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Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant's ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant's claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant's conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant's method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

This thesis argues that corporations qua corporations are moral agents sui generis and hence capable of being held morally responsible. I argue that corporations qua corporations are responsible for the actual and foreseen consequences of their actions. I analyse normative theories and the different proscriptive responsibilities they place on moral agents and hence corporations. I examine Kantianism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I argue for a unique normative ethical theory that incorporates reasoning from all three of the normative theories. I argue for a broad range of reasons to factor into deciding whether an act is ethical or not. One of the claims of this thesis is that ethical theories must incorporate an agent’s motivation, intention and character traits as relevant to deciding on whether an action is ethical or not. My thesis argues for an indispensable role for the virtues while at the same time incorporating impartial beneficence and universal rationality from utilitarianism and Kantianism. This position I, following the literature, refer to as moderate virtue theory. Having established corporate qua corporate responsibility I question the pharmaceutical corporation’s practice of patenting life saving medication during a state of pandemic in poor countries. The moderate virtue theory position prioritises contexts and the actual human condition and criticises normative theories that attempt to give universal, abstracted answers to ethical problems. It is for this reason and the current (2003) HIV/AIDS pandemic that I focus on a particular context. I examine the practice of patenting life saving medication within South Africa and argue, applying moderate virtue theory, that this act cannot be justified. I argue that a pharmaceutical corporation that patents life saving medication in South Africa cannot justify that action and thus is morally responsible for that action. I also argue that corporations patenting HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa have unethical motivations and intentions.