This dissertation is a collection of essays on bids and offer matching in a labor market for new entrants to white-collar jobs. The papers compare some of the different institutions for determining wages and conducting the hiring process in the market for new entrants to white collar jobs. The first essay analyzes how does a firm announce and commit to a wage prior to deriving specific information about applicants' productivity and the consequences of following this hiring process. In the model there are two firms and at least as many applicants as the number of firms. All applicants apply simultaneously to both firms in response to the job advertisement which also mentions a wage. Each firm derives the firm-specific productivity of the applicants from their applications which is private information to each firm. None of the applicants have any information about the firms' evaluation. There are four pure strategy Nash Equilibria in wage announcements. Both firms announce a high wage, both firms announce a low wage, both firms announce a high or a low wage, and one firm announces a high wage and the other firm announces a low wage. In the latter case there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium reflecting a firm's uncertainty about the choice of the other firm. In equilibrium one or both firms may not hire and the equilibrium may not exhibit wage dispersion. The second essay analyzes the question; which is better, to announce and commit to a particular wage prior to deriving specific information about applicants' productivity or to offer wages privately after deriving the firm-specific productivity. The equilibrium policy, to be followed by the firms in the first place, is determined endogenously by comparing the ex ante expected profits associated with the equilibria under the different policies. Lack of prior information and the uncertainty about the possible match results in "offer wages privately" as always an equilibrium policy. However, if a low wage is the equilibrium strategy under all the policies, then "any pair of policies" is an equilibrium. This justifies one of the circumstances in which different policies might coexist. In equilibrium a firm's position is always filled and the equilibrium outcome may not exhibit wage dispersion. The third essay analyses the question, if "announcing a wage" is the strategy rule to be followed by the firms, then what should be the equilibrium timing of wage announcement, before or after receiving specific information about applicants' productivity. Two policies are compared. Under the first policy a firm announces and commits to a particular wage prior to deriving the match-specific productivity. Under the second policy a firm solicits applications, derives the firm-specific productivity, and then announces and commits to a wage. The equilibrium timing of wage, to be followed by the firms in the first place, is determined endogenously by comparing the ex ante expected profits associated with the equilibrium strategy under the different timings. It turns out that announcing and committing to a particular wage after deriving specific information is always an equilibrium timing because of the informational advantage. However, if a low wage is the equilibrium strategy under all the policies then any pair of policies is an equilibrium. In equilibrium one of the firm's position may remain unfilled. The equilibrium outcome may not exhibit wage dispersion. / Ph. D.