Limited time is an important constraint and resource that is fundamental to governing. This dissertation studies the connection between limited time and political power in three different contexts. / Government

In order to complement existing empirical research on democratic consolidation in Kenya and the role of the judiciary in particular, this mini-­‐dissertation analyses the relationship between judicial appointment processes and judicial independence in Kenya. The escalation of corruption, centralisation and abuse of power by the executive, the lack of government accountability and post-­‐election conflict of 2007 is linked to the dominance of the executive and corresponding subservience of the judiciary. Historically, judicial appointments have been the ambit of the President. The powers given to the President to appoint and remove judges have resulted in judicial appointments premised on allegiance to the executive rather than on upholding justice and the Bill of Rights. To rectify this deficiency, the 2010 Constitution has introduced a merit based system of judicial appointments that meets international standards on judicial independence. The new process requires the President to limit his appointments to the recommendations of a Judicial Service Commission whose responsibility it is to shortlist candidates through a transparent public process. An analysis of the selection of Kenya’s sitting Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice demonstrates that the reformed judicial appointment process has delegitimised the executive’s dominance over the judiciary and by so doing has placed Kenya on the road restoring judicial independence. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / gm2014 / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

There is currently no satisfactory account of how judges of the Supreme Court of India and High Courts in the states are appointed, transferred, impeached or employed postretirement. For a higher judiciary commanding immense public attention, enjoying wide constitutional powers of judicial review, this is a conspicuous gulf in academic literature. This thesis intends to bridge this gulf by providing such an account. Part I extracts the Constituent Assembly Debates pertaining to these four facets of judicial functioning, describes key developments over time and analyses the extant processes in operation today. On this basis it makes three arguments: first, appointments to the higher judiciary and transfer of judges between High Courts follow processes that are indefensible as a matter of constitutional law; second, impeachment operates in an excessively slow and inefficacious manner; third, the pervasiveness of post-retirement employment of judges in government-appointed positions demonstrates inadequate attention to institutional design. Most crucially, each of these four aspects gives rise to significant concerns pertaining to judicial independence, accountability or both. This is not a peculiarly Indian problem— in several countries, the values of judicial independence and accountability have been deemed to be in tension, often irreconcilably. Part II tackles this widely articulated tension by providing a conceptual framework to understand these concepts. Its main argument is that both judicial independence and accountability are necessary for 'an effective judiciary'. Whether indeed the processes governing the four selected facets of judicial functioning in India lead to an effective judiciary is assessed in Part III. Where they are found lacking, appropriate reform is suggested. Such reform is intended to ensure that the selected processes operate in a manner that is justifiable in terms of judicial independence and accountability in principle and is efficacious in practice.