This thesis examines the communist insurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Vietnam(1961-1963). A British Colonial Service Officer, Robert Thompson, helped develop the successful counterinsurgency doctrine during the Malayan Emergency. Later he carried this knowledge to Vietnam to help in the anti-Viet Cong struggle. U.S. leaders welcomed lessons of the Malayan Emergency and their application in parts to the Vietnamese situation in the form of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thompson’s transfer of knowledge from Malaya to Vietnam shows a historical analogy taken out of context by U.S. leadership. I begin my study by looking at British evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine and practices, specifically the New Villages in Malaya, and Robert Thompson’s role in the process. The second chapter examines Thompson’s transferal of Malayan knowledge to Vietnam and the U.S. acceptance of and support for his efforts. I also compare these insurgencies in chapter two to show the differences between them and prove my thesis. Finally, the third chapter shows some reasons why the Strategic Hamlet Program failed and whether Thompson’s program was doomed to fail or not. By examining the Strategic Hamlet Program, an understanding of how the U.S. evolved policy in the Vietnam War becomes possible. / Master of Arts