Many convicted offenders around the world do not vote in elections because they have been disenfranchised, which is the legal deprivation of their voting rights as a consequence of their convictions. Addressing this practice from the perspective of legal and constitutional theory, this dissertation deals with the question of how modern democracies should understand the connection between the right to vote and the commission of a criminal offence. After careful analysis of issues related to the democratic importance of the right to vote, the civic virtue of offenders and the requirements of a democratic punishment, the dissertation argues that disenfranchisement is a practice that constitutes an unjustified exception to the general principle of universal suffrage. However, it may also critically express and shape some of our general ideas about democracy and citizenship. In particular, it is argued that the exclusionary and degrading aspects of disenfranchisement can illuminate inclusionary aspects associated to the right to vote. In making this argument, it is suggested that the right to vote not only works as a right of participation but also embodies a mechanism of democratic recognition. Addressing the current common law jurisprudential trends on disenfranchisement, it formulates a case for a strong judicial review of legislation in cases in which voting eligibility is at stake.

This is a study of Human Rights Education (HRE) discourse in community-based settings. It is a critique and analysis of the ways that HRE discourse is shaped by power and culture between the global and the local. It aims to fill a gap in the current research in a number of ways, by examining both the theories of human rights and education, as well as the practice of HRE. The aim of the thesis is not only to show how it has and is used, but also whose interests this serves. The research was carried out using mainly qualitative methods, but also some quantitative methods. In order to make connections between the global and local HRE discourse it included twelve months of fieldwork in Tanzania, where data was gathered from NGOs working in HRE explicitly. It also linked stakeholders, such as international organisations, other NGOs and individual community members such as paralegals and participants in HRE processes. The thesis has three parts which each deal with the language and texts, social practice, as well as, socio-political and cultural influence of HRE discourse. The first part outlines the sheer variety of content that inform various conceptions of HRE and shows how HRE is both plural and complex. It examines the historical and sociopolitical construction of HRE. The second part of the thesis examines the local context of HRE using the data gathered from twelve-month’s empirical fieldwork in Tanzania between 2009 and 2010. The third part of the material analyses the way that social relations both construct and are constructed by HRE discourse, the unintended consequences, and suggestions about possible ways forward.

This thesis addresses the "air of paradox" that continues to plague Kant's absolute prohibition of revolution. In seeking to identify the source of this contention, I investigate a possible inconsistency within Kant's Doctrine of Right as a doctrine of external freedom. Taking my lead from Christine Korsgaard's idea of ―perverted justice‖, I explore the idea that states can exist that undermine their own purpose, in their denial of the freedom which is their end. Establishing the possibility of perverted justice takes us into an inquiry into the nature of Kant's moral theory as a theory of freedom, and specifically, the particular kind of freedom that Right takes as its end. I take the contrast between the ethical and juridical domains as my point of departure, defending Kant's strict division between the two domains. In doing so I defend the moral status of Right against commentators who exclude it on grounds of its external nature, arguing for a conception of practical freedom that is broader than the internal freedom of autonomy, and hence can include Right under its scope. From this I offer an account of external freedom as acting in accordance with the Universal Principle of Right, which is nothing more than the constraint of one's choice under universal law. In conclusion, I argue that Right (justice) cannot be frustrated in the way that Korsgaard's idea of perverted justice suggests, due to the formal nature of external freedom. Obedience to positive law cannot deny external freedom in the way she suggests; rather, our constraint under law is constitutive of our freedom as the end of political society. There is therefore no inconsistency to be found within Kant's Doctrine of Right between the idea of external freedom as the end of Right and his absolute prohibition of revolution.

This thesis considers the question of human freedom through the lens of the revival of republican political theory that has taken place in recent decades. In its first part, it distinguishes between different strands of that revival and argues that one of these presents a variant of human freedom which more adequately captures the human condition than does the ideal of freedom traditionally endorsed by liberal thought. It then considers that question of freedom in relation to very fundamental questions of power, law, and the reasons for which we accept the existence of an organised public power in the first place, arguing that the individual finds himself trapped between, on one hand, threats to his freedom which are horizontal, emanating from private parties, and those which are vertical, arising from the apparatus of public power which exists in order to protect man from man. In part two, one of the principal advantages identified for the neo-republican ideal - its aptness for application to the freedom of individuals in relation to each other, as well as in relation to the state - is explored within the specific contexts of the relationship of husband to wife and that of employer to employee. In each case, the relationship between the question of freedom and the specific legal rules which determine when and where public power will intervene against or on behalf of one party in relation to another, most generally the rules of private property, is analysed. It is argued that freedom is primarily a function of the ‘ordinary’ law: that which determines one’s rights and duties in relation to others, and which determines the distribution of property through taxation and spending. On the basis of this account, a renewed republican constitutionalism which focuses upon issues of property within the constitution - as a right protected by fundamental rights documents, and as a potentially distorting factor within the democratic process - is offered in part three. The normative element of republican constitutionalism is not exhausted by the issue of how to organise the organs of the state such that the individual is not dominated by the state: issues of private right being a function of constitutional processes, the constitution must also ensure that its outputs do not force man to live at the mercy of man.

In the last three decades, liberal political philosophy has been increasingly concerned with the nature and extent of the moral responsibilities of members of different political communities to each other. John Rawls contributed to this debate in his final book, The Law of Peoples (LOP). There, Rawls refused to extend his account of domestic distributive justice to international politics and argued that some non-liberal (yet decent) peoples can be members in good standing of the international community. Many of Rawls’ critics maintain that this evidences a double standard, and accuse LOP of being an incoherent extension of Rawls’ political philosophy to global politics. In this thesis I show that the opposite is true. I start by underlining the main discontinuities between Rawls’ accounts of domestic and international justice. I then show that these discontinuities can be explained by tracing the evolution of the idea of public justification in Rawls’ work. Rawls’ two theories of justice are the application of the same idea – public justification – in different political contexts. While the first three chapters are dedicated to the elaboration of this distinctive interpretation of LOP, the final two chapters address Rawls’ accounts of international economic assistance and international toleration. The thesis surveys a number of critical arguments against Rawls’ elaboration of his duty of assistance and his understanding of toleration based on reasonableness. It finds them all wanting, and strikingly off the mark: all seem premised on the idea that a just world is a substantively liberal-egalitarian one. Thus, Rawls’ critics fail both to properly attend to our limited abilities to change the global political landscape (not to mention the risks associated with such attempts) and to understand the implications of any sustainable account of toleration.

This thesis approaches the Weimar constitutional debate by focusing on its most significant participants, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. It reveals that this debate concerned the constitutional question in the context of the contradiction between the democratic modern state and the capitalist economy. It was in that sense a debate on the 'riddle' that was identified by the young Marx concerning the problem of the political form through which modern societies are regulated, caught between the political question, namely that of political power, and by the social question, namely that of the socio-economic structures of power. In effect the term “political constitutionalism” captures this tension through which Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt approached the constitutional question. The historical context of the Weimar Republic is important in order to bring into the light the theories of Kelsen and Schmitt (and, secondarily, of other Weimar theorists who also approached the constitutional question through similar problématiques). Regarding this context, it is, firstly, demonstrated that the Weimar Constitution was a post-traditional constitution that dealt both with the political question (the introduction of parliamentary democracy) and with the “social question” through its “economic constitution”. It is, secondly, demonstrated how the relationship between political and socio-economic power affected, in turn, the constitutional order throughout Weimar by leading ultimately to its structural transformation. This thesis argues, firstly, that Schmitt’s solution to Marx’s riddle dissociated the constitution from its democratic promise in order to protect a concept of constitutionalism that would maintain the 19th century liberal political-economic divide. Hence, it ended up as a theory of “authoritarian liberalism” that legitimized the “structural transformation” of the Weimar constitutional order between 1930-32; secondly, that Kelsen’s solution, while placing emphasis on the association of the constitution with the democratic promise, underplayed the power of the capitalist mode of production to affect both the State and the constitutional order itself. As a result, and although he defended the Republic and the Weimar Constitution, he could not see that the constitution itself was traversed by the power of capital in its entanglement with the mode of production.

This thesis examines the impact of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) on work to promote gender equality through case studies of three local authorities. It aims to both provide new empirical evidence on the impact of the PSED on the behaviour of public bodies and to analyse for the first time the relationship between mainstreaming (the approach to equality within the PSED) and reflexive/responsive regulation (the regulatory mechanism used to enforce mainstreaming). I show that the PSED has not led to the ‘transformational’ approach to equality which some hoped it would represent. Practice varies significantly within and between local authorities; while there were examples of changes as the result of the PSED, the duty was often implemented in a minimalist or bureaucratic manner. These findings support the conclusions of earlier studies of mainstreaming which identify the variety of practices described as mainstreaming and highlight the importance of participation by civil society organisations if mainstreaming is to be transformative. I find that in two of the case studies there was little recognition of or action to promote gender equality, contributing to the debate about the practical implications of replacing a focus on gender with a broader focus on equality and diversity. My analysis draws on feminist literature on mainstreaming and legal literature on reflexive and responsive regulation, which are not usually combined. I identify an important relationship between the regulatory means by which mainstreaming is enforced and the forms of mainstreaming that result. I show that although the terms reflexive and responsive regulation are often used interchangeably in analysis of the PSED there are significant differences between the two. I conclude that changes introduced by the Coalition Government reduced responsive elements in the PSED, while making it more reflexive. This increased the likelihood that public bodies would develop a bureaucratic rather than participatory form of mainstreaming in response to the PSED. I call for the introduction of a duty to consult and engage with civil society as part of the PSED. This would make the duty less reflexive, but more responsive and be more compatible with a participatory approach to mainstreaming.

The emergence between 1965 and 1973 of a crisis of over-accumulation and over-capacity, rooted in international manufacturing yet affecting the overall private business economies of the advanced capitalist countries, inaugurated a developmental context whose profound contradictions were brought home by the Great Recession of 2008-9 and the continuing Long Depression. The intervening period has seen profound economic, political and social crisis in the advanced capitalist world and has simultaneously been treacherous for under-developed economies forced to navigate rocketing energy costs and international commodity price and currency exchange rate turbulence under the continual threat of debt-levered expropriation. The struggle to locate the causes – proximate and ultimate – of the present crisis is at the same time a battle to map the basic economic and political coordinates of the continuing long downturn. In this connection it is contended that efforts have been undermined by the epistemological underdevelopment conditioned by a crisis of knowledge-formation which has unfolded in parallel with the long downturn. The dominance of neoclassical economics (‘unworldly’ since the marginal revolution) on the right and the displacement of Marxism on a structurally weakened and autodidactic left in the context of the ascent of postmodernism as an intellectual and cultural dominant has opened a space between the material and discursive realities of global capitalist development. This work is an attempt to deploy the method developed by the classical Marxist tradition to approach the significance of the state and law in the historically-conditioned reproduction of capitalist social relations. It is contended in the first place that the dualism which obtains between national and global spheres in much theorisation of neoliberal ‘globalisation’ obscures the dialectical interrerelation of state and world market – the institutional and regulatory environment of international trade, money and finance being both the creation of states and the developing context which frames their – necessarily path-dependent and reflexive – projects of domestic economy making. As against popular notions of state decline, following Gowan the state-political content of the centring of private financial markets in the mediation of international monetary relations is recalled, while the embeddedness of the state in circuits of capital accumulation is emphasised (Tony Smith), the concept of ‘regime of accumulation’ being deployed to capture the nexus of monetary, fiscal and regulatory policy which articulates historically-conditioned development strategies. In this respect, we depart from the work of the Bolshevik jurist Pashukanis, who despite significantly advancing the materialist analysis of the juridical form, identified in his most significant work a largely derivative role for the state. It is argued that the methodological weakness represented by Pashukanis’ disproportionate emphasis on commodity exchange – his failure to proceed from the basis of the capitalist economy as a contradictory unity of production and circulation – prevents him from fully apprehending the role of the state in the production and reproduction of capitalist social relations. As the discussion unfolds, there is developed in conversation principally with Gramsci an understanding of the state as the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions. Upholding the notion of the ‘integral state’ as a differentiated unity of civil society and political society upon which terrains the capitalist class forms alliances with proximate classes as the prerequisite for and correlate of its domination of labour, the developmental context represented by neoliberalism is conceived in terms of the transition of interest-bearing capital from leading to dominant fraction of the capitalist class in parallel with its tendential contradictory disaggregation from productive capital. Such a process has necessitated a transformation in the character of bourgeois political supremacy involving a dismantling of the civil rights and social protections accumulated during the period bookended by Americanism and the welfare state and increasing dependence upon an expanded machinery of coercion. Proceeding from this basis, it is considered how in specific developmental contexts the state by way of the legal form maps the social totality, achieving distinctive couplings (and de-couplings) of wealth production and social reproduction. There is asserted the second-order integration of public and private spheres in terms of the fundamental unity of capitalist reproduction, the first-order public/private metabolism being evaluated in view of the facilitation and rationalisation of social reproduction in the context of a productive economy structured around dissociated private producers. The legal form is further interrogated in view of its role in structuring the productive antagonism between capital and labour, a relation which on the basis of its form comes to expresses various contents – from consensual integration to casuistic assimilation – as domestic social relations are (in-)validated by the operation of the law of value at the level of the world market. In this connection, the unproductive theoretical polarisation obtaining between approaches which consider law to be epiphenomenal and those which pursue its relative autonomy is enriched by a historicised conception in terms of which law, concretising specific relationships of forces within particular regimes of accumulation, appears as ‘sword’, as ‘shield’ and as ‘fetter’. This framework is particularly useful for evaluating the opportunities for the deployment of legal strategies by labour and groups oppressed under capitalism – a question in relation to which Pashukanis, following Lenin, demonstrated a remarkable political astuteness.

This thesis was written on the constitutional changes of contemporary China, with the 1982 Constitution as the object of researches. This constitution is the currently valid constitution in China, and is expected by constitutional scholars to be put in “juridification”. However, for thirty years since its birth, this task is yet to be realized. What is more, the claim of “judicialization of the constitution” as Chinese legal constitutionalists held especially during the 1990s, is now contested by emergent constitutional schools as one of many constitutions in China. They are arguing that China’s constitutional reality should not be colonized by the Western-originated constitutional science –classical constitutionalism. Having perceived the critical merits of China’s new constitutional schools, this thesis is wary of confirming unconditionally the other end of arguments, namely, applying critical theories to condense into “constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics”. The use of “constitutionalism” to describe the Chinese model, however, should be examined against whether it has indeed resolved the material problems in China’s constitutionalization, or is merely an inflationary application of the terminology. If China’s legal constitutionalism is seen as implanting formalism of Hayekian theory in service of global capitalism, in the second-generation constitutional discourse, have we opted out of this mentality and re-constituted ourselves? Constitutionalization in contemporary China hence is a complex issue covering the grounds of institutional, political as well as conceptual controversies, more than a practical issue of applicable mechanisms. The conceptual arguments on “what is constitutional” are especially challenging to classical constitutionalism, when combined with “identity politics” and “constitutional pluralism”. Between the material and conceptual level, I am insisting that the ‘democratic deficit’ caused by China’s 1990s economic reforms and the market mentality still needs a redress, before we could render its hybrid outcomes as “constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics”.

The thesis endeavours to show the interdependence of political theories, the social sub-structure, and the formal structure of the legal system in competitive society.