Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Zürich. / "Die Arbeit erscheint für den Buchhandel im Verlage von J.C.B. Mohr ..." "Literatur" : p. 135-136.

Thesis (M.A.)--Cincinnati Christian Seminary, 1984. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 200-207).

D.Phil. (Psychology) / In the first part of the thesis the need for theory development in psychology is sketched by a review of the relevant literature, thus justifying the necessity of theoretical research in psychology. The appropriate method for theory development - comparative metatheoretical analysis - is delineated, and situated against the background of two major approaches to theory development in psychology: the transcendental and the empirical. The key terms that form the basis of most of the analyses are defined, and the aim and scope of the thesis is briefly stated. The second part consists of a review of the competing philosophical views regarding theorizing and scientific inquiry in the social sciences, with the goal of developing an adequate metatheory for psychology. It starts with a historical overview of developments in the philosophy of science, emphasizing issues that are relevant to psychology. The development of scientific realism is reviewed, with a specific focus upon McMullin's empirical argument in favour of realism, and Bhaskar's transcendental justification of realism. It is also shown how realism was adapted by Bhaskar in order to suit the social sciences. Social constructionism the diametric opposite of realism - is then reviewed, as well as the intermediate positions of Manicas and Rosenberg, and Layder. These positions are all critically evaluated, and a choice in favour of a realism as the most appropriate metatheory for social science and psychology is made. In the third part of the thesis the principles of the realist position are developed further and applied to psychology. In this regard, a framework is developed to assess the epistemic status of psychology as a distinctive and legitimate social science, when seen in relation to the other social sciences. The implications of a stratified reality for psychological explanation is examined, and these implications are also linked to psychology' 5 distinctive subject matter and domain of investigation. The epistemic status of psychological explanation in relation to ordinary language accounts is examined, and the influence of stratification in psychological explanation is analyzed. A substantive realist position for psychology is then developed, which starts with a brief review of Manicas and Secord's realist position. The realist position developed has some differences in emphasis when compared to that of Bhaskar, most notably as far as the notion of structural explanation is concerned. Four theoretical case studies the theoretical debate between Guilford and Eysenck, Gustaffson 's structure-of-intellect theory, Campbell and Fiske's validational model,and cross-cultural ability research in Africa - are used to illustrate the thesis that psychological theories are in fact realist explanations aimed at approximating the causes of observed effects. This development of a substantive realist position is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the epistemic power of psychological theories. This analysis is initiated by distinguishing between various levels of causal explanation in psychology, and a framework of levels of causal explanation is developed and linked to the notion of explanatory power. The realist view of psychological theories also entails that psychological theories are seen as having certain epistemic characteristics, and these characteristics can also be seen as evaluative criteria. A model for theory evaluation in psychology is developed in which these criteria are subsumed, whereby theories can be evaluated according to two major axes of evaluation: an axis assessing the epistemic gains effected by any given theory; and an axis which assesses the influence of external factors (or the social domain) upon the epistemic status of a theory. The utility of the model is demonstrated by two applications: a preliminary assessment of Sternberg's theory of human reasoning, and an extended case study which charts the development of Festinger' s theory of cognitive dissonance, and which culminates in the evaluation of the theory. The epistemic gains achieved by the model for theory evaluation are discussed, and the thesis concludes with an afterword where the benefits and limitations of the investigation are discussed.

M.A. (Clinical Psychology) / The point of view followed in this study is that people create, through dialogue, contexts of consensus in terms of their ideas. These cognitive contexts, of which they were co-creators, comprise their realities. Various, divergent theories exist within the field of psychology. In this study an' attempt was made to illustrate how, by means if the recommended point of view, it becomes possible to comprehend the simultaneous existence of different theories. By first dividing theories into two groups, namely linear- and circular epistemology, it was demonstrated that each epistemology has ideas of its own, as well as a language of its own, for conveying these ideas. Thereafter, it was suggested that epistemologists co-create their own contexts of reality with their ideas through the process of languaging about these ideas. In the light of this it was suggested that the idea of any epistemology or theory being regarded as a domain of cognitive consensus, which was co-created by the epistemologist/s, becomes viable.

An underexplored aspect of moral experience is the experience of apprehending ("seeing") other people as mattering, grasping the significance of whether their interests are set back or enhanced. I refer to these as value-apprehensional (v-a) experiences. I argue (in Ch. 2), partly on the basis of data regarding moral cognition in psychopaths, that experiencing other people's value is one way that we attain adequate systematic comprehension of morality, understanding that others' welfare is the point behind rules against harming them. I then turn to a positive account (in Ch. 3) of what capacities we should expect to facilitate value-apprehensional experiences. I suggest we should look to the capacity to care emotionally about others: roughly, to feel emotions congruent with someone else's well-being, for her sake. I argue that this 'emotional caring' is better suited to explain value-apprehensional experience than other constructs, including empathy (which I understand as feeling what one takes another to be feeling). The broader hypothesis this raises is that emotional caring enables and improves our value-apprehensional abilities. To the extent that is true, I argue (in Ch. 4), we should (all else being equal) consider caring people to have more trustworthy moral intuitions than others, especially if they are not just competent, but skilled at caring about others. Emotions are, of course, biased in various ways, so I suggest attention-refocusing strategies for mitigating these biases. These are epitomized by an unaffiliated caring perspective, one removed from affiliation with any of a morally relevant situation's protagonists, but informed through emotional caring about the (weight of) the interests of each. Finally, I turn (in Ch. 5) to special value-apprehensional experiences that we have in intense, reciprocal relationships of caring with individuals who are special to us (I call these 'special others'). I argue that, if we accept that general v-a experiences reveal people's moral significance, we have even more reason to think that special v-a experiences reveal the special moral significance not only of the parties in the relationship, but of their participation in the relationship, for both their sakes. That is, there are moral reasons to devote caring attention to special others, even if we could otherwise do objectively more good (within reason). Emotional cares reveal not only values within everyone but reasons to devote ourselves to the individuals we care about. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2015. / November 11, 2014. / caring, emotions, moral epistemology, partiality, special relationships, understanding / Includes bibliographical references. / David McNaughton, Professor Directing Dissertation; Roy Baumeister, University Representative; Michael Bishop, Committee Member; Piers Rawling, Committee Member.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 158-163).

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy