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National Representation in Supranational Institutions: The Case of the European Central BankBadinger, Harald, Nitsch, Volker 02 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Supranational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. On the one hand,
hiring decisions are based, as in most organizations, on a candidate's professional
qualifications. On the other hand, supranational institutions often aim for broad national
representation. Reviewing evidence from the European Central Bank, we show that
nationality is indeed relevant for both hiring and decision-making. Specifically, we find a
disproportionately narrow spread of national representation in the top management of the
ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence of national networks between adjacent
management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to national
representation in the core business areas of the ECB. Examining a sample of 27 European
countries over the period from 1999 to 2008, we estimate Taylor rules for alternative sets of
euro area aggregates derived from different weighting schemes of national macroeconomic
data. Our results indicate that weights based on national representation in the mid-level
management of the ECB's core business areas best describe the central bank's interest-rate
setting behavior.
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What Do Central Bankers Do? Evidence from the European Central Bank's Executive BoardBadinger, Harald, Nitsch, Volker 01 1900 (has links) (PDF)
This paper examines how managers at the top of a public institution, central bank executives, allocate their working time. Using detailed Information from personal diaries of the six members of the European Central Bank's Executive Board over a period of two years, we codify and analyze more than 3,700 reported activities and compare the results with recent findings on the time use of CEOs in the private sector. We report four additional observations. First, the daily schedule of central bankers is dominated by routine tasks; variations in economic uncertainty have, on average, no significant effect on the number of activities. Second, there are sizable differences in the scope of activities across board members. Third, the
change in publication rules of diary entries from 'on request' to 'regular' was associated with a significant decline in reported activities. Fourth, nationality matters: Board members interact disproportionately often with fellow nationals. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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