Lawrence Kohlberg's approach to values education based upon his moral developmental stages has, since the seventies, dominated the field of moral education where it has often become a substitute for traditional and direct moral teaching. / This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that Kohlberg's approach to moral education cannot, by its very nature, be a viable alternative for moral education in regard to either individual or societal moral needs. / Although Kohlberg's system has been defended for its "classroom dilemmas", associated pedagogical techniques and its "just community" approach to problem solving, this thesis will attempt to show that these approaches have consequences which are in themselves detrimental to the development of a positive moral standard. The use of Kohlberg's system would result in extreme subjectivism and relativism which are destructive to a basic objective moral standard for society.

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This dissertation is a study of Kohlberg's moral psychology, which is a six-stage model of moral development. Kohlberg claims that his stages form a universal invariant sequence and that they are hierarchical, i.e., higher stages are better than lower stages. Accordingly, he claims that Stage 6 morality, which centers on justice, is universally valid. This ethic of justice is embodied mainly in respect for persons, fairness, and the procedural principle of ideal role taking. Kohlberg claims not only that Stage 6 values and principles are universally valid, but also that they are determinate. In other words, reasoning in terms of these values and principles guarantees that, for each particular moral problem, there will be a distinct solution on which all morally mature people could agree. By making these claims Kohlberg is advocating a strong and traditional version of universalism, which I call 'paradigm universalism.' The dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters I outline Kohlberg's theory and explore its philosophical implications. In Chapter 3 I discuss Kohlberg's debates with two important critics, Gilligan and Flanagan. Gilligan claims that Kohlberg's emphasis on justice rather than care indicates a gender bias in his model. Flanagan, on the other hand, argues that since morality is multifarious it is wrong to equate morality either with justice or care of a combination of both. While these criticism do point out certain shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory, I argue that they do not seriously threaten the universal validity of Stage 6 moral values and principles in general. Chapter 4 introduces the main philosophical arguments of this dissertation. In this chapter I argue that (1) moral psychology is relevant to moral philosophy; (2) that the claim of hierarchy for the Kohlbergian stages does receive significant support from his research; and therefore (3) Stage 6 does plausibly reflect certain universal moral ideals. At the same time I allow (4) that there is clearly certain cultural bias in Kohlberg's theory and (5) that he is excessively optimistic about the determinacy of Stage 6 moral reasoning. In the final Chapter, I reflect on the universalism-relativism debate in light of Kohlberg's theory. I argue that paradigm universalism is too strong for Kohlberg to support, and that universalism is acceptable only in a weakened form which I call 'minimal universalism.' Contrary to the hope of paradigm universalists, this minimal universalism cannot serve as a comprehensive theory for solving moral problems. Neither does it exclude all forms of ethical relativism, but it does set important limits to any acceptable relativist theory.

This dissertation is a study of Kohlberg's moral psychology, which is a six-stage model of moral development. Kohlberg claims that his stages form a universal invariant sequence and that they are hierarchical, i.e., higher stages are better than lower stages. Accordingly, he claims that Stage 6 morality, which centers on justice, is universally valid. This ethic of justice is embodied mainly in respect for persons, fairness, and the procedural principle of ideal role taking. Kohlberg claims not only that Stage 6 values and principles are universally valid, but also that they are determinate. In other words, reasoning in terms of these values and principles guarantees that, for each particular moral problem, there will be a distinct solution on which all morally mature people could agree. By making these claims Kohlberg is advocating a strong and traditional version of universalism, which I call 'paradigm universalism.' The dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters I outline Kohlberg's theory and explore its philosophical implications. In Chapter 3 I discuss Kohlberg's debates with two important critics, Gilligan and Flanagan. Gilligan claims that Kohlberg's emphasis on justice rather than care indicates a gender bias in his model. Flanagan, on the other hand, argues that since morality is multifarious it is wrong to equate morality either with justice or care of a combination of both. While these criticism do point out certain shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory, I argue that they do not seriously threaten the universal validity of Stage 6 moral values and principles in general. Chapter 4 introduces the main philosophical arguments of this dissertation. In this chapter I argue that (1) moral psychology is relevant to moral philosophy; (2) that the claim of hierarchy for the Kohlbergian stages does receive significant support from his research; and therefore (3) Stage 6 does plausibly reflect certain universal moral ideals. At the same time I allow (4) that there is clearly certain cultural bias in Kohlberg's theory and (5) that he is excessively optimistic about the determinacy of Stage 6 moral reasoning. In the final Chapter, I reflect on the universalism-relativism debate in light of Kohlberg's theory. I argue that paradigm universalism is too strong for Kohlberg to support, and that universalism is acceptable only in a weakened form which I call 'minimal universalism.' Contrary to the hope of paradigm universalists, this minimal universalism cannot serve as a comprehensive theory for solving moral problems. Neither does it exclude all forms of ethical relativism, but it does set important limits to any acceptable relativist theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Controversy regarding moral development research has given rise to a proliferation of theories competing for acceptance. For all these researchers, the work of Lawrence Kohlberg is the pivot point for comparisons, contrasts, and discussions. Still, no theories to date adequately describe and document a theoretically complete conception of moral judgment and behavior. The contention in this thesis is that Kohlberg's moral development theory should remain the base-camp for further exploration but concepts from the past as well as new components from other fields should be added to construct a better model of human moral thinking and behaving. This thesis formulates a comprehensive and more adequate moral development theory which fits existing data. Pertinent aspects of past and present moral theories are summarized. Theories are evaluated in light of knowledge gained from past thinkers and recent research. Inadequacies are discussed. New pieces from psychological personality theories are presented to replace the normally accepted concept of a unitary ego theory. A more realistic model of growth as a spiral development process is presented. This spiral model allows features of the invariant stage sequence and step-wise hierarchial development process, critical to Piaget's cognitive development theory and to Kohlberg's justice-oriented moral development theory, to exist while couched in a broader growth process that encompasses the pertinent additional features of other researchers' works. The newly constructed theory is presented. Documented case materials and portions of counseling sessions are used to show some adequacy-of-fit of aspects of this theory. / Graduation date: 1992

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