Many accounts of epistemic justification are initially plausible as accounts of justifiably coming to believe a proposition, but fail as accounts of continuing to believe a proposition. In this essay, I examine candidate theories of ongoing justification, arguing that those along both coherentist and foundationalist lines are inadequate. First, I argue that coherentism doesn't work by dividing such accounts into negative and positive theories. Negative coherentism fails because of its dependence on the principle of epistemic conservatism, against which there are decisive objections. Positive coherentism is also rejected because one can be justified in continuing to believe a proposition even if one's doxastic corpus fails to entail or make probable or in any way evidentially support the belief. Foundationalism is then considered. According to one sort of foundationalist, an agent is justified in continuing to believe a proposition only if she remembers the original justificatory basis of her belief. This sort of foundationalism suffers a fate similar to that of positive coherentism; it entails that many beliefs, which clearly are justified, are unjustified. Another kind of foundationalism, one that treats memory as a justification conferring process, is considered. This version is inadequate as it fails to account for the historical nature of justification and fails to account for the justification of unactivated mnemonic beliefs. In the essay's final chapter, I argue that the failure of both foundationalism and coherentism indicates that internalistic accounts are hopeless. Finally, a theory of ongoing justification along reliabilist lines is suggested, elaborated, and defended.

高基存. / "2001年7月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001. / 參考文獻 (leaves 120-123) / 附中英文摘要. / "2001 nian 7 yue" / Gao Jicun. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 120-123) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 序言 --- p.iii / Chapter 第一章 --- 何謂基礎論？何謂融貫論？ --- p.1 / Chapter 第一節 --- 故事 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二節 --- 基礎論與融貫論的主要分別 --- p.4 / Chapter 第三節 --- 避免混淆 --- p.6 / Chapter 第四節 --- 倒退論證 --- p.8 / Chapter 第五節 --- 融貫論者的回應 --- p.11 / Chapter 第六節 --- 不可錯性 --- p.12 / Chapter 第七節 --- 何謂「融貫」？ --- p.17 / Chapter 第八節 --- 各種類型的基礎論與融貫論 --- p.17 / Chapter 第二章 --- 戈德曼的可靠主義 --- p.21 / Chapter 第一節 --- 可靠主義者戈德曼 --- p.21 / Chapter 第二節 --- 知識論詞 --- p.23 / Chapter 第三節 --- 嘗試錯誤的進路 --- p.25 / Chapter 第四節 --- 原因要求 --- p.34 / Chapter 第五節 --- 提出可靠主義 --- p.35 / Chapter 第六節 --- 可靠主義的精確表達´ؤ´ؤ一種基礎論 --- p.38 / Chapter 第七節 --- 關於反事實情況的要求 --- p.41 / Chapter 第八節 --- 強與弱的證成 --- p.44 / Chapter 第九節 --- 對四種合理信念的要求 --- p.47 / Chapter 第十節 --- 笛卡兒的魔鬼世界 --- p.50 / Chapter 十一節 --- 訴諸客觀可靠性的錯謬 --- p.52 / Chapter 十二節 --- 基礎論中的融貫要求 --- p.55 / Chapter 十三節 --- 本章結論 --- p.64 / Chapter 第三章 --- 博朱爾的融貫論 --- p.66 / Chapter 第一節 --- 融貫論者博朱爾 --- p.66 / Chapter 第二節 --- 整體主義的證成結構 --- p.67 / Chapter 第三節 --- 融貫論四步曲 --- p.68 / Chapter 第四節 --- 「融貫」的意思 --- p.71 / Chapter 第五節 --- 三個質疑 --- p.76 / Chapter 第六節 --- 信念系統假定 --- p.78 / Chapter 第七節 --- 觀察信念的證成 --- p.81 / Chapter 第八節 --- 內省信念的證成 --- p.89 / Chapter 第九節 --- 輸入質疑 --- p.93 / Chapter 第十節 --- 可選擇的其他融貫系統 --- p.95 / Chapter 十一節 --- 真理問題的質疑 --- p.96 / Chapter 十二節 --- 信念系統假定的兩難困境 --- p.106 / Chapter 十三節 --- 倒戈相向的觀察要求 --- p.109 / Chapter 十四節 --- 融貫論中的基礎原則 --- p.112 / Chapter 十五節 --- 本章結論 --- p.114 / 結論 --- p.115 / 參考書目 --- p.120

Thesis (M.S.)--Middle East Technical University, 2003. / Keywords: Justification, Kinds of Justification, Truth, Truth Connection, Reality, Kinds of Reality, Knowledge, Conditions of Knowledge.

The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

The central thesis of this dissertation is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from psychological investigation. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of justified beliefs a psychological capacity which humans do not have. A different way of stating this view is that the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from psychological investigation. In sum, there is a meta-theoretical constraint of psychological realism on accounts of epistemic justification which requires appeal to psychological investigation in its employment. After defending these proposals, I illustrate how the constraint of psychological realism has been and can be used both to test candidate accounts of epistemic justification and to guide the construction of such an account which is intuitive and psychologically realistic. These two kinds of applications of the constraint can involve either scientific or non-scientific psychological investigation. I give examples from current epistemological literature of critical employments of the constraint which appeal to both of these kinds of psychological investigation. Finally, in illustrating the role of the constraint of psychological realism in guiding the construction of an account of epistemic justification, I consider both reliabilist views and a variety of positions which feature the notion of cognitive design. I suggest that this latter approach holds out promise for yielding an account of epistemic justification which is both psychologically realistic and intuitive.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oklahoma, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 326-336).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [218]-224).

The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1992. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-88).

This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.