This dissertation examines the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. Using a framework based in social movement theory it argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, not all parts of Israeli peace activism were paralysed in the period following the outbreak of the Intifada in 2000. By placing greater emphasis on the internal dynamics of social movement theory: collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures, and by building a three-fold typology of Israeli peace activism: a liberal Zionist component; a radical component; and a human rights component, it argues that it was only the liberal Zionist component that demobilised following the outbreak of violence in 2000. The radical and human rights component continued to mobilise, with new groups emerging, presenting alternative and innovative ways to challenge the prevailing situation. This study is based on interviews with activists in Israel, participant observation and primary data from the publications and websites of the activist groups, focusing on the period between 2000 and 2014. Through this, new empirical data to further the understanding of Israeli peace activism has been provided. This study further contributes to the literature on Israeli peace activism by unearthing new collective action frames, the evolution of tactical repertoires and a shift in the mobilising structures. Furthermore, by disaggregating the internal dynamics before analysing how they interact with the external environment, the political opportunity structures, this dissertation identifies different cycles of contention for the three components of Israeli peace activism. The empirical analysis has also led to contributions in the field of social movement theory. It shows that impact should be conceived of beyond the policy arena, with emphasis given to other areas of impact, such as mobilisation, cultural shifts and norm entrepreneurship. It also identifies a number of aspects of social movement theory that require refinement: the relationship between the government and a social movement; the connection between the international dimension and a domestic social movement; and the role of gender dynamics.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the development of an oligarchy in the Israeli political economy. In that, it both sheds light on the state-business relationship in the Israeli political economy, and refines the understanding of oligarchy in general. In order to achieve this two-folded objective, I rec-conceptualise oligarchy, identify its sources, characterise its structure, and analyse the main mechanisms through which it establishes its power in a national political economy, specifically - in Israel. The literature so far scarcely addresses the ways in which such cluster of wealth and power emerges and develops in liberal and developed market economies. This thesis aims to fill this gap, by examining the origins of the oligarchy rise, the key actors involved in the process of 'oligarchisation', and the modalities through which oligarchs are distinguished from other wealthy actors. In particular, this work illuminates the critical role of the state in the formation and modus operandiof the oligarchy, which, in return, has substantial influence on the decision-making process and the political economy as a whole. The term 'oligarchy' in this thesis refers to a set of institutional, political, and social linkages and dynamics, whose interests are to some extent converged and are increasingly counterpoised to the interests of the 'traditional' economy. My analysis develops on the basis of a critical engagement with theories examining concentration of wealth and power in national political economies, together with data collected from various governemental and non-governmental sources and fieldwork, examining the facets of this concentration in Israel. My study reveals that the corpus of ideas and assessments of oligarchy points to a cohesive power structure, which, in the Israeli case, can be identified as an informal political institution.

Ecologism is a political ideology that emerged in the 1970s. It challenged the neoliberal privileging of economic growth over environmental protection and a narrow conception of the self as autonomous, rational and self-interested. Ecologism’s normative challenge has grown quiet as it became perceived as too inward looking and focused on the self, rather than engaged with issues such as climate change that now preoccupy green political thought. However, in the early 21st century, neoliberalism now dominates western democracies. This turn away from the self and normative opposition to neoliberalism has clearly not furthered the environmental cause, and so there is a need to return to re-politicise the ontological arguments of ecologism. A small number of green political theorists have begun to look towards the Thomistic Aristotelianism of Alasdair MacIntyre and this thesis seeks to add to their number. I argue that MacIntyre’s work concerning the self as dependent rational animal, and arguments for the political and social structures that support this self, can be used to affirm and reengage ecological arguments with politics. MacIntyre’s thought moves ecologism away from its “inward-turn”, concerned with the self’s personal experience of the environment, to a collective politics that looks outwardly to challenge the dominant neoliberal order. In bringing ecologism into conversation with MacIntyre’s philosophy, the original contribution I offer ecological political theory is two-fold. Firstly, the virtues of acknowledged dependence can be used to reflect substantive concern for the environment within political deliberation. Secondly, I develop MacIntyre’s conception of localized deliberative democracy. In order to counter claims that such localization is naïve, I bring MacIntyre’s ideal into conversation with Murray Bookchin’s model of municipal libertarianism and consider two real world examples: Rojava in northern Syria and the ‘Idle no More movement’ in Canada. These examples offer hopeful evidence that decentralised deliberative politics, starting from acknowledging our dependence, can oppose the hegemony of neoliberalism both socially and ecologically.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a milestone towards lasting peace, but not the solution for the roots of a conflict. It is considered a highly politicised process because DDR is a cost-increasing provision that not only contributes to the security, but also builds confidence among warring parties. The United Nations has highlighted that without DDR, and specifically demobilisation, civil wars cannot end. Thus, DDR is a crucial aspect of any peace settlement; its greatest challenge is to design a programme and a strategy that convinces both parties that they have guarantees for surrender and disbanding and that their vulnerability and limits will be respected. This study tries to explain why not all agreements include DDR provision during peace negotiation, what determines this, and whether the DDR can explain the resumption of war or the emergence of new types of violence in post-conflict societies. This study contributes to a broader understanding of how DDR provision is determined by specific characteristics of the rebel group, country and conflict; how various components of DDR can have different impacts on the failure of peace and the new type of violence. The findings suggest that including DDR within a peace agreement, especially a reintegration programme, has a significantly positive impact on peace and shows evidence of the importance of military reintegration in the process of peace consolidation.

This thesis examines the economic effects of mass political instability events, first of the Arab Spring on Tunisia from a macro and micro perspective, and then more broadly, how economies recover from such events. In addition to an introduction and conclusion, this thesis is composed of three self-contained empirical studies, which we term as chapters hereinafter. Chapter 2 uses the Synthetic Control Methodology to estimate the output loss in Tunisia as a result of the “Arab Spring”. Our results suggest that the loss was 5.5 percent, 5.1 percent, and 6.4 percent of GDP per capita in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. These findings are robust to a series of tests, including placebo tests, and are consistent with those from an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model. Moreover, we find that investment was the main channel through which the economy was adversely impacted by the Arab Spring. Chapter 3 extends the analysis to a micro level and explores the impact of political instability that stemmed from the Arab Spring on Tunisian firms. Using a new dataset, we show that political instability was a major concern for small and exporting firms as well as for those that were operating in the tourism sector, those that have suffered from vandalism and those that were located in the interior region of Tunisia. Most importantly, we find that political instability was the most damaging constraint to firm growth after the Arab Spring. Finally, chapter 4 examines the economic implications of mass political instability events, defined as a political regime crisis accompanied by mass civil protest. Using the synthetic control methodology, it is shown that these events significantly reduce output in the short run, and even more so in the long run (up to five years later), although there is considerable heterogeneity across countries. This result was further supported by Difference-in-Difference regression estimates. In addition, we find that countries with increasing investment rates and lower previous income levels are associated with a fast recovery following mass political instability. On the other hand, democratization is found to impede recovery. These results are robust to using different sets of regressors and to the exclusion of potential outliers.

This thesis draws a picture of Kurdish diaspora politics, focusing on the community in London. Political activities carried out by the Kurds are contextualised within the framework of diasporas as transnational non-state actors, through their strong physical and psycho-social ties to their homeland, while they live in their ‘hostland.’ This work is in pursuit of understanding the attempts and strategies of the Kurds from Turkey in the UK to advance their interests as an ethno-national diaspora, and the extent to which these strategies and mechanisms provide the diaspora Kurds with necessary means to survive as a politically active group. The security concerns of the Kurdish activists have productive and destructive results for the Kurdish diaspora. The main negative outcome is the deepening of the already existing fear of politics that has been prevalent in Turkish society, including the Kurds, seemingly the most politicised segment of society since the 1980 military coup. The pressure of order-building through legal political activity and civic engagement pushed the Kurds into the pursuit of rights in various aspects of life that were conventionally seen as part of low politics; issues of secondary importance vis-a-vis national liberation, including gender equality, ecologism, social welfare, education, socialisation and cultural development, rather than issues of high politics, such as the PKK’s status, disarmament, political recognition, or autonomy. Local politics of the UK are perceived as positive, while its higher level policies and foreign policy are seen as mostly negative and "not Kurds-friendly". The diaspora Kurds emphasise negative dimensions of British state in relation to world politics and international relations. I argue that as a response to this negativity, the British Kurds pursue a survival strategy to beat “structure” with their "creative proactive agency" in the diasporan sphere, especially in local politics to which they attach more value and hope.

This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of media democratisation in post-authoritarian societies. Since the return to democracy across Latin America, research has yielded important insights into normative expectations of the media during democratisation, and country case studies have highlighted the diversity of contexts for analysis. Long-standing obstacles to media democracy in the region have not been overcome by democratisation. However, there has been little attention to exploring whether media access for civil society actors – and, so, internal plurality of the media – improves over the process of democratisation and what factors influence this. Based on a content analysis of newspaper coverage of major strategies of the campaign for transitional justice in Uruguay spanning from 1989 to 2012 and 16 interviews with journalists and civil society actors, this thesis draws three main conclusions. Firstly, it concludes that there is not a progressive increase in the quantity or quality of media access for civil society actors and this is principally due to the contingency of media access upon both journalistic routines and broader shifts associated with the process of democratisation including the return to “politics as usual” and increasing market competition. It further concludes that transitional justice campaigns face considerable obstacles in gaining media access to further their strategic ends, due to the way in which the media follows the mainstream political and public agenda during democratisation, and low levels of quality of access. Finally, it makes a methodological contribution in its mixed methods approach, which embraces the debate of de-Westernisation in media scholarship. This multi-faceted approach to researching media access reveals the way in which inequalities in media access cannot be divorced from wider power relations in society. Overall, the thesis argues that the lack of media access for civil society actors constitutes a significant and ongoing problem for the deepening of democracies in Latin America. To this end, the thesis supports a more radical account of media democratisation which incorporates a greater normative duty to represent civil society groups, particularly given the dominance of hegemonic, state-led narratives in pacted transitions. This should inform the way in which media policy is approached during democratic transitions and provide impetus for the current push for civil society-led media reform movements in the region. In addition to this, the thesis indicates the need for further and broader research into media coverage of transitional justice campaigns and mechanisms in different contexts and in comparison with other human rights issues.

This study seeks to address the question of what explains variation in the effectiveness of the EU’s actions towards Iran. To do so, it conducts a longitudinal analysis – spanning from 1992 to 2015 – focusing primarily on the nuclear dispute, in which the EU, for many unexpectedly, played a crucial role, particularly in the final period leading to the 2015 landmark agreement. In answering the central research question, this study expands on the concept of effectiveness so far used by scholars interested in the EU’s behaviour in multilateral contexts and applying it to a single country. Moreover, this study unpacks the concept of effectiveness and explores the link between internal effectiveness – that is, whether the EU manages to act cohesively and purposefully – and external effectiveness – that is, whether the EU is able to reach the goals it sets for itself in the international arena. In doing so, the aim is that of contributing to debates on whether and how EU internal effectiveness influences EU external effectiveness and the extent to which the external context helps explain variation in the EU’s ability to reach its stated goals. By revisiting the long journey leading to the normalisation of relations between Iran and the international community, this study demonstrates that internal effectiveness is necessary, but insufficient to explain EU external effectiveness, which in fact is also contingent upon the external context in which the EU operates. In particular, the empirical findings covering three distinct periods have demonstrated that focusing only on the position of the US (and related transatlantic cooperation) cannot always provide us with a full explanation of why the EU is (un)able to reach its objectives vis-à-vis third countries. Importantly, the behaviour of the ‘target country’ and the negotiating style used by the EU must be taken into account to explain why the EU’s effectiveness towards Iran has varied across time. As for internal effectiveness, it has been argued that the EU is effective as a global actor when it is able to act autonomously, coherently and is recognised by other actors, including the target country. The level of legal competence in shaping the EU’s capacity to act coherently and effectively in world politics is less important than what has been claimed by the existing literature. Importantly, when the EU is able to articulate determinate common positions and the Member States stick to what they decide jointly, the likelihood for the EU of being externally effective is significantly enhanced, regardless of decision-making rules.

This thesis examines the causal pathways underpinning the moderation of radical ethno-nationalism using the case of Irish republicanism (Sinn Féin and the IRA) between 1969 and 2010. Through the application of the ‘inclusion-moderation’ framework, I argue that a strong macro-institutional framework is central to the process of moderation. Existing explanations that emphasise the role of interplay, exchange and leadership choices typically neglect the importance of this wider institutional framework in enabling and shaping the decisions made. In the case of Irish republicanism, the processes of electoral participation, bargaining to design stable democratic institutions, and securing credible guarantees to protect their interests from the United States, all combined and reinforced each other to create a scenario whereby republicans moderated. These processes hinged upon stable democratic institutions that were perceived by republicans as embodying relatively low risks for participation, providing a stable basis for future competition, and rendering the future of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom potentially uncertain. Moderation was a gradual and path-dependent process of increasing returns whereby contact with the stable institutions imposed constraints against radicalism and incentives towards moderation. Republicanism’s transformation is best understood as moving through a series of phases, beginning with absolute radicalism, moving to relative radicalism, before becoming moderate. Crucial to this process was the decision to participate in institutions, which changed and regulated their relationships with other actors, requiring them to build alliances with potential supporters and political opponents. However, moderation was a layered process with some aspects of their policies and beliefs becoming moderate while others remained radical, albeit over time their remaining radicalism became completely accommodating. This was about acquiescing to a system of political order rather than core value change. Republicans continue to assert an alternative claim to sovereignty, reject the legitimacy of British ruling institutions, and continue to assert the legitimacy of their right to armed struggle, albeit they have put the use of violence in their past. As such, rather than thinking of ethno-national radicalism as entailing value change to prove the sincerity of their moderation, it is preferable to look to the ways they demonstrated a commitment to their new moderate path, such as through the process of decommissioning, their endorsement of policing in Northern Ireland, and their response to ongoing threats of violence from former dissident comrades. In short, the inclusion-moderation theory is a powerful approach for explaining ethno-national moderation but it needs some modification for the ethno-national context.

This thesis offers the first systematic critical examination of the political thought of Bernard Williams; explains the relation between his political realism and his critical assessment of much modern moral philosophy, and discusses how his work illuminates the debates about the nature and purpose of political theory. I defend Williams’s fundamental claim that the central questions of political morality arise within politics and argue accordingly that political theory should not, contrary to the position implicit in much contemporary political theory, in the first instance be seen as an exercise in applying a set of external moral principles to politics. I argue that although Williams’s critique of contemporary political theory is mistaken in its claim that contemporary political theorists conventionally endorse a monolithic form of moralism, he convincingly shows that political theory should begin with an understanding of the distinctive character of politics, as this enables us to understand the goods that are internal to it. In this regard, Williams’s realism is best read as an attempt to make ethical sense of politics, and as an attempt to explain how we can continue to affirm a kind of liberalism, without recourse to the moralised presuppositions that he insists we must jettison. I go on to argue that by developing the insights of Williams’s late work we can articulate a defence of liberalism that has marked advantages over the ‘high liberalism’ that most contemporary liberal theorists defend. This latter argument illustrates the distinctiveness of Williams’s contribution to contemporary debates about realism in political theory as most of the realist thinkers with whom he is grouped endorse a form of realism in order to impugn liberalism.