This thesis argues that a strong correlation exists between Islamic militancy and socio-economic and political conditions. Under 'normal' everyday conditions, passive elements of the Islamic community, the mutadayyin, dominate, but in times of crisis or challenge, it is the militants, the isl amiyyin, who react against the state, its institutions and its employees. The Egypt of Anwar al-S ad at (1970-1981) will be used in order to test this hypothesis. The everyday conditions in which the people live, work and survive will be examined in order to establish the constant, the invariable. These conditions include the sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts, especially in Upper Egypt; overpopulation; the lack of housing; the failure of education; the debt burden; the cost of war with Israel, and the 'brain-drain' from Egypt to the oil-rich countries. These aspects encouraged an increase in religiosity, both Muslim and Coptic. Egypt however was also faced with three periods of crisis during S ad at's presidency, namely the October War (1973), the 'open-door' economic policy of infit ah (April 1974+)/the Bread Riots (January 1977), and the peace process with Israel (November 1977+). Shortly after each period, the militants reacted against the state. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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This thesis is an internal organisational history of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt between 1973 and 2013. Based on memoires of Brotherhood leaders, as well as oral history interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013 with different rank-and-file members and dissidents, the thesis situates the life trajectories and personal experiences of these individuals within a larger national and international context. The purpose is to provide a historical account that is able to explain the reasons for the Brotherhood's cataclysmic failure of the summer of 2013. In accounting for the fall, my key argument centres on the internal rivalry between two political factions representing different "schools of thought", or visions, about the kind of organisation the Brotherhood was supposed to be. Representatives of the respective coalitions competed against each other over hegemony and organisational resources, basing their claims on contrasting intellectual traditions, political cultures and organisational values that had co-existed, sometimes uncomfortably, within the ranks of the Society since the times of Hasan al-Banna. The adherents of the "Qutbist" school of thought put forward the idea of a closed, pyramid-shaped and exclusive organisation, while those closer to 'Omar al-Tilmisani's model aspired to a reformed Society that was open to outsiders, and where internal progression was based on meritocracy, transparency and some form of democracy. I argue that it is through the holistic analysis of the complex dynamics between internal organisational politics, the use of ideology, and the personal experiences of key organisational members, that we are best able to grasp the Brotherhood's failed experience in governance in 2013.