Thesis(B.A.Hons.) - Dept. of Politics, University of Adelaide, 1981. / Typescript (photocopy).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1954. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [397]-401).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1947. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The accepted starting point for an analysis of interunion conflict in Britain is the multiplicity of unions in single industrial settings. This is at once valid and potentially misleading. It is valid because with only one union in any industrial setting, the chances for inter-union friction occurring would be limited to those instances where one industrial setting interacts with another. It is misleading when remedial and academic efforts are designed solely with a view to effecting a reduction in the number of unions in an industrial setting. One commentator, for instance, has proposed the amalgamation of the three largest unions in Britain. [Footnote: H.A. Turner, 'British Trade Union Structure: A New Approach?', British Journal of Industrial Relations, II (1964), 165.] Others have argued that the major unions should divide organisational rights in plants in which they cumulatively have organisational dominance. Plant A would go to Union X; Plant B to Union Y; Plant C to Union Z; and so on. [Footnote: J. Lovell and B.C. Roberts, A Short History of the T.U.C. (London: Macmlllan, 1968), pp. 180-181.] These proposals were made in the last decade. For the most part, they have not been implemented. The present study will not ignore the wisdom of an analysis of inter-union disputes which describes multi-unionism as a necessary pre-condition, but it will focus on a more functional aspect of inter-union conflict. The immediate causes of inter-union disputes concern us here; that is to say, those aspects of industrial life which in fact provoke conflict between unions. Of course, these industrial events only gain in meaning in a multi-union context , but that context will be assumed. In addition to examining the immediate causes of inter-union disputes , this study focuses on a method by which to resolve them - the Disputes Committee of the Trades Union Congress. Accordingly, this study does not approach the subject of inter-union disputes with a view to their elimination through the reforming and restructuring of trade unions and collective bargaining so that only one union is present in single industrial settings. Rather than concentrate on the elimination of inter-union disputes, this study examines the more immediate causes of these disputes and further examines the role of the Disputes Committee in resolving them once they have arisen. Inter-union disputes arise over a variety of issues. In its evidence to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, the Trades Union Congress classified inter-union disputes as being of four types. These include disputes over membership, demarcation of work, representational rights (which unions should compose the trade union side of negotiating or consultative machinery or which union should be recognised individually), and policy (including wage claims). [Footnote: Trade Unionism (London: Trades Union Congress, second edition 1967), pp. 167-168.] The present study is particularly concerned with the first type: inter-union disputes over membership. This will not be to the exclusion, however, of references to the other sorts of disputes where relevant. Disputes between unions over membership are simply those which arise over the question of union representation; that is, conflicts over which union ought to be representing a particular worker or group of workers by means of having that worker or group of workers in membership. Such a dispute may take one of two forms: it may involve an instance where one union allegedly has enrolled a member of another union, or wishes to enrol him in the future; or, it may concern a trade union organising in an industrial unit where there is another trade union also making a claim for organisational rights. This study labels the first form a transfer dispute and the second form an organisational dispute. Part 1 of this thesis approaches inter-union disputes over membership by viewing them in their industrial context. This study does not attempt to present a balanced and complete account of inter-union relations in Britain. Ifor does it attempt to measure precisely the incidence of inter-union disputes in different parts of British industry. Rather, Part I attempts to provide some ideas and concrete examples regarding the nature and sources of inter-union membership disputes which involve in their resolution senior trade union officers and perhaps the Disputes Committee of the TUC. Chapters One, two, and Three describe, respectively, how officers, members, and groups of members contribute to inter-union membership conflict* Chapter Four concentrates on a specific type of inter-union dispute - the promotion dispute. Chapter Five is concerned with the institutional premium placed by trad© unions on expansion, and with how that expansion often leads trade unions into controversial areas of organisation. Chapters Six and Seven focus on environmental factors which play a role in inter-union conflict. The subject of Chapter Six is collective bargaining arrangements, while Chapter Seven centres on management decision-making and on evolutionary considerations which influence and change Industries and occupations. Chapters Eight and Mine present two conventional responses to inter-union conflict - amalgamations and inter-union agreements, respectively - and analyse the extent to which they can favourably affect inter-union relations. Part II of this thesis examines Disputes Committee decision-making. As will become clear, a principle is emerging from the Committee's adjudication of transfer disputes. Whereas in the decade and a half following World War II membership transfers were not approved by the Committee, it has become increasingly true since then that where a union requests a membership transfer from another union but is refused, and where the requesting union 1) is faithful to the TUC's transfer procedures, 2) is organisationally dominant in the industrial unit concerned, and 3) is the possessor of negotiating rights in the unit, then the transfer will be approved by the Disputes Committee. Moreover, where the requesting union cannot summon up all three of these factors in support of its argument, it has happened in some cases that the Committee has found one or two of the factors to be sufficient. While no such overriding principle is emerging in organisational disputes, Disputes Committee adjudication has been fairly consistent, as will be described, in which of two or more types of competing organisational claims it has favoured in an organisational dispute. Part II begins in Chapter Ten by presenting the TUC's Rules which pertain to inter-union dispute resolution, the Disputes Principles and the procedures of the Disputes Committee. Chapter Eleven analyses Disputes Committee decisions in transfer disputes, and Chapter Twelve does the same for organisational disputes. Chapter Thirteen discusses the implementation of Disputes Committee awards, and Chapter Fourteen concludes this thesis by examining the utility and effectiveness of the Disputes Committee for purposes of resolving inter-union disputes.

This study attempts to discover the major factors which promote or hinder the growth of trade unionism among white-collar workers, particularly those employed in manufacturing Industries, in Great Britain. Chapter I simply discusses the reasons for undertaking such a study, a few of the methodological and conceptual problems which arise, as well as the nature of the techniques and the analytical framework used in the study. Chapter II is concerned with the pattern of white-collar employment in Britain and reveals how the composition of the labour force is changing. Already almost four out of ten workers are white-collar employees, and it is probable that by the 1980's they will outnumber the manual workers. Clearly, if the trade union movement is to continue as a dynamic and effective force in British society, it must recruit these white-collar workers. The extent to which the trade union movement has already done this is considered in Chapter III. In particular, it assembles the data on the dependent variable of this study - the occupational and industrial pattern of white-collar unionism in Britain. The pattern reveals that there are considerable variations in the degree of white-collar unionism from one industry and occupation to another. All the remaining chapters analyse the factors which this study considers worthy of examination in searching for an explanation of this pattern. Chapter IV considers the socio-demographie characteristics of white-collar workers. Chapter V examines the white-collar workers' economic position, while Chapter VI analyses their work situation. The role which trade unions and employers play in union growth is explored in Chapters VII and VIII respectively, while the influence of the government and the social climate is investigated in-Chapter IX, Chapter X draws the various parts of the analysis together and tries to produce a few generalisations regarding the growth of white-collar unionism. The gist of these chapters can be briefly summarised. No significant relationship was found between the aggregate pattern of white-collar unionism and any of the following factors: (a) such socio-demographic characteristics of white-collar workers as their sex, social origins, age, and status; (to) such aspects of their economic position as earnings, other terms and conditions of employment, and employment security; (e) such aspects of their work situation as the opportunities for promotion, the extent of mechanisation and automation, and the degree of proximity to unionised manual workers; and (d) such aspects of trade unions as their public image, recruitment policies, and structures. While the evidence regarding some of these factors was not sufficiently reliable to permit them to be discounted completely, it was satisfactory enough to reveal that at most they have been of negligible importance. But the gist of these chapters is not entirely negative. The aggregate pattern of white-collar unionism was found to be significantly related to the following factors: employment concentration, union recognition, and government action. The relationship between these key independent variables and between them and the dependent variable can be usefully summarised in a two-equation descriptive model. D = f (C,E) (1) R = g (D,G) (2) where D = the density of white-collar unionism; C = the degree of employment concentration; R = the degree to which employers are prepared to recognise unions representing white-collar employees; and G = the extent of government action which promotes union recognition. The first equation specifies that the density of white-collar unionism is a function of the degree of employment concentration and the degree to which employers are prepared to recognise unions representing white-collar employees. The more concentrated their employment the more likely employees are to feel the need to join trade unions because of "bureaucratisation", and the more easily trade unions can meet this need because of the economies of scale characteristic of union recruitment and administration While employment concentration is a necessary condition for the growth of white-collar unions, it is not a sufficient condition. Employers must also be prepared to recognise these unions. The greater the degree to which employers are prepared to do this the more likely white-collar employees are to join unions. For they are less likely to Jeopardise their career prospects by joining, they can more easily reconcile union membership with their "loyalty" to the company, and they will obtain a better service because their unions will be more effective in the process of job regulation. The first independent variable makes white-collar employees predisposed towards trade unions, while the second makes union membership practical and attractive. But the degree to which employers are prepared to recognise unions representing white-collar employees is to some extent dependent upon the membership density of these unions. This is why the second equation is necessary. It specifies that the degree of recognition is a function of the density of white-collar unionism and the extent of government action which promotes union recognition. Employers generally do not concede recognition to a union before it has at least some membership. The only exception to this is when employers recognise a union prior to it having obtained any membership in order to encourage its growth at the expense of other "less desirable" unions. Even in these cases, recognition is at least partly a function of membership density - that of the "less desirable" unions* But while a certain density of membership is a necessary condition for any degree of recognition to be granted, the findings of this study suggest that it is generally not a sufficient condition. The industrial strength of white-collar unions, as determined by the size of their membership and their willingness and ability to engage in industrial warfare, has generally not been sufficient in itself to force employers to concede recognition. This has also required the introduction of government policies which have made it easier for unions to exert pressure for recognition and harder for employers to resist it. The model is claimed to give an adequate explanation of the growth of aggregate white-collar unionism in Britain, and, in addition, to have some important implications for research on this subject as well as for the function of unions in modern industrial society, and the future growth of white-collar unionism.

M.Comm. / This chapter has provided the quantitative analysis into the question of trade unions affecting productivity and unit labour costs in a negative manner. We started by making the statement that investing in capital inputs usually requires the company concerned to borrow funds from a bank, against the current lending rate. Should this lending rate increase, we would expect the amount of fixed capital invested to fall and vice versa. The pattern of interest rates and gross fixed capital formation followed this orthodox theory but that of South Africa has not: where interest rates have been rising, so too has the level of fixed investment. One may therefore conclude that industries in South Africa value capital inputs highly and are prepared to pay a higher price in order to have more capital inputs in their production process. We then went on to analyse the South African motor vehicle industry and came to the conclusion that the factor inputs of capital and labour were not optimally allocated and that the industry operated at a less than efficient point. In fact, labour was being over-utilised and capital was being under-utilised. We also noted that labour productivity over the past decade had been declining: labour was more productive in 1984 than in 1993. The only way for the South African motor vehicle industry to become more internationally competitive is for it to operate more efficiently and contain costs. One of the ways in which it could do this would be to move closer to the level of optimum factor input; this will mean that both capital and labour inputs will be better allocated. More capital needs to be utilised and several thousand workers needs to be retrenched; Kleynhans estimates 24 000 to 36 000 workers (1994: 143). It is most likely to be the actions of labour unions that have caused vast numbers of unproductive workers to be employed at high wages. Any past attempt to reduce the size of the workforce has naturally met with strong criticism from the unions and this has led to strike action and work stoppages. Unfortunately, the harsh reality is that labour needs to be replaced by capital if the industry is to survive internationally. It was noted in a table comparing the average remuneration of workers in the motor vehicle industry of different countries that the seven other countries discussed all showed higher rates of remuneration than in South Africa. Since these countries all have highly competitive motor vehicle manufacturing industries, one must be led to the conclusion that the higher wages are only paid because of a high rate of labour productivity within that sector. This again sustains the argument that higher wages are not detrimental to an industrial sector, provided productivity is relatively higher than the wage increases. The next industry to be considered was the South African clothing industry. Again the analysis proved that factor inputs were not optimally allocated. It appeared that capital was over-utilised and labour was under-utilised but after testing the significance of the result, Clark (1996: 72) said that this was not necessarily true. The marginal productivity of capital indicated that capital inputs used in the production process are unproductive: this was confirmed by the fact that the marginal product of capital was negative. However, referring to table 5.3 which gave the production, capital and labour data for the industry, usage of the factor input capital seems to have remained constant. One would therefore conclude that as output has been increasing, the contribution of the factor input capital has been decreasing. Clark (1996 : 91) outlines two possible reasons for this phenomenon: firstly, depreciating exchange rates have meant that capital inputs have become more expensive and could have forced the industry to "make do" with less capital inputs and secondly, the imposition of economic sanctions meant that it was difficult to purchase and import such capital goods. A process of sub-contracting out to small and medium concerns then occurred, some of whom could not afford to service or replace existing machinery and so turn to more labour-intensive methods of clothing production. Labour inputs in the production process did make a positive contribution: this was confirmed by labour having a positive output elasticity coefficient but the actual productivity of each individual worker has fallen. In other words the reason for the positive contribution was the addition of extra labour units to production and not by each worker contributing more to the production process. The final industry that was analysed was the mining and quarrying industry. The data illustrates that the real output level is falling, as is the number of persons employed in the sector. The unit labour costs have risen enormously which suggests that fewer workers are being paid more to produce less output. Added to this is the fact that more capital inputs are being used that ten years ago and the capital to labour ratio index has been steadily increasing further suggests that some units of labour input are being replaced by units of extra capital input. Using the data in table 5.8 of the annual average growth rates, the average growth rate of the labour productivity index shows a negative pattern: in other words, labour is becoming less and less productive and consequently workers are being retrenched and more capital is being employed, even though the cost of utilising more capital in the industry is increasing the whole time.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: l. 129-133.

No description available.