Thesis (D. Min.)--Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 250-259).

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-84). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. / "September 2004." Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-73). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.(History)--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-173). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves [118]-146). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Department of International Relations School of Social Sciences / The formulation of International Law has been greatly driven by Western principles. These principles have been applied to the world at large as a result of the continuing hegemony of the global north. Consequently, what is deemed to be just and unjust, legitimate and illegitimate in international relations is dictated by these set standards that have been reified throughout history. Sovereign states, as realist theorist tend to emphasize, are at the core of international relations. One of the basic premises of Realism is that the absence of central authority in the international system is bound to lead to conflict. Various international relations theorists have contributed to this literature in their attempts to unpack causes, solutions and justifications for war. The United Nations Charter provides perhaps the most concrete guidelines and codifications of proper state conduct in the pursuit of peace and order and the resolution of conflicts. However, with the progression of history, the nature of conflict in international relations has experienced various changes. One of these changes worth analysing is the shift away from states as single most important actors in a conflict-prone international context. As a matter of fact, the recent history of international relations has been marked by the rise of non-state actors. This research paper seeks to investigate this shift by revisiting Just War Theory against non-state actors in conflict in Africa using the cases of the Mai Mai Bakata Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Pirates in Somlia’s Gulf of Aden.

The origins of the just war theory date back to medieval times, with the early Catholic scholars, Augustine and Aquinas, and have continued into modem times, with revisions of the theory by Elshtain and Walzer. So why is a new just war theory needed? The primary problem with the old theories is not the concept of the theory itself, but the questions that prior theories of just war leave unanswered. The just war theory of today continues to be unspecific, and does not deal with contemporary issues, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and discrimination between combatants and noncombatants in an age of airborne warfare. In the years since September 11 th, and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq sans the support of the United Nations, the concept of the just war has gained prominence in political theory and commentary. In a twofold manner, this thesis deals with the problems left unanswered by current just war theory. First, a new just war theory is proposed, which addresses many of the abovementioned issues that remain unsolved by former theories. Second, this theory is tested through application to the 1991 Persian Gulf War; the decade after the war in which economic sanctions were placed against Iraq; and the three-year period directly after the September 11th attacks, in which the world again entered into conflict with Iraq. The classic just war theory template is used, with the war and the decade-long period following it classified under the traditional jus ad bellum (just cause ),jus in bello (just conduct), and conclusion categories. The post September 11th period is dealt with using the jus ad bellum template, as a precursor to the 2003 Iraq War. This thesis tests the applicability of the new just war theory in the face of modem wartime considerations, such as advanced weapons technology, wartime military conduct, military occupation, and civilian welfare. The new just war theory has been designed to take these issues into consideration, and as such, it accommodates the just limitations of war (what a state can and cannot do in the course of a conflict), while still defining what is and is not a just cause to go to war. There is also new consideration given to the conclusion of the war, and specifically, the rights and responsibilities of both the occupied and the occupying parties, as well as the issue of rebuilding and recovery in the country or countries involved in the conflict. These are considerations that are new to war, and were not considered previous to the past century of conflict. As such, older just war theories do not adequately discuss these responsibilities, and the new theory strives to fill this gap.

In this essay I attempt to examine critically Michael Walzer's just war theory. I begin by pointing out what I take to be philosophically sound about his conception; in particular, his philosophical commitment to a doctrine of human rights as being morally decisive for questions of war. He argues, and I think correctly, that questions of justified wars and justified means within wars are ultimately questions about whether or not human rights are being respected. Unfortunately, Walzer does not always formulate his war principles in light of his fundamental commitment to human rights, and where he fails to do so, supreme emergencies and nuclear deterrence, I argue that his account becomes incoherent. At bottom, Walzer supposes, in these instances, that while individual rights may not be overriden for purely utilitarian reasons, rights may, nevertheless, be overridden for the sake of the political community. What this amounts to, for Walzer, is the following claim: that it is more just to secure the rights of a collection of individuals than it is to secure the rights of one individual. If so, it is morally permissible to suspend some individual rights for the sake of many individual rights. And even though I will hold that this argument is very persuasive, I will suggest that it is mistaken from a moral point of view which takes human rights to be morally conclusive.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Wien, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [334]-352).