This work challenges the assumption that Wittgenstein’s comments about the word “philosophy” are always either normative or descriptive. In the introduction, I demonstrate that some apparent inconsistencies of Wittgenstein’s programmatic remarks can only be resolved if we reject this distinction. Although the distinction is not central to any major interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work, rejecting it will have significant implications regarding his relation to the history of philosophy. My central task is to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s view of the history of philosophy does not imply a strict distinction between the historical concept of philosophy and Wittgenstein’s method. The core of my argument revolves around the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. In this text, Wittgenstein compares magic with metaphysics and then proceeds to attack Frazer’s exceedingly critical analysis of primitive religions. I argue that Wittgenstein’s later use of the word “metaphysic” indicates that his criticism of past philosophers is not radical enough to justify a strict distinction between his philosophical program and the history of philosophy. In order to confirm the conclusions I have drawn from Wittgenstein’s use of the word “metaphysics,” I studied two conversations Wittgenstein had about Heidegger. I read Wittgenstein’s comments about Heidegger as a sign of the blurring distinction between his own program and more traditional conceptions of philosophy.