This study examines the effect of politicization caused by executive aggrandizement on the regime, policy subsystem, and agency levels. The study finds that most public administration literature on executive supremacy concentrates on the federal government, with little attention paid to state government and the unique constitutional, political cultural, and institutional issues in the states. This study examines the tools for and consequences of executive supremacy at the state level by reviewing the case of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The study finding that efforts to enhance executive control over administration through reorganization, civil service reform, and increased use of political appointees have politicized administration in the state. At the regime level, executive aggrandizement reduces the legislature’s constitutional role in administration. This complicates the application of public administration theories that call upon career administrators to act as constitutional officers, responsive to both the legislature and the executive as well as their own constitutional duties. Executive aggrandizement also invites legislative retaliation, potentially leaving career administrators caught between the chief executive and the legislature. At the policy subsystem level, politicization upsets the equilibrium of policy subsystems by introducing partisan actors and the winner-take-all mentality of political campaigns into the traditionally low-level conflict of policy subsystems. At the agency level, politicization harms institutional capacity and negatively impacts agency morale and employee trust in agency management. The study concludes by proposing public administration appeal to the enlightened self-interest of chief executives by demonstrating that politicization does not make chief executives more effective, in most instances. The tool of cost-benefit analysis is borrowed from policy analysis to offer a method for chief executives to determine when politicization is appropriate. / Ph. D.