This dissertation fills a void in the economics literature related to the effect of enforcement costs on solid waste disposal policy. The analysis demonstrates that the choice of a cost effective policy tool, be it either an enforcement mechanism or targeted subsidy, is an empirical question dependent on the particular attributes of the current waste disposal situation and the cost of enforcement. A solid waste disposal market simulation model is developed. The model is applied to the development of a policy aimed at solving Virginia's scrap tire disposal problem. The policy options considered are criminal enforcement, regulatory enforcement, and subsidies. The results of the case study indicate that in every case criminal enforcement is more expensive than regulatory enforcement. With regard to the question of what the role of enforcement versus subsidies should be, the most important indicator is the objective function. If the policy makers are concerned with total costs, and are not public budget constrained, then subsidies were found to dominate. If however, officials are concerned with gross or net public costs, due to a budget constraint, then enforcement dominates. The dissertation also documents the author's involvement in the development of Virginia's scrap tire management regulations. This experience shows that the model, although accurate, would only be useful as a policy development tool under certain conditions. Lastly, although this research provides a sophisticated means to determine least cost solutions to solid waste disposal problems, such as, used oil disposal, hazardous waste disposal, animal waste disposal, or human sludge disposal, it can be even more powerful as a means to demonstrate the need to consider the cost of enforcement when developing policy. / Ph. D.