published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is a study of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. In particular, the thesis explores Chinese policy-makers’ ideas about Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), and considers how those ideas shaped China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. To do so, the thesis employs a four-part ideas framework that examines Chinese policy-makers’ background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas about Japan, and shows how the interaction between these four different idea types shaped China’s Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. Furthermore, the thesis draws on over 200 recently declassified Chinese-language archival records from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as well as additional Chinese, Japanese, US and British archival sources. It argues that China’s experience of Japanese imperialism, industrialisation and war during the first half of the twentieth century deeply shaped Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949, though in ways that at first seem counterintuitive. Although Japan had waged a brutal war against China, Chinese policy-makers viewed Japan as an important source of industrial goods, technology and expertise, and a symbol of a modern, industrialised nation-state. However, China’s experience of Japanese imperialism and militaristic aggression often made it difficult to justify the policy of ‘trading with the enemy’. Ultimately, the thesis argues that China sought to expand economic ties with Japan after 1949 because Chinese policy-makers believed that doing so would assist China in becoming a modern and industrialised state, one that was strong enough to withstand foreign imperialism and restore its central position in the international system. Chinese conceptions of Japan thus help to explain how Japan became China’s largest trade partner by 1965, despite the bitter legacy of the War of Resistance and the Cold War divide between the two countries after 1949.

No description available.

Cheung Mong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-121). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Tables and Figures --- p.vi / Abbreviations --- p.viii / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction: Why Different Policy Responses in Two Similar Crises? --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Central Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Main Argument --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Layout --- p.4 / Chapter Chapter Two --- A Theoretical Framework for Analysis: The Concept of Strategic Culture --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Competing Explanations --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Theory of Strategic Culture --- p.19 / Chapter 2.3 --- Defining Strategic Culture in this Research --- p.29 / Chapter 2.4 --- Research Method and Data --- p.37 / Chapter Chapter Three --- The Dual Sources of Strategic Culture in Postwar Japan --- p.39 / Chapter 3.1 --- Paradigm in the Ruling Level: Yoshida Doctrine --- p.40 / Chapter 3.2 --- Paradigm in the Social Level: Pacifism --- p.47 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Interaction between the Two Paradigms on Policy --- p.52 / Chapter 3.4 --- Summary --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter Four --- Japan's Responses to the Gulf Crisis: The Gap of Two Paradigms (1990-91) --- p.59 / Chapter 4.1 --- Searching for a New Identity: Four Views to Japan's Security --- p.60 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Two Competing Paradigms in the Eve of the Gulf Crisis --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3 --- A Strategic Cultural Explanation to the Reluctant Response on Overseas Dispatch --- p.72 / Chapter Chapter Five --- Japan's Responses to the Anti-Terrorism War: Moving towards An Unitary Paradigm (2001) --- p.82 / Chapter 5.1 --- "Japan's Emerging New Identity: The Notion of ""the Normal Nation""" --- p.83 / Chapter 5.2 --- Decline of the Pacifism --- p.92 / Chapter 5.3 --- Japan after the 911: Sending the SDF Overseas --- p.98 / Chapter Chapter Six --- Conclusion --- p.118 / Chapter 6.1 --- Japan Between the Pacifist Nation and Great Military Power --- p.109 / Chapter 6.2 --- The Significance and Limitation of the Research --- p.112 / Bibliography --- p.115

The early September day in 1951 that brought the Pacific War to an official end, with the signing of a treaty of peace, concluded as representatives of Japan and the United States signed the Bilateral Security Treaty. The security treaty symbolized new realities of international relations, just as the peace treaty had buried the old. By cementing into place a strategic alliance between the former Pacific antagonists, the treaty represented the great and lasting achievement of postwar American diplomacy in Asia. Nevertheless, the treaty was both the outcome and the perpetuation of a stereotyped and lopsided relationship, now fixed firmly into place, as a Japan diminished by defeat acceded to the necessity of a security embrace with its former conqueror, and the United States enlisted a most valued, albeit a most reluctant ally for the ongoing struggle to meet and defeat the Soviet threat. At the end of the Pacific War such an outcome had been beyond the pale. The security treaty was the product of years of crisis adaptation. Hopes that the U.S. could make China the great power of Asia were dashed by revolution. As cherished verities of U.S. diplomacy fell by the wayside, new truisms, based upon strategic interests inherited from victory in the Pacific and the cold war policy of containment, staunchly rose to assume their place. As a result, U.S. attitudes towards Japan underwent a tortuous reassessment. The initial occupation policies of disarmament and reform were replaced by the urgent need to enlist Japan as a vital cold war asset. However, this reorientation was not easily accomplished. Competing interests within the U.S. Government clashed over the means necessary to insure Japan's security and stability, while also guaranteeing the creation of a reliable ally -- a debate that became ever more heated as the cold war intensified. The Japanese, at great disadvantage, skillfully attempted to negotiate a role for themselves in the postwar world, eager for an alliance, yet fearful of domination. The goal of this thesis is to chart and document the evolution of this policy transformation, in all its twists and odd turns. To accomplish this task I turned to an older tradition of political science, one widely practiced at the dawn of the discipline. To be sure, judicious use was made of many of the theories and methodological approaches prevalent currently. Yet while useful at times, these methods often failed to adequately explain those indeterminate moments of idiosyncratic chance and contingency of events upon which so much, to my mind, the final outcome depended. I turned therefore to a more historical approach. My primary sources became the diplomatic record as revealed in the Foreign Relations of the United States and the memoirs of those who participated in the fashioning of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. By the time the security treaty was concluded, the agreement reached was not one of shared joint purpose, but one which defined and gave sanction to diverging national aims that could not, nonetheless, be realized in isolation. The continued U.S. military presence in Japan had been the goal of a policy process ultimately defined in military terms, as the final bastion of cold war containment on the rim of Asia. The Japanese understood the need for security in a volatile world, but not the necessity of providing it for themselves, as the postwar political system slowly organized around emerging economic priorities. It was an odd arrangement, but one which met respective needs and desires. Yet its lack of reciprocity and mutual commitment has ensured through the years the continuation of an ambiguous and uncertain alliance.

No description available.

The intent of this study is to assess the role of fundamental Japanese security policy objectives in driving the significant shifts in Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation with the United States from 1993 to 2003. In studying the relative influence of the objectives that guided Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation, this thesis seeks to address a gap in the literature. A debate has occurred over the direction of Japanese security policy that is based on widely different assumptions on the importance attached to various fundamental security objectives. At the same time, Japan???s approach to missile defence has been the subject of considerable analysis that identified the crucial importance of the issue for the attainment of these fundamental security policy objectives. But no linkage has been established between these two levels of analysis. In particular, there has been an absence of assessments of what Japan???s decisions on missile defence cooperation indicate about the relative influence of the various objectives. This thesis developed an analytical framework to enable such an assessment by examining the structure of missile defence cooperation undertaken. Japan possessed a range of options in the level and type of involvement in missile defence cooperation. That involvement would determine the eventual type of benefits and costs incurred against the affected objectives. Cooperation agreed to (or rejected) over the ten year period thereby provides a means to determine the influence of key objectives on Japan???s approach, and in particular those objectives that restrained involvement. The thesis finds that a clear hierarchy existed in the influence of the various objectives on Japan???s approach with changes in their influence explaining the evolution of Japan???s commitment. The desire to strengthen the alliance, weakening domestic political constraints, and disregard of China???s opposition provide the key explanations. These findings not only point towards the respective strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches employed to explain Japanese security policy, but they also suggest the value of greater attention to the state???s ability to overcome domestic constraints in determining policy in order to fully understand the broader transformation of Japanese security policy.

The present international situation is characterized by the division of the World in two power blocs. The countries of the Western World have united themselves in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the first effective large scale example of regional collective security in world history. The spiritual foundation of NATO is the idea of the Atlantic Anglo-American community based on mutual friendship and cooperation between Great Britain and the United States. But it was by no means certain that these two great powers of the Anglo-Saxon race should cooperate in close association with each other in world politics. After World War I, the British Empire found its world supremacy - undisputed so far – challenged by the potential and increasing strength of the United States. Great Britain had then to make her decision whether she was to antagonize the United States or to become her cooperative partner in international politics. The test-case was offered by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The global importance of this Alliance cannot be over-estimated. It was one of the strongest pillars of Britain's foreign policy, and contributed, to a substantial degree, to Japan's ascendancy in the Far East; it influenced decisively United States foreign policy immediately after 1919 - being to a large extent one of the deeper causes for the isolationist withdrawal of the United States from the system of international cooperation as established at the Paris Peace Conference -, and presented Great Britain with the decision to choose definitely-between Japan as Britain's ally in the Pacific and the realization of the Anglo-American Community. It is the purpose of this thesis to point out these implications of the Alliance on international politics, particularly during the crucial years from 1919 to 1922. An elucidation of the problem from the British aspect is all the more important because it reflects the change in the constitutional development within the British Commonwealth after World War I. Finally, Britain's foreign policy towards Japan in that short period sheds significant light on the British attitude towards the political development in the Far East during the Manchurian Crisis in the beginning of the 1930's. It furnished the key for understanding the British appeasement and flirtation with Japan as it became evident by Sir John Simon's policy in 1932. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

There are the ways in which Japan was prepared for war. The purpose of this paper will be to show how the militarists achieved the power that they did, power so great that it enabled them to go over the heads of, and the protests of, the civilian branch of government and even the Emperor himself if necessary. The history of the warlords needs to be examined in order to furnish a background needed for a study such as this. The primary function of this investigation will be to show the role played by these two factions during the “decisive decade” from 1931-1941. That decade began with the incident at Mukden, Manchuria, September 18, 1931, and ended with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Various aspects of the situation will be examined in order to illustrate as fully as possible the magnitude of the role of the militarists and the Zaibatsu. In this way the true picture of Japanese foreign policy can be seen.

No description available.