This paper empirically assesses determinants of countries' fiscal rules suggested by the political science, sociology, and economics literature. We find several of these variables to be related to the stringency of fiscal rules, providing indirect evidence for the relevance of governments' deficit bias. These determinants may also serve as instruments in models with (endogenous) fiscal rules as explanatory variable.

This paper estimates the effects of fiscal institutions on fiscal policy outcomes, addressing issues related to measurement and endogeneity in a novel way. Recently developed indices, based on partially ordered set theory, are used to quantify the stringency of fiscal rules. Identification of their effects is achieved by exploiting the exogeneity of institutional variables (checks and balances, government fragmentation, inflation targeting), which are found to be relevant determinants of fiscal rules. Our two-stage least squares estimates for (up to) 79 countries over the period 1985-2012 provide strong evidence that countries with more stringent fiscal rules have higher fiscal balances (lower deficits), lower interest rate spreads on government bonds, and lower output volatility. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series