Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [253]-261). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

There has been much interest in assessing whether elections conform to an established standard of practice, especially in emerging democracies in the Balkans, the former Soviet Bloc, Africa, Asia, but more recently in established democracies such as the United States. Indeed, the conduct of many elections is routinely evaluated by observers from international and regional bodies and domestic and international non-governmental organisations.

When we think of “law” in a popular sense, we think of “rules” or the institutions that make or enforce those rules (legislatures, the police, courts, etc.). But where do these rules come from and what makes them legal rules? Put differently, does a rule’s status as a legal rule mean that it is sealed off from the influence of other systems of human knowledge and inquiry (like the humanities)? There are many possible answers to these questions, but the one that I am concerned to examine in my work arises from narrative, which is one of the most fundamental modes of human expression. By keeping narratives at a distance or delay, law loses (and has indeed lost) some of its essential humanity. My project is, then, an attempt to explain the relationship between law and narrative, and—in the end—to suggest ways to rehumanize law by reconnecting it to its narrative roots and certain cognates in the humanities. To do this, I retell dozens of law-stories within a theoretical framework derived from literary, legal, and political theory.

This thesis examines whether Muslims qua Muslims can regard as legitimate the demands of citizenship in a non-Muslim liberal democracy. This involves asking whether requirements such as living in and being loyal to a non-Muslim state, regarding non- Muslims as political equals with whom one might co-operate socially and politically, contributing to non-Muslim welfare and participating in non-Muslim political systems can be regarded as legitimate practices. It is an exercise in what John Rawls referred to as 'conjecture', or the attempt to examine and argue for the existence of an overlapping consensus between a liberal political conception of justice or citizenship and a particular comprehensive ethical doctrine. Chapter One examines the status of conjecture in political theory and the place of the idea of an overlapping consensus in liberal justification, followed by a proposal for a methodology for this type of comparative political theory. Chapter Two deals with the precise demands liberalism places on citizens, and the particular concerns of Muslims living in non-Muslim states. I show that before we can discuss the central liberal concerns of justifying state neutrality and individual freedoms to revise one's conception of the good, it is necessary to look at a series of questions related to Muslim belonging, loyalty and solidarity in a non-Muslim state. I then present and defend a conception of liberal citizenship in response to certain challenges and concerns of Islamic political ethics. Chapters Three through Five then deal with the range of Islamic responses to the demands of liberal citizenship as I presented them. Chapter Three considers the question of residence in a non-Muslim state and whether the most common justifications for such residence can be considered compatible with liberal conceptions of a well-ordered society. Chapter Four examines the problems of political obligation and loyalty - whether Muslims can in good faith meet their obligations of loyalty to both the global community of fellow believers and their state of citizenship. Chapter Five deals with questions of recognition and solidarity - whether Muslims can recognise non-Muslims as political equals, form relationships based on justice, contribute to their welfare and participate in a common political system. All three chapters demonstrate that very strong and authentically Islamic arguments exist for accepting all of the above demands of citizenship, many being found even in medieval works of Islamic jurisprudence. Crucially, Islamic arguments shown to support the idea of an overlapping consensus also vindicate many of the claims of Rawlsian political liberalism to be a more appealing form of liberalism to non-liberals precisely because of its abstention from claims to metaphysical truth.

Univ., Diss.--Tübingen, 2002. / Literaturverz. S. [449] - 529.

Originally presented as the author's postdoctoral Thesis--Universität Münster, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [405]-465) and index.

Following the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, Muslim nations have been placed in the spotlight of international debate; the prevailing understanding is that democracy and Islam are fundamentally incompatible. This verdict is particularly damning in light of the trend in International Law which, since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, has equated democracy with human rights. Yet, a thorough analysis of the debate, taking into account the historical and theoretical bases of liberal democracy — the cultural, legal, and political development of Islam, and the extent to which the politics of Islamic countries represents the politics of Islam — reveals that democracy and Islam are, in fact, fundamentally compatible. In practice, Islamic Law can be applied alongside developments in democratic representations and human rights, whilst popular perceptions of Islam as inhibiting development in human rights are often unfounded, as can be demonstrated by examining the case of Saudi Arabia.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Philosophie--Nancy 2, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 217-245).

Teilw. zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Habil.-Schr., 2005/06 / Literaturverz. S. [346] - 372