In this paper I propose a two-step theoretical extension of the baseline model by Diamond and Rajan (2011) and examine the amplification mechanisms when collateralized funding shocks are endogenously affected by liquidity shocks. Based on high returns on illiquid assets that are potentially available conditional on future fire sales, liquid banks increase their cash holdings by limiting term lending - a speculative motive of liquidity hoarding directly aggravated by a cash reduction due to increased haircuts on collateralized borrowing. As a result, funding liquidity shrinks steadily and credit freezes are more likely. On the other hand, illiquid banks refuse to sell more illiquid assets than necessary to meet depositors' claims - a speculative motive of illiquidity seeking indirectly amplified as fire sale prices are endogenously depressed via increased collateral requirements. Illiquid banks are forced to sell more assets, the problem of insolvency becomes more severe and market freezes are thus even more likely. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

In this paper, I examine the impact of direct equity injections and troubled asset purchases on bank lending and solvency and analyze how ex ante tighter caps on leverage affect ex post decisions between both interventions. Extending the model of Bachmann (2018) by adding the government as a liquidity supplier, illiquid banks can either sell troubled assets at fire sale prices to collateralized financed liquid banks or to the government. If illiquid banks are forced to sell all troubled assets in order to meet premature withdrawals and the government is left with excess liquidity compared to direct equity injections, they can use these funds to bid up prices. Higher prices reduce future returns on buying illiquid assets and motivate liquid banks´ incentive to lend by crowding out their speculative motive for liquidity hoarding. As a result, troubled asset purchases weakly dominate direct equity injections in terms of lending and solvency, directly amplified by a drop in collateral liquidity. Additionally, regulating illiquid banks ex ante by tighter caps on leverage affects the government's decisions about ex post interventions to effectively stabilize lending and solvency conditions, as the self-reinforcing downward spiral between fire sale prices and collateral liquidity is mitigated. Hence, I find that there exists an inherent nexus between ex ante regulations and ex post interventions. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series