The enactment of the FCPA and the formation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention created two historical events for theoretical analysis: because the FCPA unprecedentedly criminalized transnational bribery in 1977, its wisdom was initially questioned. Then, since the Convention endorsed the FCPA approach in 1997, academic focus was shifted to the practical effect of the Convention in controlling transnational bribery-—which is also the topic of this study. / This study develops argument based on an awareness of the limitation of a popular methodology in current literature-—the problem-solving paradigm. This paradigm is grounded in the rational-choice tradition, assumes signatories’ enforcement of the Convention as resulting from their self-serving purposes, labels the current level of Convention enforcement as “ineffective-enforcement”, and borrows solutions from conventional collective action theories to prescribe. This paradigm well explains why most signatories have brought few enforcement actions. Yet its excessive commitment to orthodoxies prevents scholars from grasping the uniqueness of the collaboration and prescribing successful solutions. Besides, it avoids explaining why some signatories have indeed enforced the Convention. A historical approach that draws causality from a process’s historicity is thus proposed as a supplementary methodology. / This study analyzes signatories’ compliance with the Convention by four steps: First, it explains a seemingly outdated but unexplained question—the dynamic of the institutionalization of the OECD anti-bribery collaboration, and finds that the central institutions did not result from signatories’ trading off conflicting values and interests, but from their attempts to coordinate demands of different stakeholders within given institutional contexts. / Second, this study explains why most signatories tend to defect rather than faithfully enforce the Convention, following the logic of the problem-solving paradigm: destabilizing factors in the indigenous collaboration encourage defection in the first place, and the monitoring program in the collaboration fails to resolve these destabilizing factors in the second place. More fundamentally, the surreptitious nature of transnational bribery fails central monitoring—a conventional effective solution to collective action problems. / This study then formulates a three-level solution model to address the monitoring problem: first, this model encourages private sector actors to report clues of transnational bribery so as to resolve the lack of first-hand information. Second, given the weakness of private sector actors in collecting solid evidence, this model stresses the dominant role of national prosecutors in the home country of bribe-paying companies to conduct in-depth investigations. Third, given that prosecutors may shirk duty because of protectionism, this model suggests to authorize prosecutors in the home country of victimized competitors the right to monitor the investigation process. / Forth, this study takes the US as an example to analyze the positive side of Convention enforcement. Given that FCPA enforcement is embodied in the SEC and the DOJ’s independent performance of their own statutory duties, this study reviews variation in the SEC and the DOJ’s enforcement efforts in past decades, and finds that this variation results from their adherence to their own missions in an evolving institutional context—which gradually incorporates their duties of enforcing the FCPA into their central missions. / 美国的《反海外贿赂法》和世界经合组织的《关于反对在国际商务活动中贿赂外国公务人员行为的公约》（《公约》）为学界提供了两个重要课题：《反海外贿赂法》开创性地将跨国商业贿赂规定为犯罪，其合理性曾饱受质疑；《公约》将《反海外贿赂法》的精神推广到其他国家后，学界进而关注其执行效果，并提供政策建言—此亦是本文的论题。 / 本文的论述建立在对学界的“问题导向型”研究范式批判继承的基础之上：该范式植根理性主义传统，假定国家决策的自利属性，将《公约》的执行现状拟制为“非有效执行”，并试图从传统集体行动理论中借鉴对策。该范式阐释了为何多数缔约国执行《公约》乏力。然而其过于依赖传统理论，忽略《公约》项下集体行动的独特性，难以找准对策。同时该范式完全回避解释少数缔约国认真履约的现实。因此，本文在肯定该范式的理论贡献之上建议采用历史分析方法，从《公约》执行实践中总结经验，以为补充。 / 本文首先分析了《公约》项下反贿赂集体行动的制度化进程，发现《反海外贿赂法》和《公约》等核心制度的产生并非源自各缔约国对利益和价值的权衡取舍，而是立法者在既定的社会制度和价值体系中协调各主体的利益关切的必然选择。随后，本文立足于 “问题导向型”范式的理论成果，阐释了大部分缔约国不执行《公约》的原因：反贿赂集体行动存在着诸多结构性不安定因素，而《公约》项下的监督体制未能克服相关问题。《公约》项下集体行动问题需要系统的、三层次的应对模式：鼓励私人主体提供贿赂案件的原始线索；将私人主体获取原始线索的优势和公权力搜集确凿证据的优势整合；赋予受损的竞争者的母国对调查取证的参与权，促成缔约国相互监督。最后本文分析了美国日益激进的战略，发现其对《反海外贿赂法》的执行力度随着执法部门的执法义务和本部门中心任务的逐渐兼容而得以加强，其轨迹不同于理性主义对国家行为逻辑的预测。美国的激进战略客观上造就了国际规制竞争，为提高公约执行水平提供了新路径。 / Liu, Lianlian. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 337-355). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on 15, September, 2016). / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only.