The meaning that Justice has after a conflict in a society might vary regarding the political development and cultural and shared values of a certain society. Rawls, in his Theory of Justice gives his idea of what justice is and presents two principles of justice that he argues are required to live in a good society: a first principle that secures equal rights and liberties for all individuals and a second egalitarian principle that restrains the consequences of economic inequalities within societies. He also introduces the concept of “overlapping consensus” which I will use regarding the idea of Reconciliation, at the end of this paper. In the cases presented in this paper (i.e. Argentina and South Africa), essential human rights were violated, therefore wrongdoers made the society unjust. The aim of this thesis is to elucidate the conditions that are necessary to re-establish justice when a society goes through a conflict. I will introduce some ideas concerning that issue: ideas of retribution, reparation and reconciliation. These are seen as different paths for several countries when trying to tackle to the matter of achieving justice. In my view, this question can be answered appealing first to an intuitive conception of moral justice that may exist at an individual and collective level, as well. The ethical dilemmas both levels have are in relation to the harm done, punishments and how to balance them, limiting, for instance, the punishment in order to accomplish a just and a better society. I will also present how shared values can result from a process of reconciliation, which is considered as the ideal alternative to achieve justice. However, when the equilibrium between members of a community is broken, some people claim that punishment can restore that lost equilibrium that existed before in the community. Nevertheless, peace, reconciliation and justice cannot be constructed under the basis of silence. One way to keep memory alive is to let survivors, for instance, narrate what they have lived through; telling stories also creates a new space to share with others their experiences, revealing their fears and emotions. Regarding this theme, I will present the NUNCA MAS (Never Again) report, which is fundamental as it gives some testimonies, facts and proposals that will help to reach a consensus and therefore, future reconciliations. Why is important to achieve justice? Because then members of a certain community will be able to interact in the present with common shared values and thus, deal with the past. Not to consider reconciliation as one important step to achieve justice, and only think in terms of punishment, instead of giving way to peace and justice, could perhaps promote the possibility of further conflicts. To consider both punishment and reconciliation might just be one possible blueprint in the long and difficult way of searching for a just society.

In an attempt to illustrate that the developed world has obligations to alleviate severe poverty, Thomas Pogge created a theory driven by human rights to focus on negative rights and duties of the avoidance of harm. His theory of global justice is developed on a minimalist account of what it means to harm. For him, the violation of the negative duty not to harm constitutes an injustice. This injustice is enacted against the citizens of developing nations by the global institutional order. Citizens of the developed world are perpetuating injustice by harming individuals through the imposition of a global order that avoidably causes human rights deficits without due compensation or reform to policies. Many critics take issue with his definition of harm as focused on negative rights, as well as find his theory of causation troublesome. His critics largely object to his assertion that the developed world causally contributes to severe poverty. Critiques of Pogge attempt to demonstrate that it is not the case that the developed world is causally responsible for severe poverty. In doing so, some make reference to domestic factors within developing nations, which they claim Pogge largely neglects. Others argue that the current global institutional order benefits developing nations. Furthermore, some of his critics engage with the normative demands that follow from his argument. They claim he has a minimal definition of harm and injustice that leads to unmanageable maximal obligations. Conversely, there are claims his argument leads to normative demands that are insufficient in redressing injustices. I argue that Pogge’s theory of global justice has developed the foundation necessary to motivate affluent nations to establish a minimally just global institutional order that avoids the perpetuation of avoidable human rights violations. This foundation elucidates and establishes, through the global institutional order, an overarching causal relationship between the world’s affluent nations and the severely poor. This relationship, despite critiques, is essential in order to illustrate that developed world citizens do indeed contribute to severe poverty and so must take action to establish a minimally just institutional order. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2009-02-02 16:07:34.355

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Duke University, 2007.

Thesis (doctoral), Universität, Düsseldorf, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-257).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2001. / Vita. This is an electronic reproduction of TREN, #033-0590. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108).

Thesis (doctoral), Universität, Düsseldorf, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-257).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2001. / Vita. This is an electronic reproduction of TREN, #033-0590. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108).

The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005). My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.

What conditions lead to confidence among civil war combatants that they will not face accountability for perpetrating sexual violence? This study investigates the causes of impunity for sexual violence among armed actors. It develops a theoretical framework which identifies three explanations for armed group impunity for sexual violence, namely (1) flawed prohibitions inside an armed group; (2) negligent enforcement by its authorities; and (3) pardons in the form of amnesties during the peace process. Adopting a two-pronged approach, the study first explores the associations between amnesties arising from concluding peace agreements and post-settlement levels of sexual violence in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and South Africa. A small-scale, events-based dataset of sexual violence by governments and rebel groups in the first three years after war was constructed. The second and main part of the study is a comparison between two rebel groups in Burundi’s civil war (1994-2008), CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy) and Palipehutu-FNL (Palipehutu-Forces for National Liberation) and their practices of prohibition and punishment of wartime sexual violence, taking into account also the possible influence of amnesties. Based on original data from 19 focus groups of ex-combatants from these rebel organisations, it is found that flawed prohibitions and negligent authorities are the main explanations for armed group impunity. The findings do not support amnesties as a cause of armed group impunity for sexual violence. Moreover, additional findings suggest that accountability for sexual violence is triggered by dependency on civilian support, while impunity is facilitated by an armed group’s ability to secure recruits, material and other resources without the help of local communities.