Thèse - Université de Paris. / "Bibliographie": p. 407-411.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

This thesis examines four aspects of the contempt power in New Zealand. It does not, therefore, purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of contempt in all its protean forms. Rather, its aims are to assess what the law is, and why, and to consider whether it aptly describes the values of the society it purports to protect. The law of contempt has suffered from an excess of dichotomies and classifications which nowhere guarantee its clarity. The most enduring classification is that which distinguishes between criminal and civil contempts, largely on the basis of whether the sanctions which follow are punitive or coercive. Three types of criminal contempt are discussed. Contempt in the face of the court concerns the jurisdiction to punish summarily contumelious behaviour in court. It is argued that, since the summary procedure permits the imposition of sanctions without the usual trial safeguards, the contempt power ought to be limited to the removal of the contemnor from the court. Any more extensive contempt power arguably infringes the freedoms protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The law of sub judice contempt seeks to strike a balance between the competing values of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. Judicial insistence on the existence of a real risk as a matter of practical reality before the actus reus of this form of contempt is met has effectively restrained criticisms of the rule. Nevertheless, since it can penalise non-negligent practices, it is suggested that sub judice contempt should be treated as a crime of strict liability. The third form of criminal contempt, scandalising a court or judge, is said to be necessary to ensure confidence in the administration of justice. However, there is little evidence that the public perception of the judiciary would suffer through debate over the abilities of its judges. This arm of contempt ought not to be perceived as a form of judicial protectionism. For that reason, and because it arguably infringes the Bill of Rights Act 1990, it is urged that contempt through scandalising a court or judge should be abolished. The law of civil contempt is dealt with through a discussion of breaches of injunctions and undertakings. Since the sanctions which follow may serve both punitive and coercive ends the distinction between this category and the other three is regarded as incomplete. It is contended, however, that there are many similarities between criminal and civil contempts which merit their treatment as a genus. Whenever punitive sanctions are imposed (whether for a criminal or civil contempt) normal trial safeguards ought to exist. On the other hand, if enforcement of a court order is sought, such protection is inappropriate. A procedural approach to the different types of sanctions ought to rid contempt law of perplexing categorisations which fail to address the essential characteristics of the contempt power.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Paris, 1943. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Sally Hadden, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of History. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 22, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.