Thesis (J.S.D.)--Stanford University, 2008. / "September 2008." Includes bibliographical references (p. 196-200).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Defense and Security))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Strindberg, Anders ; Simeral, Robert. "March 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 23, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Judicial Review, Balancing Civil Liberties, Global War on Terror, Political Spaces, Strategic. Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-106). Also available in print.

Thesis (doctoral)--Bonn. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [135]-138).

Thesis (M.A.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed on 27 Mar. 2006) "For Master of arts in arbitration and dispute resolution." Includes bibliographical references.

Can courts really build democracy in a state emerging from undemocratic rule? If so, how they do this, and what are their limits in this regard? This thesis seeks to explore the development since 1945 of a global model of democracy-building for post-authoritarian states, which accords a central position to courts. In essence, constitutional courts and regional human rights courts have come to be viewed as integral to the achievement of, or even constitutive of, a functioning democratic state. The roles courts play in supporting a democratisation process are onerous, and differ starkly from the roles of such courts in long-established democracies of the Global North. Courts in the new democracies of the post-war world have been freighted with weighty expectations to ‘deliver’ on the promises of a new democratic order, while navigating their own place within that developing order–or, in the case of regional human rights courts, inserting themselves into the democratisation process from without. At both the domestic and regional levels, from within and without the state, they are somehow expected to ‘judge’ democratisation. They are required to assess what is needed to support the democratisation process at any given point, especially in light of key deficiencies of the newly democratic order, and to judge when the democratisation context requires a different approach than may be appropriate in a mature democracy, such as the US or Ireland. However, the grand claims made for these courts as democracy-builders in existing scholarship have never been subjected to systematic analysis, nor have the overlapping roles of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts been considered in tandem. This thesis addresses a very significant research gap by drawing together a scattered and fragmented scholarship on the roles of courts in new democracies, integrating discussion of regional human rights courts, providing an innovative conceptual framework for how courts at each level act and interact as democracy-builders, and tracing connections between different normative arguments concerning the roles courts should play. As the first attempt at a wholesale exploration of the effectiveness and viability of the existing global court-centric model for democratisation, this thesis examines what we think courts do as democracy-builders, what they actually do, and what they should do. In doing so, it argues for a significant re-evaluation of how we conceive of, and employ, courts as democracy-builders.

Habilitationsschrift--Münster, 1969. / Bibliography: p. [291]-305.

Risālat al-Duktūrāh--Jāmiʻat ʻAyn Shams. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [613]-622) and index.

This study explored the process of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review in Ethiopia and determined the role of the courts. It examined the different suggestions made by different authors and officials regarding the respective role and function of the courts and the House of Federation in interpreting the constitution and exercising the power of constitutional review. It also seeked to inquire the counter-majoritarian problem which focused on the relationship between judicial review and democracy. The thesis also inquired into the legitimacy of the Ethiopian approach to constitutional review. In this regard it seeked to determine whether the approach represents and adequate response to the counter-majoritarian problem. It also seeked to determine whether Ethiopia has adopted an institution that is well suited, competent and impartial to discharge the task of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review.

This thesis examines three interrelated issues. The first concerns a question about the status of administrative law, namely whether administrative officials have authority to determine what the law requires under a democratic constitution. Historically, this question has not been adequately addressed in public law scholarship because neither Diceyan constitutional theory nor common law doctrine has been traditionally receptive to administrative law. In this thesis, I argue that there are good reasons for people to respect the legal authority of administrative officials and their decisions. Those reasons are rooted in respect for the democratic process by which administrative officials are empowered, and respect for the various forms of expertise that administrative officials possess. The second issue concerns the doctrinal aspect of administrative law. If there are good reasons for believing that administrative officials have legitimate legal authority, then those same reasons suggest that judges should respect administrative legal decisions. In order to better understand how the relevant reasons for respecting administrative decisions alter the practice of judicial review, I compare and contrast the traditional doctrine of jurisdictional review with the doctrine of curial deference. This comparison shows that the doctrine of curial deference provides a superior account of the legitimate legal authority of administrative officials, and that this account makes a practical difference for the practice of judicial review. The third issue concerns whether the doctrine of curial deference can be reconciled with the rule of law. Assuming that there are good reasons for respecting administrative decisions, how can judges both respect an administrative decision while ensuring that it is consistent with the rule of law? I argue that judges can both respect administrative decisions and maintain the rule of law by requiring administrative officials to justify their decisions adequately in light of public reasons which are both patent and latent in existing legal materials.

No description available.