Tong Kwok-Kit. / "August 2000." / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Choinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-116). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy) / This thesis consists of two parts. First an argument is made to the effect that the contemporary debate on justice does not sufficiently address the specific problems pertinent to radically unjust societies. In the second part an attempt is made to propose remedies for these deficiencies. In chapter one the following deficiencies in the contemporary debate on justice are pointed out: (i) it does not provide sufficient guidance on how injustice should be identified, (ii) there is a lack of clarity on the universality or particularity of theories of justice; (iii) the methodology of theories of justice is neglected; (iv) a thorough evaluation of forms of political action acceptable for the transformation of injustice into justice is relatively absent; (v) there is a lack of attention to conflicts of pluralism other than religious and moral pluralism. In the second chapter it is noted that people in radically unjust societies often accept their situation willingly or endure it passively because they either accept a set of ideas legitimating it, or they perceive their situation as the inevitable product of natural forces that they are powerless to do anything about. Suggestions are made to enable these people to see their society as the product of human activity and thus as something that they as human beings can modify, alter, change, or transform. Having established, at the beginning of chapter three, that the quest for a universal theory of justice is important, various findings are briefly sketched. It is followed by an attempt to distinguish universal elements that ought to belong to the contents of any theory of justice, justified by reference to features of our common humanity, from ·the particular elements in a theory of justice, brought about by a variety of factors, such as socioeconomic circumstances, cultural values, specific experiences, and so on. In chapter four a theory of justice as complex consensus is expounded in six theses, which leads to a method appropriate for (i) the theoretical articulation and explanation of injustice and (ii) the design, construction, and justification of a theory of the optimally·just society that complements and completes the universal elements, distinguished above, by means of particular elements so that the resulting theory of justice is applicable to the unique socio-political context of a particular society only. In the fifth chapter views that defend an extrinsic or an intrinsic relation between the means and ends of the transformationof a radically unjust society into a nearly just (or even an optimally just) one, are contrasted. Thereafter an extensive defense of an intrinsic relation between the means and ends of political transformation is provided. The final chapter starts by indicating what should be counted as gains made in terms of justice once a radically unjust society has been transformed into a nearly just (or even an optimally just) one. A sketch of the simplest way possible for implementing and securing these gains will be examined and remedies will be proposed that best secure justice for those shortcomings that have been pointed out.

Liberal democracies sit on a foundation of popular sovereignty and the values of equality, liberty, and fairness. While some coercion by the state is necessary in order to maintain state sovereignty and provide a stable government, and excessive use of state coercion violates the liberty of its citizens. The harm and offense principles provide the boundaries of acceptable state coercion, but if these laws are unfairly enforced by police as the domestic arm of state authority, then the equality of liberty has been violated. United States' law enforcement has unfairly enforced just laws against black Americans, resulting in black Americans' overrepresentation in police brutality and killings. The implicit threat of police brutality against black Americans limits their liberty below that defined by the harm and offense principles. The unequal liberty between black and white Americans causes a potential lack of equal participation in political life, furthering an imbalance between races. Therefore American law enforcement should be considered a threatening obstacle to maintaining a healthy liberal democracy in the United States. Keywords​: liberal democracy, liberty, state coercion, police, United States Range of thesis​: 90,458 characters

Justice is a key guiding ethical principle in bioethics. When justice is addressed in bioethics the focus is primarily on the fair distribution of resources, that is, distributive justice. In this thesis, I argue that a distributive conception of justice is unable to adequately address many of the relevant issues of justice within bioethics. These issues are better understood and addressed using a social conception of justice. Social justice is concerned with ensuring that the norms and rules of social structures are fair and equitable. I argue that social and distributive justice are not only compatible, but also complementary. As a result, both conceptions of justice need to be applied to bioethical issues if we are to achieve a truly just outcome. As a case study, I apply this analysis to the controversial issue of the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical research trial.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Boston University, 1990. / The central question of this dissertation 1s whether Habermas's discourse ethics can successfully take account of the kinds of criticisms of Kantian formalism, first raised by Hegel, without at the same time abdicating the universalism of the Kantian conception of justice. Specifically, it considers whether the universality of moral principles can be maintained while recognizing the particularity of our experiences and values. This question is pursued in the context of a discussion raised by contemporary Anglo-American ethicists. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that . our notions of the right and the good are derived from a notion of the good life which defines the character of any given community. This would seem to undercut the force of Habermas's quasi-deontological position, which asserts that norms are only legitimated by universally valid criteria. This dissertation maintains that Habermas's theory of moral character accounts for both our historical rootedness and our ability to adopt a universalistic standpoint from which to question and assess our culturally mediated beliefs. When Habermas's position is considered in light of the arguments of critics such as Carol Gilligan, Martha Nussbaum, and Larry Blum, who criticize neo-Kantian tendencies to characterize morality as moral argument and the consequent failure to develop concepts of moral character, moral perception, moral emotion, and moral judgment, it becomes clear that Habermas needs a general moral theory that extends to the private sphere. It is posssible to reformulate Habermas's ethical theory so that the distinction between norms and values issues from an ideally regulated discourse that at the same time defines the boundary between public and private. The gap between norms and values also can be bridged by incorporating the notion of symmetrical reciprocity as a meta-norm of discourse, which would ground both principles of justice and a notion of the good without privileging any historically specific vision of the good life.

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Rawls emphasizes in his later writings that his theory of justice as fairness is not a defense of welfare-state capitalism. He argues that welfare-state capitalism cannot be an acceptable regime for justice as fairness because its ideal institutional description fails to satisfy the two principles of justice in various ways. Against Rawls, I argue in this thesis that his rejection of welfare-state capitalism is not justified. I begin by clarifying an ambiguity regarding what arrangements and policies according to Rawls are essential to satisfy the two principles of justice through closely studying the institutional arrangements of property-owning democracy and liberal socialism—the two regimes thought by Rawls as capable of fully satisfying the two principles of justice. After that, I show that the fundamental reason behind Rawls’s rejection of welfare-state capitalism is his assumption that welfare-state capitalism does not aim to realize justice as fairness. I argue that this assumption held by Rawls is not justified because the essential institutional features of welfare-state capitalism can be compatible with the arrangements and policies necessary to satisfy the principles of justice. I also argue that if Rawls’s assumption regarding the aim of welfare-state capitalism cannot stand, he should not rule out welfare-state capitalism as an acceptable regime for justice as fairness. Finally, I examine different arguments that provide alternative reasons to justify Rawls’s rejection of welfare-state capitalism. I argue that all of them are unsuccessful because they either are based on problematic interpretations of the two principles of justice or fail to conclusively rule out welfare-state capitalism. By showing that welfare-state capitalism can be an acceptable regime for justice as fairness, this thesis proves that a just society does not need to be the one that entitles every citizen to a substantive right to own real capital. Also, in the process of arguing for welfare-state capitalism, this thesis also indirectly contributes to the recent debates between Rawlsians on the left and right over the proper interpretations of the first principle of justice and the Difference Principle. / published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis explores the relative strengths of particularism and generalism in the area of meta-ethics in philosophy, utilising justice as a case study. More specifically, this thesis examines the claims of Jonathan Dancy in his book on moral particularism, Ethics Without Principles (2004), that one can construct a moral philosophy without reference to any general principles, or invariant reasons. His book is primarily a study of reasons, and this thesis also presents a study of reasons through the eyes f both the particularists and the generalists. At its core, the particularism holds holism to be true in the theory of reasons, whereas generalism, at its core, holds atomism to be true in the theory of reasons. In my thesis I find that the strongest form of atomism and the strongest form of generalism is Rossean generalism. I conclude that these two pictures combined provide a superior account of what reasons are and how they work than Dancy's particularism. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

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