Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-212). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--Wake Forest University. Dept. of Psychology, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-51).

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Kant famously claims his table of judgments is complete. However, Kant does not provide a demonstration of his claim of completeness. In fact, he does not seem to think that a proof of completeness is necessary. I argue that we can reconstruct a demonstration that Kant would accept once we reflect upon his notion of a disjunctive judgment.

No description available.

This thesis argues that Hannah Arendt is correct to suggest that thinking enables judgment, even though Arendt never fully formulates this idea herself. I provide a critical reading of Arendts essay Thinking and Moral Considerations and of her series of lectures on Kants political philosophy. I argue that Arendts concept of impartiality can provide the bridge between the concepts of thinking and judging that is otherwise lacking in her account of these faculties. I argue that Arendts philosophy can be construed as an ethically relevant theory: despite the fact that Arendt offers no moral prescriptions, she describes a process of thinking through which ethical decisions can be made. Arendts work is therefore highly relevant as a critique of relativism, nihilism and the skeptical notion that judgments are arbitrary.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 263-285) / Microfiche. / ix, 285 leaves, bound 29 cm

Inaug.-diss.--Leipzig.