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Strong key derivation from noisy sourcesFuller, Benjamin Woodbury 12 March 2016 (has links)
A shared cryptographic key enables strong authentication. Candidate sources for creating such a shared key include biometrics and physically unclonable functions. However, these sources come with a substantial problem: noise in repeated readings.
A fuzzy extractor produces a stable key from a noisy source. It consists of two stages. At enrollment time, the generate algorithm produces a key from an initial reading of the source. At authentication time, the reproduce algorithm takes a repeated but noisy reading of the source, yielding the same key when the two readings are close. For many sources of practical importance, traditional fuzzy extractors provide no meaningful security guarantee.
This dissertation improves key derivation from noisy sources. These improvements stem from three observations about traditional fuzzy extractors.
First, the only property of a source that standard fuzzy extractors use is the entropy in the original reading. We observe that additional structural information about the source can facilitate key derivation.
Second, most fuzzy extractors work by first recovering the initial reading from the noisy reading (known as a secure sketch). This approach imposes harsh limitations on the length of the derived key. We observe that it is possible to produce a consistent key without recovering the original reading of the source.
Third, traditional fuzzy extractors provide information-theoretic security. However, security against computationally bounded adversaries is sufficient. We observe fuzzy extractors providing computational security can overcome limitations of traditional approaches.
The above observations are supported by negative results and constructions. As an example, we combine all three observations to construct a fuzzy extractor achieving properties that have eluded prior approaches. The construction remains secure even when the initial enrollment phase is repeated multiple times with noisy readings. Furthermore, for many practical sources, reliability demands that the tolerated noise is larger than the entropy of the original reading. The construction provides security for sources of this type by utilizing additional source structure, producing a consistent key without recovering the original reading, and providing computational security.
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Lyra: uma função de derivação de chaves com custos de memória e processamento configuráveis. / Lyra: password-based key derivation with tunable memory and processing costs.Almeida, Leonardo de Campos 16 March 2016 (has links)
Este documento apresenta o Lyra, um novo esquema de derivação de chaves, baseado em esponjas criptográficas. O Lyra foi projetado para ser estritamente sequencial, fornecendo um nível elevado de segurança mesmo contra atacantes que utilizem múltiplos núcleos de processamento, como uma GPU ou FPGA. Ao mesmo tempo possui uma implementação simples em software e permite ao usuário legítimo ajustar o uso de memória e tempo de processamento de acordo com o nível de segurança desejado. O Lyra é, então, comparado ao scrypt, mostrando que esta proposta fornece um nível se segurança mais alto, além de superar suas deficiências. Caso o atacante deseje realizar um ataque utilizando pouca memória, o tempo de processamento do Lyra cresce exponencialmente, enquanto no scrypt este crescimento é apenas quadrático. Além disto, para o mesmo tempo de processamento, o Lyra permite uma utilização maior de memória, quando comparado ao scrypt, aumentando o custo de ataques de força bruta. / This document presents Lyra, a password-based key derivation scheme based on cryptographic sponges. Lyra was designed to be strictly sequential, providing strong security even against attackers that use multiple processing cores, such as FPGAs or GPUs. At the same time, it is very simple to implement in software and allows legitimate users to tune its memory and processing costs according to the desired level of security. We compare Lyra with scrypt, showing how this proposal provides a higher security level and overcomes limitations of scrypt. If the attacker wishes to perform a low-memory attack against the algorithm, the processing cost grwos expontetialy, while in scrypt, this growth is only quadratic. In addition, for an identical processing time, Lyra allows for a higher memory usage than its counterparts, further increasing the cost of brute force attacks.
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Lyra: uma função de derivação de chaves com custos de memória e processamento configuráveis. / Lyra: password-based key derivation with tunable memory and processing costs.Leonardo de Campos Almeida 16 March 2016 (has links)
Este documento apresenta o Lyra, um novo esquema de derivação de chaves, baseado em esponjas criptográficas. O Lyra foi projetado para ser estritamente sequencial, fornecendo um nível elevado de segurança mesmo contra atacantes que utilizem múltiplos núcleos de processamento, como uma GPU ou FPGA. Ao mesmo tempo possui uma implementação simples em software e permite ao usuário legítimo ajustar o uso de memória e tempo de processamento de acordo com o nível de segurança desejado. O Lyra é, então, comparado ao scrypt, mostrando que esta proposta fornece um nível se segurança mais alto, além de superar suas deficiências. Caso o atacante deseje realizar um ataque utilizando pouca memória, o tempo de processamento do Lyra cresce exponencialmente, enquanto no scrypt este crescimento é apenas quadrático. Além disto, para o mesmo tempo de processamento, o Lyra permite uma utilização maior de memória, quando comparado ao scrypt, aumentando o custo de ataques de força bruta. / This document presents Lyra, a password-based key derivation scheme based on cryptographic sponges. Lyra was designed to be strictly sequential, providing strong security even against attackers that use multiple processing cores, such as FPGAs or GPUs. At the same time, it is very simple to implement in software and allows legitimate users to tune its memory and processing costs according to the desired level of security. We compare Lyra with scrypt, showing how this proposal provides a higher security level and overcomes limitations of scrypt. If the attacker wishes to perform a low-memory attack against the algorithm, the processing cost grwos expontetialy, while in scrypt, this growth is only quadratic. In addition, for an identical processing time, Lyra allows for a higher memory usage than its counterparts, further increasing the cost of brute force attacks.
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GPU akcelerované prolamování šifer / GPU Accelerated Ciphers CrackingSchmied, Jan January 2014 (has links)
This work describes one - way hash functions and cryptographic algorithms . It also describes their implementation regarding DOC, PDF and ZIP files contents encryption . Subsequently , the implementation analyzis is provided . Following next, the brute - force attack procedure levereging GPU is proposed and evaluated.
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