from the Christian God, who is described as having offspring. In addition, all exclusivist groups in the study stated the view that it was the Christianisation activities that tore apart the relationship between Muslims and Christians. / In contrast, the relationships between inclusivists Muslims and Christians are coloured largely by harmony. The inclusivists chose to work within the New Order system for changes beneficial to Indonesian Muslims by avoiding direct conflict with the government and occupying themselves with intellectual endeavours. Against such a backdrop, the renewal of Islamic thought, characterised mainly by inclusivism, was introduced and developed. Moreover, the inclusivists hold the view that plurality is a law of nature (sunnatullah). Within this view, all religions are seen to adhere to the same principle of One Truth; and will therefore gradually find their ‘common platform’ or kalimatun sawa. As a reflection of their perspective on religious pluralism, most inclusivists admit the existence and rights of other religious believers, especially the ahl al-kitab. / The study found that it was the exclusivists who were more adamant in criticising the inclusivists through articles in their media or sermons in their mosques. Three of their important critiques are the belief that the inclusivists have established a link with Jews and Christians, that inclusivism weakens Muslim faith by giving new interpretations to the Islamic foundation texts that deviate from the accepted views, and that inclusivists lack concern about Christianisation. In contrast, the inclusivists tend not to criticise or respond to critiques directed at them by the exclusivists, as they consider these to be emotional or personal.

No description available.